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The district court gave no weight to the Commission’s March 1, 2000,
informal staff opinion letter, which explained that, based on the Act’s legislative
history, the term “adverse action” should be interpreted broadly. In particular, the
court stated that the letter was contrary to the “plain meaning” of the Act. Mark v.
Valley Ins. Co., 275 F. Supp. 2d at 1318. As explained above, the court
misinterpreted the Act. The court also rejected the letter because it was a staff
opinion, not the product of formal agency action. Id. However, the staff opinion
letter is in complete accord with the Commission’s Notice of User Responsibilities,
16 C.F.R. Part 601, App. C, which is the product of formal agency action (i.e., notice
and comment rulemaking, see 62 Fed. Reg. 35586 (July 1, 1997)), and which states
the Commission’s view that the term “adverse action” is defined “very broadly” by
the FCRA. In any event, the present brief has, in accordance with standard
Commission practice regarding amicus briefs, been approved by a vote of the
Commission. The vote to approve the brief was unanimous.
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to introduce the subpart relating to actions taken by insurers. Nonetheless, the
committee report that accompanied the bill made clear that the proposed amendment
of the FCRA was intended as an enhancement to, not a narrowing of, preexisting
protections. S. Rep. 103-209, at 5. In addition, the committee report accompanying
S.650, which contained a definition of adverse action identical to the one that was
adopted, explained that it applied to “‘adverse action’ with respect to * * *
applications for new insurance.” S. Rep. 104-185, at 32. Given the court’s failure to
conduct a careful examination of the statute’s language, its claim to have found the
“plain meaning” of the Act (a “plain meaning” that is in conflict with the clear intent
of four committee reports) is simply wrong.
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FICO’s actions that are at issue in this case would clearly have triggered the