World Bank Document

Pakistan’s Citizens

Damage Compensation

Program (CDCP)

CASE STUDY

June 2013

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80621

PAKISTAN’S CITIZENS DAMAGE COMPENSATION PROGRAM (CDCP)

Summary

Following severe floods in 2010, the Government of Pakistan (GoP) put in place a temporary

nationwide social safety net (SSN) program that has successfully reached an estimated eight

million flood-affected people. The program has also led to the development of a SSN disaster

preparedness action plan by the GoP for future disasters and crises.

This case study looks at: the approach taken to the design and delivery of the program, which

allowed for its rapid establishment and expansion over a wide geographic area; the efficient

beneficiary registration and payment distribution system created in partnership with

commercial banks and linked to the national civil registry; and the largely effective coordination

achieved among 19 partners operating at the national, provincial, and local levels. The

challenges that arose in implementing such a massive program over a short time in vulnerability

targeting, communications and grievance processes – and the solutions found – are also

explored.

Disaster Context

In July and August 2010, during the monsoon season, Pakistan experienced the worst floods in

its history (IRIN, 2010). The floods covered all four provinces of the country (Sindh, Punjab,

Khyber Pakhtunkwa and Baluchistan), as well as the autonomous territories of Gilgit-Baltistan

and Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK). The National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA)

estimated that more than 20 million people were affected, with over 1,980 reported deaths.

Approximately 1.6 million homes were destroyed, 2.4 million hectares of crops damaged, and

both farm and non-farm livelihoods were severely affected (Multi-Cluster Rapid Humanitarian

Needs Assessment, August 2010).

More broadly, Pakistan is highly vulnerable to natural disasters, including recurrent floods,

earthquakes, landslides, cyclones, and drought. Between 1993 and 2002 alone, over 6,000

people were killed and nearly nine million affected by the impact of natural disasters (NDMA,

2012). The country experienced a major earthquake in 2005, and further major monsoonal

floods have also occurred in 2011 and 2012.

Program Overview

The Pakistan’s Citizen’s Damage Compensation Program (CDCP) is a rapid response cash grant

program. It was initially created by the GoP to provide much-needed relief to the flood-affected

population, and later continued and expanded to support their early recovery.

The CDCP builds upon the GoP’s prior experience using cash grants in crisis response. This has

included the delivery of a US$100 million cash transfer program (compensation for losses) to

survivors of the 2005 Pakistan earthquake and the provision of cash grants to people internally

displaced during the 2009 civil conflict. Considerable knowledge was gained – and systems

developed for – both the administration of such assistance and the use of more modern

delivery modalities, such as debit cards.

The CDCP did not use Pakistan's existing SSN mechanism as a vehicle for the flood recovery

program. The Benazir Income Support Program (BISP), a nationwide SSN that provides monthly

cash payments to female household heads in the poorest 20 percent of Pakistan's households

had been established in 2008

(Hunt et al, 2011), but it was not developed enough at the time

of the disaster to be used to deliver support to affected people. Instead, the federal

government worked closely with provincial governments and the National Database

Registration Authority (NADRA) to initiate a separate program.

Based on positive prior experience from the 2009 civil crisis, the GoP decided to deliver the

cash transfers through commercial banks. The selected program beneficiaries were issued Visa

direct debit cards by these banks, called Watan cards, which could be used to collect their

grants from ATM machines or deisgnated Points of Sale.

Phase I

Phase I, which ran from September 2010 to June 2011, aimed to provide quick assistance to

families who lost their homes or faced a serious threat to their wellbeing as a result of the

flood. It was funded by the GoP, which provided almost US$ 400 million in cash grants to more

than 1.62 million families across Pakistan (CDCP website, 2012).

Eligible households located in the affected areas were given a one-off cash grant in the amount

of PRK 20,000 (or approximately US$213). This amount was determined based on the funds

available to the GoP to try to cover the urgent needs of a very large flood-affected target

population. The funds helped households to cover these needs at a crucial time (PDAM, 2011),

with an evaluation of Phase I finding that families had used the grants mostly for food, health

needs, housing repair, and debt re-payment (Hunt et al, 2011). However, the amount was

insufficient for the flood-affected households to recapitalize their damaged or lost assets.

Phase II

A decision was taken to implement a second phase of the CDCP June 2011 and ends in June

2013 in order to support the recovery of affected households. The GoP provided US$100

million for Phase II, and development partners (donors) pledged approximately US$480 million

in additional funds including: USAID (US$ 190 million), DFID (US$ 100 million), and the

Government of Italy (US$ 65 million). The World Bank provided a credit of SDR 79.5 million

(US$ 125 million equivalent). The World Bank also has assisted the GOP in the design and

implementation of Phase II.

Flood-affected households, including many of those from Phase I, are being provided with cash

payments which can be used to meet any of their recovery needs, such as reconstructing their

houses, restoring their livelihoods or paying back accumulated debt.

With additional donor

The BISP replaced two prior SSN mechanisms, which had less comprehensive outreach.

The funds were initially earmarked for reconstruction only, but it was later decided to allow the beneficiaries to

choose how to spend the cash in order to give them greater flexibility.

support available, the GoP has been able to double the size of the grant to eligible households

to PRs 40,000 (around US$ 426), a more suitable amount to support recovery, which is provided

in two installments of PRK 20,000 each.

Phase II also incorporates an objective to assist the GoP in strengthening the implementation

of the CDCP, as the Phase I evaluation found many gaps in the delivery capacity of the program

– for example, in areas such as beneficiary targeting and verification, appeals/grievances

processing, monitoring and evaluation, and communications. Additionally, Phase II gives

specific attention to applying the learning experiences from the CDCP to planning for future

disaster/crisis responses.

Key Program Features

Policy and Institutional Framework

A major lesson learned by the CDCP has been the importance of assessing the capacity of

implementing agencies to successfully deliver a large-scale SSN disaster response program. Not

only do human resources have to be adequately scaled up, but the implementing partners also

must be provided with the skills and information to perform their roles effectively.

Operational Context

The GoP faced the enormous challenge of mounting a large-scale SSN that would not only

respond to the early recovery needs of more than eight million people spread throughout the

country, but also do this quickly. Experience has shown that usually the faster the support can

reach the poor and vulnerable affected by a disaster, the less likely they are to resort to harmful

negative coping strategies (World Bank, 2009). Access issues in many locations – due to the

floodwaters, remoteness, difficult terrain or other factors – further complicated the situation.

Added to this, disaster response is highly devolved in Pakistan, with the provincial governments

playing a key role. While the 2006 National Disaster Management Ordinance had established

the foundation for a more coordinated response to national scale disasters, including the

creation of a National Disaster Management Council (NDMC) and National Disaster

Management Authority (NDMA), the related 2010 National Disaster Management Act was not

passed until December, 2010. Thus, many structural aspects of multi-level, multi-agency

disaster response coordination were still at an early stage of development.

It was clear to decision-makers that substantial collaboration and coordination between

multiple levels of government and multiple partners would be required in order to successfully

implement the CDCP. Under considerable public pressure to deliver assistance to the flood

survivors, the GoP had very limited time to develop a workable program implementation

structure.

Policy/Institutional Structure

The pragmatic approach taken was to work largely through the organizational structure

established for the broader national flood response, combined with other public/private sector

and international partners with previous experience in cash transfer schemes (e.g. commercial

banks, International Organization for Migration, etc.). In total, 19 different institutions

participated in the implementation of the CDCP (see Figure 1 on CDCP institutional

implementation arrangements). The specific working relationships have developed and

evolved over time – with learning along the way about what works and what does not – as

experience has been built in delivering one of the world's largest post-disaster early recovery

SSNs to date.

Figure 1. CDCP Institutional Implementation Arrangements

Source: Cabinet Division, GoP

Policy. Four key bodies/agencies are responsible for the broad oversight and policy direction of

the CDCP. These include: the Council of Common Interest (CCI), comprised of the Prime

Minister and all four Chief Ministers of Provinces; the National Oversight Disaster Management

Council (NODMC), an independent body created to oversee all flood response related activities;

the Cabinet Division, Prime Minister's Secretariat which facilitates federal, provincial and

district level coordination; and the Ministry of Finance (MoF), responsible for financial

oversight, including the transfer of GoP and donor funds to the CDCP's commercial bank

partners.

Implementation

Federal. At the national level, there are three key implementing agencies. The Cabinet

Division, Emergency Relief Cell, through its CDCP unit, manages policy and coordination issues

Development

Partners

Council of Common

Interest

Cabinet Division

NODMC

Ministry of Finance

NADRA

(Implementation

Entity)

Partner Commercial

Banks

Policy Level

NADRA Provincial

Office

Federal Level

Bank Provincial

Offices

PDMA

Provincial Level

NADRA

Local/Mobile

Registration Centre

Bank

POS/ATM

Facility

District Coordination

Office

District/ Local Level

NDMA

Cabinet Division ERC

(Implementation

Agency)

including: beneficiary coverage, eligibility criteria and benefit levels; program implementation

mechanisms; and management of GoP/donor funds.

Three Partner Commercial Banks (PCBs) are responsible for delivering the cash transfer

payments to the CDCP's beneficiaries. The criteria for their selection included the spread of

networks (especially at the provincial level) and previous experience in operating cash transfers

to unbanked families/people. For example, one of the selected banks had previous experience

from the GoP's 2009 IDP crisis response and the BISP. The PCBs (UBL, HBL, and Al-Falah) were

selected through an internal GOP consultative process, rather than through a formal

competitive bidding process, due to time constraints.

The National Database Registration Authority (NADRA) is the CDCP's technical execution

agency. NADRA is an independent corporate body, responsible for Pakistan's civil registration

system, and has been internationally recognized for its work. NADRA was selected for this role

due to its high quality pre-existing national database, large and strong staff capacity, effective

use of international financial reporting standards, and prior experience supporting cash transfer

programs following the 2005 earthquake and 2009 Internally Displaced People (IDP) crisis.

NADRA also supported the BISP to develop and populate the database for its national

household poverty survey (NADRA Technologies Ltd, u.d.).

NADRA receives, aggregates and verifies all beneficiary data at the national level, producing and

disseminating the beneficiary lists. At the provincial level, NADRA coordinates with the PCBs in

the production and delivery of the Watan cards. NADRA also provides the PCBs with

beneficiary lists and information about payment dates and amounts. NADRA developed the

program's operational procedures, which its shares with the provincial governments and PCBs,

coordinating with them on their respective roles. NADRA further coordinates with the

provincial and local authorities to set up data collection centers and to follow up on grievances

related to updating of beneficiary information (which can affect CDCP eligibility status).

Provincial/District/Local. At these levels, the Provincial Disaster Management Authorities

(PDMAs), the State Management Authority (AJK), the District Coordination Offices (DCOs), the

PCBs’ provincial offices and NADRA's provincial/local offices are the key implementing partners.

The district and local level government counterparts, supported by the DCOs, are responsible

for: mobilizing and scheduling beneficiaries to go to NADRA registration centers; providing sites

and security for local registration centers and points-of-sale (places to collect the cash transfer

that are set up locally by the PCBs); and carrying out beneficiary verification and grievance

redress processes (forwarded to the PDMAs for final approval). The PDMAs work closely with

the DCOs and other district/local authorities in these areas. The PDMAs have technical links

with the NDMA, however, they report directly to the provincial governments.

Since 2000, NADRA has created a civil registration system and issued secure Computerized National Identity

Cards (CNIC) to over 96 million of Pakistan's 150 million citizens in -country and abroad. Its National Data

Warehouse hosts the data of these citizens and runs various transaction processing, business intelligence and

decision support applications. NADRA employs more than 11,000 technical and management personnel. It has

developed 365 multi-biometric Interactive Registration Centers and deployed 189 mobile vans to register citizens

living in remote areas. It has received international awards for its e-passport services (NADRA Technologies, u.d.).

Institutional Capacity

Phase I: The immense scope and scale of the CDCP, involving a number of government agencies

that were carrying multiple flood response responsibilities, initially stretched the capacity of the

implementing partners to – and in some cases, beyond – their limits. For instance, some

PDMAs had only recently been created and soon became overwhelmed by the needs they

faced. This contributed to early issues in beneficiary targeting and

communications/coordination, as well as bottlenecks in grievance processes. It should be

noted, though, that the operational context of the flood response would have tested the

capacities of any government in the world.

Phase II: The Phase I evaluation, commissioned by the GoP and the World Bank to guide the

approach to Phase II, identified a number of capacity gaps. The Phase II capacity development

focus has included, among other things, the provision by the World Bank of: technical support

to the Cabinet Division for its coordination and policy preparation functions; improved staffing

and office facilities to strengthen the financial management capacity of the ERC (leading to

creation of the CDCP Unit); technical support to the DCOs' grievance process and to generate

the data required to support the resolution of grievance cases; and technical assistance,

training, and hardware/software for the PDMAs especially the newer PDMAs in Sindh and

Balochistan. The capacity development assistance has led to notable improvements in program

delivery, as captured in the CDCP's progress reports.

Targeting

A number of important lessons have been learned about efficient and effective targeting

approaches at scale over the course of implementation of the CDCP, including:

• Geographic and housing damage criteria need to be combined with poverty and

vulnerability criteria in order to achieve a balance between coverage of those most affected

by the disaster and coverage of those least able to cope with the disaster's impacts.

• Independent third party verification helps to reduce targeting errors.

• It is essential to incorporate robust grievance/appeal systems into disaster relief and

recovery programs to correct the targeting errors that will inevitably occur when trying to

cover a large affected population.

• An adequate level of human resources and technical capacity (surge capacity) needs to be

put in place to administer the beneficiary selection/verification system.

Phase I

Targeting Methods. The overall target population for the CDCP is flood-affected families, as

defined by the GoP.

For Phase I, the provincial and regional governments used two different

A family consists of married spouse(s) with unmarried children. When two people get married, they fill out a form

requesting the change of status, then NADRA issues a new family number to husband and wife and the CNIC is

updated with that number. The same number will be used for their children until they in turn get married and

decide to change their status. If a husband decides to have a second wife, when the change of status is requested,

the new wife takes the husband’s family number. If men or women never get married, they will keep the same

family number permanently, since they remain members of their original families.

targeting methods to identify CDCP beneficiaries within this population. A geographical

targeting system was used in Punjab, Sindh and Balochistan. Entire communities were

identified as calamity affected, through notification by each province of the flood-affected

Areas (determined through a visual calculation that at least 50 percent

of houses or crops were

lost). In Khyber Pakhtunkwa (KP) province and the autonomous territories of Gilgit Baltistan

and AJK, families living in flood affected housing units, rather than communities, were

identified as flood-affected. This was based upon a Rapid Housing Survey.

The main reason for the different targeting approaches by the provinces was one of access.

Khyber Pakhtunkwa, a mountainous province, had experienced flash flooding; the waters

drained away after a day or so, allowing rapid access by the housing damage surveyors. The

other provinces had experienced more slow-onset flooding, as the affected districts lay mostly

on a floodplain; they were still flooded months after the initial river overflow. Access to the

flooded districts was limited, and also those communities that were directly affected were

more easily identifiable from a distance. Additionally, the PDMA in KP had greater capacity to

conduct housing surveys than their equivalents in other provinces, due to previous earthquake

response experience.

The Phase I eligibility criteria also required the head of each potential beneficiary family to have

a Computerized National Identity Card (CNIC), issued by NADRA, and a declared address in the

areas classified as affected by the PDMAs. NADRA generated a list of all family heads with

addresses in the affected areas using its own dataset in Punjab, Sindh and parts of Balochistan

while KP, AJK, Gilgit-Baltistan and the rest of Balochistan provided lists of CNICs on the basis of

the provincial surveys.

Beneficiary Exclusion/Inclusion Issues

. The findings from the Phase I evaluation suggested that

for every 100 potentially eligible family heads, only 43 had received the Watan card; 41 of

these would have been on the original beneficiary list, and two would have come through the

grievance process. A further 33 would have been unsuccessful in the grievance process (Hunt

et al, 2011). While these figures are only crude estimates based on a small sample of

beneficiaries, and possibly unrepresentative of the broader population

, it became apparent

during Phase I that some gaps were emerging in beneficiary coverage. There were a number of

contributing factors to this situation.

Firstly, the geographic targeting system used in three provinces was vulnerable to inclusion or

exclusion errors. Whilst it could be implemented very quickly, an important consideration

during an emergency relief response, it missed directly affected families living within

communities where less than 50 percent of the housing was damaged or destroyed. At the

same time, families which may not have experienced housing damage were eligible for support

This requirement was lowered to 40 percent in Punjab.

Inclusion error refers to the inclusion of ineligible individuals in a program due to inaccurate eligibility

specification, elite capture or other factors – also known as “leakage”. Exclusion error refers to the exclusion of

eligible individuals from a program – also known as under-coverage (Van Domelen, 2007).

Contextual factors limited the evaluation to a rapid assessment methodology which did not allow for the use of

statistically representative sampling methods. The criteria used to make the calculations also were not stated.

if they lived in a community determined to have 50 percent or more of housing damaged or

destroyed.

Secondly, the Rapid Housing Survey approach used in KP and the autonomous regions also had

some strengths and limitations. While it took longer to identify those affected, no community

was excluded from receiving the Phase I cash transfer. However, for those families living in

housing units that were inadvertantly missed by the surveys, there was no grievance

mechanism in place to allow them to become beneficiaries, regardless of the severity of their

exposure to the flooding. Additionally, the surveys were carried out by local “notables”

(leaders/authority figures), together with the District Administration officials, under the

direction of the provincial authorities. As these individuals usually were not engineers, they

looked for general and obvious signs of damage as a proxy for flood impacts – this increased the

possibility of exclusion errors.

Finally, the beneficiary selection and verification process proved to be lengthy and

cumbersome, particularly for those who had lost the documentation necessary for verification

either prior to, or during, the floods. The process was also affected by capacity limitations at

the DA level and a lack of communication between policy makers and implementers.

The requirement to possess a national identity card can potentially exclude some poor and

vulnerable groups, as they are the least likely to possess one. In response to this concern,

NADRA went to great effort to provide new CNICs to flood-affected people, issuing more than

400,000 in the four provinces. Additionally, those who were excluded due to lack of a CNIC

could apply for a CNIC and inclusion in the program through the case management system

(Hunt et al, 2011). The Phase I evaluation found that few people had been excluded from the

CDCP due to not possessing a CNIC (Hunt et al, 2011). This approach was retained in Phase II,

with a similar finding in the baseline report for the Phase II impact evaluation, which is currently

underway (O'Leary et al, July 2012).

Phase II

Targeting Methods. Measures were taken from the outset of Phase II to address the targeting

issues identified during Phase I. These changes meant not all Phase I beneficiaries were eligible

for Phase II support, and some people excluded from Phase I were included in Phase II.

Housing damage was adopted as a proxy indicator for livelihoods losses nationwide, rather than

the geographic targeting method previously used in Balochistan, Punjab and Sindh. This meant

that the existing Rapid Housing Surveys could be utilised for targeting in KP and the

autonomous regions, while new surveys needed to be conducted in the other three provinces.

Each province used different definitions of household flood damage (O'Leary et al, July 2012).

The beneficiary eligibility criteria adjusted from a focus on families to households (NADRA,

u.d.), which is more broadly defined in the socio-cultural context of Pakistan.

For both phases,

the CCI took a decision to provide the transfers to household heads, rather than to family

The GOP defines a household as consisting of all people living under a common roof and sharing a kitchen.

Typically, it consists of a “core” family plus extended family members, but may also include unrelated individuals

such as close family friends. However, each province used its own definition of household (NADRA, u.d.).

heads. The CDCP's 2012 impact evaluation is investigating whether this has had any impact on

intra-household resource distribution outcomes (World Bank staff, 2012).

The eligibility criteria were further refined to filter out the better off and to include particularly

vulnerable households through the addition of two new eligibility criteria (NADRA, u.d):

1. Well off households are excluded from receiving the Phase II transfer. Wealth is measured

by a combination of proxies such as those having bank accounts in international banks,

frequent international travel activities and executive jobs.

2. All legitimate vulnerable beneficiaries, defined as female and disabled headed families in

NADRA's CNIC database included in Phase I, but not captured as head of household through

the [housing damage] survey will, de facto, become a Phase II beneficiary.

The vulnerability characteristics of flood-affected families/households was profiled by analyzing

a random sample from NADRA’s flood registration database and linking this with information

on gender, disability and educational levels in the civil registration database (GoP, July 2012).

Additionally, the outstanding legitimate grievance claims from Phase I were settled and

considerable resources have been invested in strengthening the GoP's communications,

grievance redress and policy and implementation capacities at different levels.

Figure 2. CDCP Operational Model

Source: Pakistan Case Study, World Bank, 2013

Verification Processes. The GoP and a development partner (USAID) also introduced

independent Third Party Verification (TPV) of the selected beneficiaries during Phase II.

USAID

contracted the Rural Support Program Network (RSPN), a national NGO, to conduct the TPV;

twelve RSPN partners in 108 districts (representing 70 percent of Pakistan) participated. If the

TPV found substantial discrepancies between the original list and the spot checked list, the area

was to be resurveyed by the authorities, in accordance with the selection parameters defined in

the CDCP's Operational Manual.

The verification process determined if: 1) the correct person had been identified as a

beneficiary; 2) the person was the owner of the house surveyed; and 3) the house presented

the level of damage that would justify its inclusion, according to the provincial definition. The

damage assessment was supported by photographs of the original survey certified by locally

recognized authorities (as some houses had been reconstructed by the time of verification).

Verification was done using statistical sampling methods, and consisted of examining 196

households per district. Districts were considered correctly surveyed if less than 10 percent of

the households visited had been incorrectly targeted in the original survey; if a 10-30 percent

discrepancy was found, re-sampling was performed of 50-100 households (according to the

district's population size). If the discrepancy was greater than 30 percent, the district was

rejected as incorrectly surveyed; if the overall discrepancy of the original and additional

samples taken together is less than 15 percent, the survey results are accepted as valid.

Out of 80 districts, only seven were rejected, primarily due to capacity limitations of the

provincial authorities, and had to be resurveyed. These results indicate that the original

sampling, which was carried out by the District Administrations (DAs), was largely correctly

done in terms of minimizing inclusion errors - relieving concerns about potential malpractice at

this level. Notably, the DA’s knew beforehand that their sampling would be independently

verified, which may have encouraged greater attention to accuracy.

Beneficiary Exclusion/Inclusion Issues. The findings of the baseline survey recently completed

for the Phase II impact evaluation (underway at the time of preparation of the case study)

suggest that Phase II has been reasonably successful in targeting the most severely affected and

the most vulnerable households (i.e., the poorest and least educated) in the four provinces,

with the exception of Balochistan. The coverage of female and disabled-headed households

also has increased in Phase II by over 14 percent from Phase I - these beneficiaries represented

one fifth of the CDCP's total caseload in June 2012 (GOP, July 2012).

The baseline survey also has highlighted the importance of the measures taken to strengthen

beneficiary grievance processes. While inclusion errors have been estimated at a rate of 14

percent, exclusion errors are estimated at a high 61 percent (as the CDCP's TPV processes

focused only on the assessment of lists provided by the District Administrations, it could not

directly identify broader errors of exclusion from these lists). However, these figures were

USAID Assessment and Strengthening Program website: http://asp.org.pk/Operations/tpv_cdcp.html

(27/11/2012).

Although the baseline study found indications that some female-headed households may still face barriers to

becoming a beneficiary, while being marginally less flood-affected than male-headed households (O'Leary et al,

July 2012).

compiled before households had been notified of the results of third party verification, hence

before the commencement of any grievance processes. The CDCP's comprehensive grievance

mechanism is expected to address this problem, decreasing exclusion errors to an estimated 37

percent of flood-affected households (O'Leary et al, July 2012). The impact evaluation is further

assessing the contributing factors to the CDCP's exclusion errors.

Beneficiary Registration and Payment

The CDCP offers a model of how to establish an efficient decentralized beneficiary registration

system for a very large number of clients over a widespread geographic area. By the end of

Phase I, more than 1.6 million families had been enrolled, and RPs 33 billion (US$ 374 million)

was distributed (CDCP website, 2012). A further 874,000 Watan cards have been issued and

nearly RPs 31.9 billion (US$ 337.6 million) disbursed during Phase II up to June 2012 (GoP,

2012). This is an impressive logistical and administrative achievement.

The main areas for potential refinement in future disaster responses include exploration of: the

possibilities to provide mobile banking services for those with restricted mobility or living in

isolated places; and safe/feasible systems for the replenishment of cash in more remotely

based ATMs and Points of Sale.

Beneficiary Registration

Over the course of Phases I and II, NADRA established 101 CDCP local offices covering all of the

flood-affected districts, named Watan Card Facilitation Centers (WCFCs). The WCFCs serve as a

'one stop shop,' where the beneficiaries are enrolled, register complaints/grievances and often

receive their payments via a Point of Sale machine. Biometric screening

is used to verify the

beneficiaries against their CNICs to ensure they are not fraudulently claiming. They are then

registered and issued with a Watan card (see Figure 2). This can be used at the Point Of Sale

desk or any PCB's ATM. In certain districts, the placement of a cash desk at the WCFC (ie on-

site cash storage) was deemed a security risk and payments have been processed at a local

bank branch, usually one-two km away from the WCFC.

Biometric screening is the matching of physical characteristics of an individual, in this case fingerprints and facial

images, to computerized databases linking these physical characteristics to information about the individual,

allowing for their precise identification.

Figure 3. Beneficiary Registration Process

Source: NADRA

Payment System

Overall, the payment process has operated efficiently, and the CDCP has created an

opportunity to bring hundreds of thousands of people into the formal banking system for the

first time. For example, the Phase I evaluation found that all beneficiaries interviewed who had

received a Watan card were able to withdraw fully their grant. Over 60 percent of those

interviewed said they found using the card “very easy” or “quite easy,” 96.3 percent said they

would prefer to receive any future funds through the card, and virtually all still possessed their

WATAN card. Around 70 percent expressed interest in converting their Watan account into a

permanent savings account, an interest shared by the PCBs (Hunt et al, 2011).

The accessibility of the communities to the WCFCs and/or banks varies greatly across the

country, with the coverage of ATMs more sparse in remote rural areas (NDMA, 2011). This has

increased the transaction cost for beneficiaries living in these areas (Hunt et al 2011). As the

Watan card took two days to activate, for security reasons, many beneficiaries also had to

make a follow up trip to the WCFC or local bank branch. On average, during Phase I, people

had to travel 30.4 km (return trip) to withdraw funds, which took an average of 2.3 hours and

cost PRs 283.9 (Hunt et al 2011). According to World Bank staff, in many cases, the local

government authorities assisted remotely-based beneficiaries with transport during both

Phases I and II.

Some security problems arose early in Phase I when large numbers of beneficiaries showed up

at the WCFCs to claim their benefits. For Phase II, staggered payment days, including gender-

specific and/or disabled population-specific payment days, were programmed to better manage

the beneficiary flow. The PCBs also experienced congestion at many ATMs and difficulties

replenishing them in more remote sites (Hunt et al, 2011).

Overall, the CDCP has an impressively low rate of technical and corruption issues for a payment

system covering such a large number of beneficiaries. During both Phases I and II, only isolated

instances have been reported of beneficiaries not being able to collect their cash transfers (e.g.

technical issues, third party theft, etc.) or being asked to pay bribes (Hunt et al, 2011; GoP,

2012). The PCBs operate a beneficiary payment complaint system that includes dedicated

offices and hotlines (e.g., to deal with lost Watan Cards, forgotten PIN numbers, etc.). This is

especially important for beneficiaries without previous experience of using ATMs, estimated at

65 percent in a 2012 nationwide survey conducted by the International Organisation for

Migration (IOM), a communications partner of the program (IOM, 2012b). An extensive public

information campaign also has been carried out during Phase II, in coordination with that of

NADRA/PDMAs to provide guidance about the processes, including a focus on improving the

financial literacy of the beneficiaries (GOP, 2012).

Grievances/Complaints

The comprehensive beneficiary grievance process and the improvements made to it over time

have made an important contribution to the targeting outcomes of the CDCP. For example, it is

contributing to reducing beneficiary exclusion errors in Phase II by an estimated 24 percent if

the current level of 40 percent approval of appeals cases continues (O'Leary et al, July 2012).

Management of the grievance process has been the biggest challenge faced throughout

implementation of the CDCP. The caseload of eligibility-related appeals has been large and the

rate of case resolution has been relatively slow. For example, as at June 2012, 795,117

eligibility-related appeals had been logged in Phase II, out of which 203,553 (25.6 percent) had

been resolved at the district level, with 118, 830 awaiting final acceptance by NADRA (15

percent). On the other hand, the number of complaints filed has been very low (4,554) for a

program of this size (GoP, 2012). The December 2012 figures, which record a total of more

than 1.08 million appeals lodged, also have indicated improvement in the appeals process, with

48 percent of cases resolved at the district level (GoP, forthcoming).

The lessons learned by the CDCP have related to: ensuring adequate human resource capacity,

training/skills and inter-agency communications to administer the system; making the system

as simple and easy to navigate as possible; and investing sufficiently in beneficiary

communications.

Phase I: The CDCP established a multi-agency and multi-level grievance process, with three

steams: updates, complaints, and appeals. At the local level, grievance and complaints redress

desks were put in place at the WCFCs, run by NADRA and the DCOs; these were operational in

87 out of 101 WCFCs by the start of Phase II. The role of the redress desks has been to: log

eligibility-related grievances, complaints about service delivery, and grievances related to

updating of the CNIC information, as this can affect eligibility (e.g., changed marital status,

death of household head, etc.).

Different partners were made responsible for the resolution of complaints against service

providers, depending on the nature of the complaint. For instance, NADRA has overall

responsibility for updating the CNIC information and has set up public telephone hotlines to

support this work, in addition to the services provided by the redress desks. The PCBs utilize

their own CDCP information and complaints services to resolve payment-related issues.

For program eligibility issues, there are a number of agencies which have been involved since

Phase I. Flood-affected families who think they have been wrongfully excluded from the CDCP

eligibility list can lodge an appeal at the WCFC grievance counter. If appropriate, the appeal is

forwarded to a District Review Committee (DRC) for resolution. The DRC reviews the cases,

investigates the validity of the claims, and then conveys its recommendations to Provincial

Appeals Secretariats located within the PDMAs. The Secretariats make the final decision on the

cases, which are then forwarded to NADRA for final cross-checking against the eligibility criteria

and entry into its database.

The human, technical and financial capacity that would be required to administer the grievance

system was under-estimated during Phase I (GoP, 2012), as the GoP had no prior experience of

operating a post-disaster SSN of this magnitude. Additionally, the grievance process proved to

be lengthy and cumbersome, and the communications among the service providers – and

between the service providers and flood-affected people – were insufficient. This resulted in

confusion and difficulty both for those administering the system and those trying to access it.

Furthermore, it gave local administrative officers considerable power, leading to some

inappropriate behavior (Hunt et al, 2011). All of these factors have contributed to continued

delays in resolving grievance cases and likely to the number of cases themselves over both

phases of the CDCP.

During Phase II, a number of actions have been taken to strengthen the grievance process and

resolve the backlog of cases. The District Review Committees (DRC) have been established to

resolve grievances, as a body of respected individuals who are independent of the selection

process and possible vested political interests; the DRCs fall under the responsibility of the

District Administrations and each is supported by a NADRA data entry expert. The focus on

grievance mechanisms has been increased in communications campaigns with stakeholders.

The CDCP has also provided training and technical support at the district and provincial levels.

The capacity of key service providers has improved, but still remains variable and stretched in

some places – particularly given the high volume of appeals generated due to targeting errors.

New initiatives continue to be introduced into the CDCP, such as performance-based incentives

programs for the DRCs (GoP, 2012).

Communications

The CDCP has invested a considerable amount of thought and attention into the development

of effective beneficiary communication systems at scale, despite difficulties experienced along

the way. The GoP has worked with experienced partners and has gradually improved its

outreach in this area, building from the lessons learned during Phase I about the importance of

ensuring that: locally appropriate and accessible communication channels are selected, capacity

exists to deliver and receive communications messages and materials at all levels, and that the

messaging is clear and consistent across all audiences. A 2012 survey of flood-affected

communities by IOM found that the CDCP program had the most widely circulated information,

reaching 68 percent of the population (IOM, 2012b).

Phase I:

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) was engaged by the GoP to provide

information to the public on the various programs and services available for flood survivors

during Phase I,

with DFID providing bilateral funding. IOM prepared, field-tested and refined

a set of answers to “Frequently asked Questions” (FAQs) about the CDCP, with technical

support from NADRA. IOM also developed radio campaigns,

some printed material, and FAQ

fliers. It stationed two information officers in each of 25 flood-affected districts where the

caseload was larger than 25000, with one based at the WCFC and the other conducting

community/household visits (IOM, 2012b).

The information officers included female staff to

hold separate meetings with female beneficiaries (Field interviews, 2012). IOM also conducted

five provincial workshops with NGOs, CBOs and other organizations which highlighted key

communication issues such as: beneficiary financial literacy, getting information to remote

areas, and increasing the access of the elderly, women and disabled to WCF services (IOM,

2012b).

Due to the low literacy rates of the rural population, direct face-to-face communication with

beneficiaries was used extensively. IOM employed its pre-existing approach of forming

“humanitarian field teams”, typically paid local representatives selected from the communities

and trained by IOM in community mobilization techniques. The teams initially conducted CDCP

awareness-raising sessions in the targeted villages, including separate consultations with men

and women. They are complemented by “human networks” – a group of at least five people

per village who can read and write an SMS. These networks are trained to share SMS messages

through informal channels (e.g., mosque announcements, word-of-mouth, etc.). The

humanitarian field team communicates important information via the human network, and the

network informs the field team of important messages or queries from the beneficiaries. If a

particular query is applicable to the wider population, it is sent out as a mass message.

Despite these considerable efforts at community outreach, problems arose. A large quantity of

public information materials was produced, but the dissemination of these products appears to

have been limited at sub-district levels, possibly reflecting limited capacity at these levels (Hunt

et al, 2011). The phase I evaluation could not identify a clear strategy for the delivery of these

communication products, either to the end-users or to the implementing stakeholders,

particularly at district and local levels (the urgency of the initial emergency response did not

allow enough time for the development of a full strategy). Most information that was spread

by word-of-mouth through the human networks also had led to mixed messages. This situation

contributed to confusion among both program administrators and the potential beneficiaries,

particularly with regards to registration and grievance procedures (Hunt et al, 2011).

IOM had prior experience in this area, having worked with 3 million IDPs during the 2009 IDP crisis.

Radio Pakistan estimates that its radio network covers 98 percent of the country's population

(http://www.radio.gov.pk/marketing

, viewed 27/11/2012).

In two other districts, where the population is under 25,000, only one information officer has been provided.

Phase II:

As a result of this experience, and the less pressurized circumstances after the immediate

emergency response had been delivered, a formal Communications Strategy was developed for

Phase II by NADRA and Cabinet. The World Bank provided specialized technical support to this

process, including the incorporation of a focus on the design and provision of appropriate

communication materials for each stakeholder, while encouraging innovative and locally

appropriate interventions to reach the beneficiary population. The Strategy has three

components: internal training/briefing to ensure a coherent understanding of all aspects of the

CDCP at all levels among the stakeholders; beneficiary awareness raising through appropriate

local media and local government/institutions; and public awareness activities for the general

public, media, academia, donors, politicians, and civil society nationally.

IOM's key supporting role has continued during Phase II with DFID and World Bank financing. A

DFID-funded IOM call center in Islamabad also was established during Phase II that functions as

a hotline to provide information on the CDCP program and procedures, and SMS messaging has

been used to provide information on beneficiary status given the high prevalence of mobile

phone use in Pakistan.

Program reporting has indicated improved knowledge levels/clarity of

understanding among service providers and beneficiaries as a result of all of these efforts.

IOM also conducted a major study in early 2012 to identify lessons learned and best practices

for future emergencies. Some interesting findings include: the need for financial literacy

training to be provided directly to beneficiaries, rather than through pictorial banners (IOM,

2012a);for greater promotion of call center use among a population with reasonable mobile

phone access; and use of an integrated-voice-response system for less literate beneficiaries to

track the status of their cases (IOM, 2012b). Further studies are also planned by the CDCP on

word-of-mouth communications issues in order to better inform future programming (GoP,

2012).

Monitoring, Evaluation and Accountability

The CDCP's system for monitoring and evaluation (M&E) has provided useful information to

guide the program's progress and to identify implementation issues that require attention. The

Management Information System (MIS) put in place provides efficient tracking of progress and

bottlenecks in rolling out the cash transfer assistance and resolving grievances/appeals, with

issues brought to the attention of decision-makers on a regular basis. This combined with a

range of internal and external M&E, audit and feedback mechanisms developed over Phases I

and II has fostered a climate of continuous improvement within the program – as well as

contributing to low reported incidences of fraud.

Nearly 72 percent of CDCP beneficiary households surveyed by IOM in 2012 owned at least one mobile phone

(IOM, 2012b).

Monitoring

The CDCP has a monitoring framework and follows an annual monitoring plan that is approved

by its governance structures. Monitoring is carried out through various internal and external

channels. NADRA and the Cabinet Division undertake field level monitoring while an

independent international audit firm conducts external operational audits of all the institutions

involved in implementation of the program. The CDCP's MIS is also an important program

monitoring mechanism. It was developed during Phase I, and was partly manual (e.g., at local

levels), but has been fully computerized during Phase II.

The MIS is the system through which all information on targeting, enrollment, payments and

grievances is gathered and processed. It combines the Cabinet Division's financial records of

disbursements and bank reconciliations with NADRA's national civil registry-linked beneficiary

tracking system. The Monitoring Module of the MIS produces lists of indicators which are used

to develop a variety of regular reports at different geographic and managerial levels. Teams of

Field Monitoring Officers are trained and equipped to generate the data that underpins this

work. The Director for Monitoring and Evaluation ensures that these monitoring reports are

discussed with the relevant stakeholders in order to take timely corrective action.

Some particularly interesting features of the MIS are: the system can generate alerts to trigger

important grievance redress procedures; its indicator lists for reporting can be made available

to all stakeholders in formats that are suited to their level of accessibility (e.g., printed or

online); and the operational audit includes process monitoring, with feedback provided

fortnightly to NADRA and the Cabinet Division and recorded in the MIS (Field interviews, 2012).

Financial Management

The Phase I evaluation found the overall fraud level low in the CDCP's beneficiary identification,

grievance and payment processes (Hunt et al, 2011), and there have only been a small number

of reported cases of beneficiary misinformation leading to fraud in Phase II (GoP, 2012). Both

findings indicate that the system put in place has been functioning effectively.

The CDCP Operational Manual, approved by the CCI, defines the policies and guidelines for

transparent and accountable program/financial management and audit, including funds flow

control arrangements and procedures. The program is both internally and externally audited.

The Cabinet Division appoints staff to conduct internal audits, while the program is externally

audited by the Auditor General’s office. The internal audit assesses whether internal

management controls are aligned with program objectives and the Operational Manual. The

external audit certifies whether the program's accounts are being maintained according to

internationally recognized standards endorsed by the GoP, as well as reporting on the strength

of internal financial controls.

The CDCP stakeholders interviewed for the case study considered the external audits, both

operational and financial, a particularly good mechanism for controlling corruption and

identifying financial gaps or bottlenecks.

Social Accountability and Transparency

The help desks and phone hotlines put in place by NADRA/PCBs play a key role in gathering

feedback from beneficiaries and the broader flood-affected population. NADRA also operates a

CDCP website on which the eligibility criteria and beneficiary lists are published (more basic

hard copy notices are posted in villages), along with an extensively used SMS enquiry/response

system. Moreover, the inclusion of community members on the DRCs is an important

mechanism through which the CDCP holds its targeting system open to local public scrutiny.

The early provision of information to beneficiaries on potential fraud/malpractice is considered

a key feature to build into communications campaigns for future programs (GoP, 2012).

Evaluation

An independent evaluation was carried out at the end of Phase I which provided timely advice

to inform the design and implementation of Phase II, and a Mid-Term Review Workshop also

has contributed to the continuous learning and improvement of program delivery during Phase

II. An impact evaluation of PHASE II is being conducted during 2012.

Disaster Preparedness and Program Continuity

Pakistan's experience highlights the real challenges that governments can face when trying to

provide post-disaster support on a large scale. If limited resources are spread as far as possible

across the largest number of affected people, this may be publicly perceived as more equitable,

but it can lead to the inclusion of some in lesser need and the exclusion of some with greater

need. Conversely, setting up a beneficiary targeting system that is sensitive to different

forms/levels of vulnerability carries costs to administrative speed and efficiency. Regardless of

the targeting system used, the management of a large-scale response also requires levels of

administrative, financial and technical support beyond normal programming. This is needed to

establish and implement fast and efficient mechanisms for communicating with disaster-

affected people, selecting and registering beneficiaries, disbursing assistance, managing

grievances and ensuring adequate fiduciary/operational monitoring and control.

Good disaster preparedness can make a significant difference to the speed and quality of a

response (World Bank/United Nations 2010). A World Bank meta-evaluation further found that

countries with adequate SSN systems already in place are able to respond more effectively to

protect the poor and support recovery from shocks (IEG-World Bank/IFC/MIGA, 2010).

The CDCP has supported the GoP's decision to strengthen its preparedness for post-disaster

SSN programming, with the development of an Action Plan for Early Recovery in Future

Disasters (through Cash Transfers) in 2012. The Plan outlines the institutional framework for

the deployment of a SSN/cash transfer program framework in response to future natural

disasters or civil crises. The framework has been developed based on the experience of the

CDCP and previous post-disaster/crisis SSN programs. It includes strategies for mapping and

building implementation capacities among government stakeholders at all levels, conducting

contingency planning and simulation exercises, pre-identifying banking partners and signing

standing agreements, as well as funding and donor coordination (Harvey et al, 2012). This is

The CDCP Operational Manual also encourages one-two female members on each DRC.

one of the first comprehensive national SSN disaster preparedness/contingency plans to be

developed in the world with a focus on rapid-onset disaster scenarios.

There is also good potential to link the short-term SSN relief and recovery programs to longer

term GoP social protection/assistance programs in future. The Action Plan envisages the use of

Pakistan's National Poverty Score Card (NPS) as a tool to prioritize assistance to the most

vulnerable (Harvey et al, 2012). The NPS was developed for the Benazir Income Support

Scheme (BISP) and used to conduct a national poverty survey; NADRA assisted BISP to carry out

the survey and record the results in an electronic database linked to its national civil registry.

The CDCP beneficiary database is also linked to the civil registry. This opens up the possibility

to incorporate previously unidentified beneficiaries into the BISP or other future SSN

programming (i.e., poor individuals who obtained a CNIC through the CDCP program and,

hence, may have been missed in the poverty survey) as well as households that have fallen

below the poverty line due to the disaster’s impact. Thus, while Pakistan may operate distinctly

different kinds of national SSN for regular programming and for times of disaster, the two can

interact.

Lessons Learned

Overall, the experience of the CDCP clearly demonstrates that it is possible to establish a large-

scale post-disaster SSN cash transfer program that will address both relief and recovery needs

within the affected population. With sufficient advance disaster preparedness planning, and

attention to the lessons that have emerged from the CDCP's iterative learning process, such

programs can be established relatively quickly, run efficiently, and deliver effective results.

Some of the key lessons learned to date by the CDCP include:

• Post-disaster SSN programs can benefit from building on strong existing institutions and

mechanisms, such as NADRA's civil registry and BISP poverty/vulnerability databases.

• The capacity of institutional partners to deliver post-disaster SSNs needs to be assessed,

especially at sub-national levels, and adequate technical support/resources provided.

• In large-scale disaster contexts, geographical targeting can be a faster way to identify

beneficiaries, but the potential for exclusion/inclusion errors is high. Geographic criteria

need to be combined with other criteria, particularly poverty/vulnerability criteria, in order

to achieve an appropriate balance between reaching those most affected and reaching

those least able to cope with the disaster's impacts.

• Access difficulties, e.g., following slow-onset floods, can make the conduct of household

level damage and loss surveys too slow a method of targeting for early relief responses in

certain areas. This may require creative solutions such as: aerial surveys correlated with

existing poverty and vulnerability databases, followed up by field-based beneficiary

verification processes when conditions permit; or universal targeting of urgent relief

support when resources permit.

• Third party independent verification of targeting efficiency is an important mechanism to

reduce targeting errors; notifying the original surveyors that this verification will occur can

act as a deterrent to inappropriate targeting.

• A national-level computerized database/registry system is a useful tool to use in large-scale

post-disaster SSNs, as it allows a level of initial identification of beneficiaries, verification of

payments and monitoring that is difficult to achieve through non-digital registries.

• The electronic funds transfer systems used by the formal banking system can be monitored

more easily and are less susceptible to inappropriate transactions by intermediaries.

• A payment system using debit cards is a very efficient way of delivering cash to

beneficiaries, provided that: a) adequate information/guidance on how to use the

cards/ATM machines is delivered to them; b) point of sale desks are readily accessible; c)

bank staff are adequately trained to guide them through the process and help them with

any problems that may arise; and d) adequate security is provided at the points of sale.

• It is important to include financial literacy training for target populations not accustomed to

the use of formal or electronic banking systems.

• When designing a payment system, it is important to give consideration to the kinds of

accessibility issues which frequently arise post-disaster (e.g., disrupted and/or more costly

transportation networks, etc.), in addition to the mobility restrictions faced by specific

groups such as the disabled, elderly and women in certain socio-cultural contexts.

• Strategic planning of communications activities is needed to ensure that: the most

appropriate and accessible communicaton modes are selected; sufficient human resource

and technical capacity is in place for effective two-way communication between the

program and its target audiences; and the program's messaging is clear and consistent. For

the CDCP, it was found that the most effective communications strategy with the flood-

affected population combined the use of mass media, social media and face-to-face

methods .

• Grievance processes need to be as administratively simple and easy to use as possible, if

they are to be accessible to poor and disadvantaged beneficiaries. Clear and early messages

regarding the process are necessary to ensure it works correctly.

• Disaster preparedness is a sound investment for countries at high risk from disaster

impacts.

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Interviews and email communications with:

• Ahmad, Maria, National Project Officer for Mass Communications, International Organization for

Migration.

• Ahmed Mir, Brig (R) Nasar, Project Coordinator CDCP, National Database Registration Authority

(NADRA), Ministry of the Interior, Government of Pakistan.

• Balghari, Abdul Hamid, Joint Secretary/Director General, Cabinet Division Emergency Relief Cell.

• Iqbal, Naeem, Project Manager, National Database Registration Authority (NADRA), Ministry of the

Interior, Government of Pakistan.

• Jamal, Ahmad, Senior Group Head, Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund.

• Khalid Khan, Muhammad, Deputy Chief of Party, Assessment and Strengthening Program, Rural

Support Network.

• Lotia, Hina, General Manager, Program Development Department, LEAD Pakistan.

• Mangi, Ahsan Ali, Director General (Operations), Benazir Income Support Programme.

• Naeem, Brig. Sajid, Project Coordinator (CDCP) National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA).

• Najam Jamy, Gul, Project Manager, Social Safety Net Technical Assistance Project, Benazir Income

Support Programme (BISP).