In a survey conducted by CBS nearly 45 percent of the 175,000 people who voted,
indicated they thought replay should remain, but with changes. Another 29 percent said
they favored the rule as it is, while 26 percent said they opposed the rule (Goodwin, 1986).
A replay official monitored the live game feed from an in-stadium booth, and initiated all
reviews, reversing a call only with “indisputable visual evidence.” When there was a
question about a call, the official replayed the telecast on one of his machines as the head
field official was alerted to halt play. The other Video Cassette Recorder (VCR) continued
recording the telecast so the official could study any other replay angles shown.
Expressing the unknown nature of the replay booth official, Dennis Lewin, the head of
production for ABC Sports said, ''We have no clue about how long he'll wait, or what he's
waiting to see'' (Goodwin, 1986). Both the networks and the league emphasized that the
official did not dictate which replay angle he wanted to see or what order they were shown
in. Nor may he requested any particular shot. He merely saw what was broadcasted,
replayed what he wanted on his tape machines, made his call, and relayed it to the field.
Some executives were also concerns because the dependence on the NFL to provide
pictures to settle questionable calls brought with it the potential that the outcome of games
could be influenced directly by the producers who decide where cameras were focused,
which ones were attached to replay equipment, which replay angles were selected chosen
for airing, and in what sequence (Goodwin, 1986).
To address that concern, television executives asked NFL to get its own equipment and
highlighted that they had no problem with the theory of improving the game through
technology. It's was the current practice that bothered them (Goodwin, 1986).
In 1992, six years after its introduction, an opposition group lead by George Young got
enough votes to eliminate it (King, McDonough and Zimmerman, 1994, in Dudko, 2013).
The owners voted 17 to 11 in favour of keeping replay; which fell short of the required
According to McCown (2016), at that time there were two main reasons behind the
decision to stop the instant replay: instant replays slowed down the game too much, and
it failed to get enough correct calls. Freeman confirmed there was a major problem with
incorrect reversals (Freeman, 1992).
Director of Officials Jerry Seeman indicated there were nine erroneous reversals, because
there was not the irrefutable evidence necessary to overturn a call made on the field.
Seeman also said there were 12 plays that should have been reversed, but weren't. Clearly
there was a problem with the system.
Some opponents of replay claimed it caused on-field referees to be timid because they
wanted to avoid the embarrassment of having their decisions overturned before a
national television audience (Freeman, 1992). But not all agreed. New Orleans Saints
General Manager Jim Finks, said “I think it's a step backwards for the National Football
League. I think it was something we had that was very unique, very effective... I think
we're going to regret the day we voted it down and I think we'll have it back in, very
frankly” (Freeman, 1992).
Seven years later, Finks words rang true. In 1999, NFL decided to try replay again. New
advances in technology led them to believe that the new digital system would have a
positive impact in the replay operation because it used no-linear re-winding, said
Commissioner Paul Tagliabue: