Airport Security Guidelines Manual - Version 1.0
June 2024
Airport Security
Guidelines Manual
Version – 1.0
Access
Control
Situational
Awareness
Security
Operations
Emergency
Communication
Airport Security Guidelines Manual - Version 1.0
June 2024
Revision History
Revision No. Description Date
0 Initial Release December 30, 2019
1 Airport Security Guidelines Manual – Version 1.0 June 17, 2024
2
3
4
5
Note: The revision history table is to be updated with the noted revisions before every re-
distribution of this document.
Airport Security Guidelines Manual - Version 1.0
June 2024
Table of Contents
1.
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................1-1
Purpose .................................................................................................................................... 1-1
Applicability .............................................................................................................................. 1-2
Threats to Airport Safety and Security ................................................................................. 1-2
Airport Security Manager ....................................................................................................... 1-2
Law Enforcement Support for Airport Security ................................................................... 1-3
2. General SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ..............................................................................2-1
Security System Logic and Design ...................................................................................... 2-1
Cyber Vulnerability Testing ................................................................................................... 2-2
Two Factor Authentication ..................................................................................................... 2-3
Remote Access ....................................................................................................................... 2-3
Backup Power for Security Systems .................................................................................... 2-3
3. AIRPORT SECURITY AREAS ............................................................................................3-1
Overview of Aviation Facility Security Operations ............................................................. 3-1
Airside .................................................................................................................................... 3-2
Landside ................................................................................................................................... 3-2
Terminals .................................................................................................................................. 3-3
3.4.1. Introduction of Security at Planning/Design Inception ............................................. 3-3
3.4.2. Security Requirements for Terminals ......................................................................... 3-5
3.4.3. Security Requirements for Terminal Emergency Egress Paths ............................. 3-6
3.4.4. Airline Tenant Security System General Information, Sharing and
Coordination with the Authority ................................................................................... 3-6
3.4.5. Access Control Systems (ACS) .................................................................................. 3-8
3.4.5.1. Access Control System Components ................................................................ 3-9
3.4.5.2. Access Control to Back of House Areas (BOH) ............................................... 3-9
3.4.5.3. Access Control Base System and Integration .................................................. 3-9
3.4.5.4. Electronic Access Control and Alarm Monitoring Systems (ACAM) ........... 3-10
3.4.5.5. Access Control System Management Policies ............................................... 3-11
3.4.5.6. Biometric Authentication .................................................................................... 3-11
3.4.5.7. Badging or Credentialing ................................................................................... 3-11
3.4.5.8. Electronic Card Access ...................................................................................... 3-12
3.4.5.9. Manhole Lock Systems (Access Covers) ........................................................ 3-12
3.4.6. Video Surveillance Systems (VSS) .......................................................................... 3-12
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3.4.7. Video Management & Surveillance Systems (VMSS) ........................................... 3-14
3.4.8. VMSS Base System ................................................................................................... 3-14
3.4.9. TSA Checkpoint VSS and VMSS Requirements ................................................... 3-14
3.4.10. Public Address Systems (PAS) ................................................................................. 3-15
3.4.11. Variable Message Signage ........................................................................................ 3-16
3.4.12. HVAC Systems ............................................................................................................ 3-16
3.4.13. Accommodation of Space in Public Areas for Police Screening Operations ..... 3-17
3.4.14. Accommodation of New Security Technologies and Protocols ........................... 3-17
3.4.15. Terminal Airside Operations Areas .......................................................................... 3-17
3.4.16. Expansion and/or Replacement of Security Systems Areas ................................ 3-18
Security Related Areas ........................................................................................................ 3-18
3.5.1. Secured Area ............................................................................................................... 3-18
3.5.2. Sterile Area................................................................................................................... 3-18
3.5.3. Exclusive Use Area ..................................................................................................... 3-19
3.5.4. Airport Tenant Security Program Area ..................................................................... 3-19
4. Security Requirements for TERMINALS and Other Buildings in Public Areas ..........4-1
Frontage Roadway and Sidewalk Areas ............................................................................. 4-1
Enforcement of Vehicle Standoff (Use of Bollards) ........................................................... 4-1
Terminal Building Entrances, Curtainwall and Façade Glazing System ........................ 4-4
Building Construction for Blast Loading .............................................................................. 4-5
Landside Vehicular Parking Lots and Garages .................................................................. 4-5
Operational Security at Terminal Frontage, Arrivals and Departures Halls ................... 4-6
4.6.1. Tenant Coordination with Airport Security Manager (ASM) and Port
Authority Police Department (PAPD) ......................................................................... 4-6
4.6.2. Terminal Public Areas .................................................................................................. 4-7
4.6.3. Security at Baggage Claim and Inbound Baggage Areas ...................................... 4-8
4.6.4. Trash and Recycling Receptacles in Public Areas .................................................. 4-8
4.6.5. Terminal Interior Landscaping in Public Areas ......................................................... 4-9
4.6.6. Terminal Expansion or Renovation .......................................................................... 4-10
4.6.7. Gunshot Detection Systems ...................................................................................... 4-10
4.6.8. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive (CBRNE), and
Detection Sensors ....................................................................................................... 4-10
4.6.9. Automated License Plate Recognition Systems (LPR) ......................................... 4-11
4.6.10. Public Safety Life Safety (PSLS) Radio systems ................................................... 4-12
AirTrain Stations .................................................................................................................... 4-12
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Loading Docks for Delivery to Vendors ............................................................................. 4-13
Terminal Non-Public Areas ................................................................................................. 4-14
Electrical Substations and Critical Infrastructure Facilities ............................................. 4-16
5. TSA Passenger Security Screening Checkpoints (SSCP) ............................................5-1
SSCP Overview ....................................................................................................................... 5-1
Regulations and Guidelines .................................................................................................. 5-1
Essential Coordination ........................................................................................................... 5-2
Planning Considerations ........................................................................................................ 5-2
SSCP Power, Data and VSS ................................................................................................ 5-2
Safety .................................................................................................................................... 5-2
6. AIR OPERATIONS AREA (AOA) .......................................................................................6-1
AOA Perimeter Protection ..................................................................................................... 6-1
6.1.1. Perimeter Intrusion Detection System (PIDS) .......................................................... 6-1
6.1.2. Perimeter Fencing ......................................................................................................... 6-2
6.1.3. AOA Perimeter Guard Posts ....................................................................................... 6-5
6.1.3.1. General ......................................................................................................6-5
6.1.3.2. Vehicle Barrier Gates .................................................................................6-6
6.1.3.3. AOA Guard Post Configuration and Booths ...............................................6-7
Identity Checks, Background Screening, and Issuance of Photo Identification
Badges/Cards .......................................................................................................................... 6-7
7. TENANT AIR CARGO AND AIRLINE SERVICES FACILITIES .......................................7-1
Cargo Facilities and Security Considerations ..................................................................... 7-1
7.1.1. Requirements for Air Cargo Screening ...................................................................... 7-1
7.1.2. Cargo Facility Security Requirements ........................................................................ 7-1
7.1.3. Cargo Facility Security Operational Practices .......................................................... 7-3
Airline Hangars and Other Aircraft Maintenance Facilities ............................................... 7-4
In-Flight Catering Facilities .................................................................................................... 7-5
8. COMMERCIAL TENANT BUILDING COMPLEXES ON AIRPORT PROPERTY ............8-1
Hotels and On-Airport Accommodations ............................................................................. 8-1
9. General Aviation ................................................................................................................9-1
Operational Practices ............................................................................................................. 9-1
Security Control of Personnel ............................................................................................... 9-1
Security Control of Aircraft ..................................................................................................... 9-2
Security Control of Bags and Baggage ............................................................................... 9-2
Security Control of Infrastructure .......................................................................................... 9-3
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10. MAINTENANCE AND CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITY ....................................................... 10-1
Tool Management Plan ........................................................................................................ 10-2
Landside, Terminal & Airside .............................................................................................. 10-3
10.2.1. Security Management Plan ....................................................................................... 10-3
10.2.2. Identity Checks, Background Screening, and Issuance of Photo
Identification Badges/Cards ....................................................................................... 10-3
10.2.3. Project Security Guard Plan ...................................................................................... 10-4
10.2.4. Radios/Two Way Communication ............................................................................ 10-4
10.2.5. Admittance to Construction Site................................................................................ 10-4
10.2.6. Construction Site Access Control ............................................................................. 10-5
10.2.7. Security Guard Posting Staffing Requirements ...................................................... 10-5
10.2.8. Surveillance Video Design Methodology ................................................................. 10-6
11. Acronyms and Abbreviations ......................................................................................... 11-1
12. REFERENCES .................................................................................................................. 12-1
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1. INTRODUCTION
The guidelines in this document are intended for Port Authority of New York and New Jersey
(hereinafter referred to as “Port Authority”, “Authority”, or PANYNJ) staff, airport tenants and
consultants or contractors that tenants retain to perform design and construction. It is a single
document that captures the requirements, is regularly updated, and serves as a guide to security
standards that shall be followed at all Port Authority airports. Note that compliance with these
security guidelines carries with it no guarantee of protection against acts of terrorism, other
crimes, or any of their consequences. While following it will help reduce risk, it cannot eliminate
it. All tenants, passengers, service providers and employees at the airports must take their own
reasonable standards of care and responsibility associated with the use and application of
information provided in this guideline.
Purpose
This document (hereinafter referred to as the “Airport Security Guidelines Manual” or “Guidelines”)
serves as a guideline to the security standards that have been established by the Port Authority
for the planning, design, construction, operation and maintenance of tenant facilities at its airports.
These security standards incorporate the guidance issued by the Transportation Security
Administration (“TSA”), aviation industry best practices and the Port Authority’s own requirements
which it has put into practice for the safe and secure administration of its airport facilities, sites
and spaces.
These security standards are intended to inform existing and prospective facility planners,
tenants, security managers, and vendors of security considerations to be addressed in
accordance with Port Authority security policies and the general threat environment. These
standards supplement standard building code requirements for any Port Authority agreements. It
should be noted that the Guidelines will be incorporated into new Port Authority Aviation
Department agreements as well as renewals, however exclusion of the Guidelines in these
agreements shall not be construed as an exemption from implementation. A tenant may construct
or alter its premises with measures that are in addition to the Guidelines, however, it must adhere
to the minimum requirements of the Guidelines. The Port Authority may conduct surveys of a
tenant’s leasehold prior to, during and after construction or an alteration to ensure compliance
with the Guidelines.
The Port Authority has implemented a strategy to provide a holistic and all-inclusive view of
airport-wide systems and activity to increase situational awareness at its properties in support of
security and life safety. This will occur across multiple mixed-use facilities, while allowing
individual stakeholders to operate and manage their respective areas independently. The intent
is to provide for better communication, coordination, logistics planning and response to any event
or incident that occurs onsite; thereby aiding in keeping all stakeholders informed about what is
occurring at neighboring buildings within the given property or campus. When potential threat
events are detected, operators can be alerted of the condition and provide the corresponding
emergency response protocols.
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Tenant security managers and planning developers shall refer to the Guideline for fundamental
requirements for security designs, technologies, and protocols to be applied to design and
operations at Port Authority aviation facilities. The intent is to maintain a culture and environment
where security is always a central consideration in planning, design, construction, and operations.
The security requirements for specific premises as required by this Guideline shall be
incorporated into the tenant "Comprehensive Security Plan" which will be approved by the
relevant airport ASM.
The standards described in the Guidelines assume that the tenant’s planning, design,
construction, and operations will be in full compliance with all TSA regulations and Security
Directives (SD) issued by the TSA or other applicable government agencies.
Applicability
Any project sponsor that has received formal confirmation from PA of the receipt of the complete
30% Detailed Design Package or an approval of same prior to the publication date of this version
of the ASGM shall continue to be governed by the ASGM version in effect at the time of such
confirmation. Furthermore, projects that have passed the 30% Detailed Design phase — including
those systems currently under construction or in operation — with PA approval shall be held to
the design standards specified by that approval (under the previous ASGM version in place before
the publication of Version 1.0 of the ASGM). PA reserves the right to require a project sponsor
to resubmit the 30% Detailed Design Package under the requirements of the latest ASGM if the
design has not been approved for advancements.
Threats to Airport Safety and Security
The basic threats from terrorism can take the form of physical attack using conventional weapons,
vehicles, explosives, flammables, chemical, radiological, and biological agents, or the use of
cyber methods to adversely impact public safety systems and infrastructure. Threats from natural
hazards, such as wind and flood, shall be considered in planning and operating safety and security
measures.
Airport Security Manager
The Airport Security Manager (ASM) is the primary contact at each Port Authority Airport for
compliance with TSA regulations, and Port Authority Security Standards and policies. The ASM
is the designated Airport Security Coordinator (ASC) under TSR 1542 and in this capacity, is the
Port Authority’s liaison with the local TSA on regulatory matters and with airport tenants and
permittees. The ASM prepares and maintains the Airport Security Program and approves tenant
security programs, and construction -related security plans. The ASM is charged with mitigating
security risk to the airport through use of security audits and risk assessments to identify
vulnerabilities, engagement of airport employees in awareness programs, training PA and tenant
staff in best security practices, recommending capital security improvements, and implementation
of procedures and policies to correct or enhance the airport security posture. The ASM oversees
a variety of security equipment for access control, intrusion detection, surveillance, and physical
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protection. The ASM oversees a civilian guard force for access control and surveillance and
inspection patrol. The ASM works in close collaboration with the Airport Manager and staff, Port
Authority Police Department (“PAPD”), the TSA, CBP, and FBI. It is also noted that security
threats are ever evolving so tenants should check with the ASM for the latest information in this
area.
Law Enforcement Support for Airport Security
The Port Authority operates facilities and systems at which terrorism or other criminal acts may
have a significant impact on life safety and key infrastructure. Tenants, vendors, and contractors
are required to cooperate with the Port Authority and its employees in complying with the security
standards set forth in these Guidelines.
Operational security plans rely upon the presence of a quick and strong response force. At Port
Authority airports, that response force is provided by armed law enforcement consisting of the
PAPD at JFK, EWR, LGA, and TEB and the NY State Police (NYSP) at SWF, sometimes
supplemented by other law enforcement entities and the National Guard, as authorized by the
Governor in times of heightened alert.
The PAPD is also supported by the US Department of Homeland Security through the TSA when
it comes to anti-terrorist training, drills, equipment, and canine patrol forces.
PAPD operations and response are coordinated with TSA Security operations and US Customs
(at international airport facilities.)
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2. GENERAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
Security System Logic and Design
This Section addresses a general approach to the following types of security related systems:
• Access Control Systems (ACS)
• Video Surveillance System (VSS)
• Video Management & Surveillance Systems (VMSS)
• Public Address Systems (PAS)
• Automated License Plate Recognition Systems (LPR)
• New Security Technologies and Protocols
• Cybersecurity
• Backup Power for Security Systems
To be effective, these security systems shall be well planned and integrated in a manner that
results in an error-free logic to assure that they achieve their security objective. This logic is
formally known as a Concept of Operations or ConOps.
During the planning and design phases of a project, operational security mitigations shall be
documented by developing ConOps. The ConOps is a set of formal documents that describe how
the building systems (space layout, structures, finishes, electrical, electronics, communications,
HVAC, physical access control, barrier gates, and fire protection) will support and coordinate with
the operational security plans to mitigate the various threat scenarios on a daily basis.
In planning technology-based security solutions, project planners need also to provide for
expansion and evolution of systems and facilities. Allowing capacity for future design technologies
in the present alleviates much of the burden for additional costs in retrofitting infrastructure in the
future. This forward thinking approach to planning and project design also minimizes downtime,
loss of space and services, and inconvenience to airport passengers. Security project planning
shall also incorporate back-up redundant features, such as, alternate power sources, to ensure
that critical systems remain resilient during emergency events.
The tenant shall also be required to build into the technology-based security systems a Quality
Assurance element that will allow for monitoring that the required procedures are being followed
by employees by generating a compliance report.
Additionally, all technology systems that are part of construction or renovation must be covered
by a comprehensive maintenance plan or contract beyond the initial warranty that is provided as
part of installation (the “Comprehensive Maintenance Plan”). These Comprehensive Maintenance
plan shall ensure the technology systems are kept up to date with the latest manufacturer
approved firmware and software patches, software version upgrades, and general maintenance
associated with technology systems. This may include physical work such as ensuring hardware
is kept cleaned, filters changed and kept dirt/dust free, that HVAC systems supporting technology
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are kept in good working condition, and that batteries associated with UPS systems are tested
and replaced on a regular basis. Further, necessary system administration of software must be
accounted for and included such as software maintenance, backups, archives, and any other
tasks required to maintain system functionality. These systems must be maintained and kept in
good working condition for their entire useful life and must not be allowed to degrade overtime
due to lack of maintenance.
The tenant shall also have a Cybersecurity policy and plan that covers all airline terminal
computing resources and is complied with by all airline terminal employees who have access to
the computing resources the (“Cybersecurity Policy”). It is intended to clarify and ensure that
computing resources are used in a professionally responsible manner and that appropriate steps
are taken to safeguard the confidentiality, integrity and availability of all related computing
resources, information, data, and equipment.
The Cybersecurity Policy shall include all IT networks, systems and applications operated on site
by the tenant. The Cybersecurity Policy shall also be responsible for articulating requirements for
the tenant as an external IT partner accessing Port Authority networks. The Cybersecurity policy,
and technical requirements shall cover all tenant personnel (such as employees, contractors,
vendors, and other individuals), regardless of whether they directly or remotely access Port
Authority IT systems and networks.
As a minimum the Cybersecurity Policy shall be in compliance with the TSA’s Cybersecurity
Emergency Amendment issued on March 7, 2023 (TSA EA 23-01), and all subsequent revisions
to that amendment. TSA EA 23-01 requires that impacted TSA-regulated entities develop an
approved implementation plan that describes measures they are taking to improve their
cybersecurity resilience and prevent disruption and degradation to their infrastructure. They must
also proactively assess the effectiveness of these measures, which include the following actions:
• Develop network segmentation policies and controls to ensure that operational technology
systems can continue to safely operate if an information technology system has been
compromised, and vice versa.
• Create access control measures to secure and prevent unauthorized access to critical
cyber systems.
• Implement continuous monitoring and detection policies and procedures to defend
against, detect, and respond to cybersecurity threats and anomalies that affect critical
cyber system operations.
• Reduce the risk of exploitation of unpatched systems through the application of security
patches and updates for operating systems, applications, drivers, and firmware on critical
cyber systems in a timely manner using a risk-based methodology.
Cyber Vulnerability Testing
The tenant shall also perform periodic testing of all their IT systems to uncover vulnerabilities
before cyber criminals find them. Technical vulnerability testing, especially when combined with
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parallel evaluations of IT administrative processes and procedures, provide Cybersecurity
officers, compliance auditors and system mission managers with important information regarding
risks to their IT networks, client/servers and applications. The results of cyber vulnerability tests
are used to make risk-based decisions regarding the deployment of new systems/applications,
drive more purposeful protection policies, better secure (i.e., hardening requirements)
networks/systems and address weaknesses in administrative support processes.
Two Factor Authentication
Port Authority policy articulates security requirements for implementing a two-factor
authentication system to protect the Port Authority, when a tenant is connecting to a Port Authority
system through an external network connection via VPN. An authentication factor is an
independent credential category used for verifying one’s identity. The three most common
categories are described as, something you know (knowledge factor; i.e., password), something
you have (possession factor; i.e., smart card) and something you are (inherence factor; i.e.,
fingerprint). One of the primary attack vectors for both cybercriminal and white hat hackers is to
access potential targets via vulnerable external network connections (ENCs). ENCs include, for
example, employees, consultants and contractors connecting remotely via VPN to Port Authority
networks. Using two-factor authentication mechanisms reduces the risk of exploiting these
classes of external connections.
Remote Access
Current Port Authority policy precludes any remote access to Port Authority IT and OT/ICS
networks from any foreign owned/operated networks. Accordingly, a temporary exception is
required from the Port Authority Chief Security Officer to enable said network access. For a list of
temporary exceptions contact the ASM.
Backup Power for Security Systems
All security system shall have as a minimum, a four (4) hours uninterrupted power source (UPS)
and a dedicated emergency power generator backup for the system, except the PSLS Radio
should have eight (8) hours UPS. An audible alarm, connected to the AOC to indicate UPS
malfunction must be operational when the UPS is activated and in use.
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3. AIRPORT SECURITY AREAS
Overview of Aviation Facility Security Operations
Airport Security Areas encompass designated zones for the operation of airline terminals,
commercial aircraft, air cargo facilities, and general aviation facilities. Security areas for airline
terminal operations are addressed first in the Guidelines. Air cargo facilities are covered in
Section 7, and General Aviation is covered in Section 9.
Airline terminal operations encompass enplaning and deplaning activities of aircraft operator
passengers. For the purposes of this document, the term “terminal” refers to that main building,
or group of buildings, where the screening, boarding, and unloading of public, scheduled
commercial aircraft passengers and property occurs.
Essential considerations in TSA guidelines for terminal security planning
0F0F 0F required at Port
Authority airports include:
1. Restricted access to the AOA, SIDA, Secured Area, and Sterile Area, which are defined
in 49 CFR § 1542 and in each airport’s security program.
2. Flow of both passengers and employees from landside to airside and back.
3. Efficient and effective security screening of persons and property entering Sterile Areas,
including consideration for queuing space during peak loads.
4. Effective screening of employees entering the AOA, Secured Area, and Sterile Area.
5. Separation of security areas and use of required signage.
6. Identification and protection of other vulnerable areas and assets.
7. Protection of aircraft, people, and property.
8. Blast mitigation measures.
9. Baggage screening requirements including checked baggage inspection systems (CBIS)
and Checked Baggage Resolution Area (CBRA) Design Standards.
10. Space and infrastructure for checked baggage explosives detection systems (EDS) and
devices.
11. Space for advanced and next-generation technologies at passenger screening
checkpoints.
12. Accommodation of integrated infrastructure for advanced surveillance, and access
controls with biometrics.
13. Command and control capabilities for improved situational and domain awareness.
14. Cyber security requirements.
Terminal operators are subject to the terms of the Airport Planning Standards, Aviation
Department – Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, Preliminary Draft, Version 3,
dated September 2018 (Airport Planning Standards), where applicable, as may be amended
from time to time. The Airport Planning Standards establish a general set of standards and
performance criteria to maintain safe, functionally efficient, and code-compliant terminal area
operations while ensuring airport customer satisfaction. The Guidelines shall take precedent over
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the Airport Planning Standards with respect to any security standards or terms that may seem
contradictory.
Subject to a tenant area–specific security program or plan approved by the Port Authority, the
airport tenant and space permittees assumes responsibility for specific security systems,
measures, or procedures, except for such systems, measures or procedures maintained by law
enforcement. Crime and law enforcement at Port Authority NYC metropolitan area airports is
under the oversight of the PAPD, members of which are armed, patrol the airports, and constitute
the first line response force to any emergency, criminal or otherwise on airport property. Airport
security policies, regulations, and protocols that all tenant terminal operators and airlines are
required to follow are under the management and enforcement of the Port Authority civilian
ASM or ASC.
Pursuant to 49 C.F.R. 1542.5, the ASMs have the regulatory responsibility for compliance with
applicable TSA regulations and must ensure that all tenants and airlines are in compliance with
the TSA and Port Authority requirements. The ASMs also coordinate the sharing of information
and meet with all the tenants on a regular basis to coordinate safety and security activities. They
also conduct security audits and provide appropriate security countermeasures for vulnerabilities
identified. Both the PAPD and ASMs report through a chain of command to the Port Authority’s
Chief Security Officer (CSO).
The general layout of Port Authority aviation facilities, as defined in TSA Recommended
Guidelines for Airport Planning, Design & Construction, consists of three areas typically
referred to by the industry as airside, landside, and terminal. Each major area of the airport
(airside, landside, and terminal) has its own special security requirements. Maintaining the
integrity of airside/landside boundaries plays a critical role in reducing unauthorized access to,
attacks on, or the introduction of dangerous devices aboard passenger aircraft.
Airside
The airside is a designated non-Public Area, as it generally includes security areas to which
certain requirements apply under 49 CFR § 1542 (e.g., the AOA, fuel farms and Secured Areas).
Facility plans must reduce the number of delivery portals and access points to public restricted
areas such as the Sterile and Secured/SIDA Areas to the absolute minimum number required.
Landside
Landside infrastructure is separate from terminal and airside facilities. In general, the landside
facilities at Port Authority airports available to the public include, but are not limited to, patron and
other public parking lots and garages, walkways, public access roadways, rental car facilities, taxi
and ground transportation staging areas, Air Train stations, and any other on-airport tenant
facilities that serve the public such as hotels.
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Landside infrastructure also includes facilities that are critical to the continued day to day
operation of the airport. These include Port Authority owned and operated assets such as: office
buildings, maintenance facilities, electric substations, PAPD facilities, and parking facilities for
Port Authority vehicles, among others.
Based upon the Port Authority’s agency-wide risk assessment for its airports, which considers
actual past threats and acts of terrorism at Port Authority facilities, the surrounding NY/NJ Metro
Area, and other major airports around the world, the Port Authority’s landside facilities also have
significant security requirements. Further information on these requirements is contained in the
Guidelines.
The landside facilities must also meet the local jurisdictional standards for public safety and
security, which may result in special safety requirements that will interface with the airport’s overall
security and fire safety system.
Terminals
The varied nature of functional activities in terminals calls for a wide range of security, safety, and
operational standards. Many of these standards are closely linked to the locations of restricted
areas such as Sterile and Secured Areas within, and near, the terminal. Since the terminal usually
straddles the boundary between airside and landside, certain portions of a terminal must meet
the requirements of both areas.
3.4.1. Introduction of Security at Planning/Design Inception
Physical and operational security requirements must be introduced into the airport tenant project
in the planning and design phase, to the degree required, for leases that cover new construction.
In addition, projects that involve renovation of existing construction, or leasing and operation of
an existing on-airport building may have similar requirements. For the latter category of projects,
it is necessary to check with the ASM.
In the project’s preliminary planning/design phase, the tenant developer shall retain an
experienced anti-terrorism security professional and force protection engineer to perform security
planning based upon the threats provided by the Port Authority for the specific airport. The
aforementioned security professional, who will serve as the engineer of record (EOR) for blast
analysis, blast mitigations and for any other analysis of physical effects from established threats,
shall demonstrate sufficient previous experience in completing force protection design for building
projects of a similar nature.
Any threat related information that is generated in the planning, design and construction process
shall be classified as Confidential Privileged Information (CPI). Any individuals on the developer’s
planning and design team who will be involved in generating or handling the Port Authority’s CPI
for the security planning and design shall be required to undergo a background check through the
Port Authority’s Personal Assurance Program, currently provided by Secure Worker Access
Consortium (SWAC), and execute a Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA), all in accordance with the
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requirements contained in the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey Information Security
Handbook, Revised April 2, 2018, as may be further amended (the “Security Handbook”). Only
the Secure Worker Certification: “Secure Worker – High” will be accepted. Secure Worker
Certification: “Secure Worker – Limited” will not be accepted.
The developer shall be required to designate a Security Information Manager (SIM) to ensure that
the Security Handbook is strictly adhered to by the planning and design team and that they
maintain related documentation.
Due to their confidential nature, the specific threats and threat magnitudes to the Port Authority
Airports (“Port Authority Threat Matrix”) are not included in this document. The types of threats
and minimum threat magnitudes to be used for site specific threat and vulnerability assessments
at a Port Authority airport will be provided to the tenant’s designated SIM under a separate cover.
The tenant’s anti-terrorism security professional in conjunction with the tenant’s
Architect/Engineer of record, shall prepare a Protective Design Narrative (PDN). The PDN shall
document the threat mitigation strategies and specify the level of design performance required for
each threat scenario in the Port Authority Threat Matrix. The identified mitigations shall then be
refined in each later phase of the design all the way through to the construction phase and shall
be subject to audit by the Port Authority as a basis for issuance of a Permit to Use or Occupy from
the Port Authority.
The PDN shall document the specific strategies for mitigating threats by either: (a) screening them
out through the use of physical barriers or electronically based access control, (b) defining the
physical level of performance of the facility structural building elements and finishes that are
required to limit damage to property and occupants from threats, (c) employ security technology
and personnel to detect, deter and defend the facility from threats. As such, the PDN shall rely on
both physical force protection mitigations that are “built in” to the facility and operational security
measures that shall be provided on a daily 24/7 basis.
The security planning and design process described above applies to all tenant development
projects to be constructed and operated at Port Authority airports. This includes but is not limited
to: airline terminals, elevated frontage roadway viaducts, parking garages, certain cargo facilities,
General Aviation facilities, car rental facilities, and facilities that house utilities essential to airport
operations. The Port Authority Document “
Security Planning Guideline: Guideline for Security
Classification, Planning and Design at Project Inception for Port Authority and Tenant Projects” is a useful
reference and provided detailed explanations for these processes.
The def
inition, communication, and transmittal of information that is classified as Sensitive
Security Information shall strictly follow the requirements contained in the Security Handbook (see
Appendix). This includes obtaining required security credentials through background checks,
training, and strictly adhering to proper classification, marking, handling, transmittal, and storage
of security information.
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3.4.2. Security Requirements for Terminals
Each airport terminal has a unique road system, architectural design, and operational layout. Each
tenant terminal operator is required to tailor security design solutions to resolve fundamental
security vulnerabilities and meet operational needs. Security Planning and Design must be
introduced at Planning Inception and followed throughout the Design and Construction phases.
The Security Level Categorization is used to prioritize the security efforts and allocated resources
more effectively to safeguard the most critical information and systems. It is determined through
SPM at project inception. Once categorized, the Security Design Criteria identifies whether the
project is classified as confidential or confidential & privilege, that must be followed through each
phase of the project.
Selected PDN security design options shall follow throughout the design/construction stages of
the project and be reflected in the design and construction submittals.
TSA best practice guidelines
1F 1Fare considered a minimum requirement at Authority airports.
Tenants must implement the following security design strategies for new terminals and for
renovation and expansion projects as outlined in the following sections:
1. Approach roadways and unscreened parking facilities must have adequate standoff
distances from the terminal that are enforced with crash-rated vehicle barriers (bollards)
that prevent vehicles from driving close to or into the terminal (see Section 4.2)
2. Blast resistant façade and glazing materials or fabrications (see Section 4.3)
3. Structural columns and beams that are resistant to explosive blasts and progressive
collapse (see Section 4.4)
4. Surveillance systems (such as VSS, video analytics, LPR, etc.) at curbside, doorways and
perimeters, and within the departures hall, baggage claim and arrivals hall areas (see
Section 3.4.6 and Section 3.4.7)
5. Capability for vehicle inspection stations with ample space for vehicle queuing and
standoff distances (see Section 4.1).
6. Consolidation of points where employees can enter any Secure Area (as defined in the
TSA Guidelines) and technology at those entry points that will screen 100% of employees.
7. The comprehensive security plan between the Port Authority and airport tenants shall
stipulate the measures by which the tenant shall perform terminal security functions. This
comprehensive security plan shall contain descriptions of areas in which security
measures are specified at each Port Authority airport in addition to all other security
requirement related to its premises.
8. The comprehensive security plan shall also include design elements or reduce eliminate
loiterers including the use of roll up doors, and security shutters to close off concession
space at night or when business operations are closed.
In addition to the above security requirements, airport terminal design shall incorporate applicable
safety and security strategies from the recommended practices for Crime Prevention Through
Environmental Design (CPTED) as outlined in APTA Standards Development Program
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Recommended Practice (APTA SS-SIS-RP-007-10) by APTA Transit Infrastructure Security
Work Group.
3.4.3. Security Requirements for Terminal Emergency Egress Paths
1. Emergency egress vertical exit paths (enclosed stairways) and horizontal corridors in
Public Areas shall only exit to landside, including muster points.
2. Sterile Area egress vertical exit paths, horizontal corridors and muster points shall be
separated from the Secure and Restricted Areas including all critical Back of House (BOH)
spaces.
3. Where a floor plan cannot provide a separate Sterile and Secure area emergency egress
path at a certain location, the doors exiting from the secure side shall be equipped with
FAIL SECURE, so that exiting sterile passengers will not be able to enter the Secure Area.
4. Restricted Area (Public Side) emergency egress path exits shall not lead to Sterile, Secure
and AOA spaces.
5. There shall be no “free flow” from Secure Areas to Sterile Areas and vice versa.
6. Primary and secondary emergency egress paths leading to the AOA side of the terminal
shall avoid design conditions that intersect with active airside operations areas such as
baggage cart paths.
7. A detailed ConOps for Terminal Emergency Egress Paths shall be developed and
accompany the submittal of egress plans to the Port Authority for review by the CSO.
3.4.4. Airline Tenant Security System General Information, Sharing
and Coordination with the Authority
General Information:
1. Security: The transmission of the video signal shall be secure and meet the minimum-
security requirements defined by the PANYNJ.
2. Information Security / Non-Disclosure: These requirements and specifications about
equipment installed as well as video images and data sharing are sensitive. The parties
will restrict access and disclosure to such information to those with a need to know.
3. Maintenance and Support: Tenant shall be responsible for any ongoing maintenance
support that is required for their tenant-owned base systems (i.e. video surveillance
system, access control, specialty sensors, etc.); however, any maintenance support
required for the connectivity to PANYNJ systems will be the responsibility of the PANYNJ.
Tenant agrees to allow PANYNJ physical space in their building data rooms to install and
maintain equipment necessary for connectivity. Exact location of equipment shall be
discussed and agreed upon by both parties. There may be cases where PANYNJ
equipment may not need to be installed in tenant spaces, but rather adjacent spaces or
buildings.
4. Floor plans and maps: Tenant shall share electronic files of relevant floor plans and maps
of their leased space. These files should include clean architectural level drawings for use
in PANYNJ systems with the intention of placing cameras and sensors on the maps for
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monitoring and situational awareness purposes. Such files should also include drawings
and floor plans showing the location of cameras and sensors for the PANYNJ to use as
reference when locating devices, creating emergency response plans, etc. Any updates
to the leased space, and subsequent updates to any floor plans or maps should be shared
with the PANYNJ as well.
Note: Construction drawings showing details related to the physical construction of an
area or facility will not be deemed acceptable, as the intent of this requirement is to use
the floor plans and Maps for end users at computer workstations once the area or building
is completed. Therefore, clean, consolidated, floor plans showing final as-built conditions
of all areas shall be provided to Port Authority for this use.
5. Tenant terminal operators are required to provide the information identified in paragraph
(6) below for the specific electronic security systems listed herein:
a. Video Management System
b. Airport Security ID Card Access Control System
c. Gunshot detection system (if applicable)
d. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive (CBRNE) detection
systems (if applicable)
e. Automated License Plate Recognition Systems
6. Required Security System Information for each electronic security system listed in the
preceding paragraph (5), tenant terminal operators are required to provide information
related to the manufacturer and vendor of the security systems, if a selection has not been
made, terminal operators must keep the Port Authority apprised of the vendor that is
chosen. This will allow for appropriate planning and interface plans to be completed to
meet the requirements of this document. The information required to be shared with Port
Authority includes:
a. Name of the manufacture and product, along with version of software being installed.
b. Point of contact from the manufacturer that can provide technical information to the
Port Authority about the system, and about any available software development kits
or API’s for integration to third party systems. Note, any requirements from the
manufacturer that are needed to provide third party camera sharing to the Port
Authority shall be the responsibility of the tenant/stakeholder to provide (i.e. software
license for SDK or API).
c. Point of contact from the tenant who will be managing the integration effort with
PANYNJ.
7. Both parties agree to work together to meet the requirements of the Guidelines including
all the features and functions listed below:
a. Network Connectivity:
i. Tenant will provide connectivity and share data connections for the video
surveillance system contained in its leased space with PANYNJ. The tenant’s
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participation in this aspect of integration will increase the PANYNJ’s ability to share
critical information with first responders during a large-scale event and respond
proactively to potential threat events that may adversely impact other facilities and
locations throughout facility campus.
ii. For the program strategy to function as designed, network connections from tenant
space to PANYNJ must be established. Tenant agrees to provide space and
power for PANYNJ to install network appliances, conduit, and wire to connect to
the facility-wide network.
iii. Costs for tenant network appliances along with conduit and wire installation will be
the responsibility of the tenant, and costs for PANYNJ network appliances along
with conduit and wire installation will be the responsibility of PANYNJ; however
the tenant is required to make the Port Authority aware of any opportunities to
include the necessary conduit and wire installation as part of any new construction
or renovation activity, so that proper planning can be made in conjunction with the
tenant.
b. As necessary, the parties shall proceed in good faith and with all due diligence to
finalize a plan for data sharing and agree to work collaboratively on additional systems
in the future, such as fire alarms systems, CBRNE (if they become available) and
others deemed mutually beneficial for integration.
3.4.5. Access Control Systems (ACS)
Tenant terminal operators shall, at a minimum, electronically monitor, record and control portals,
doors, and access points for authorized personnel passing between the following areas:
1. Sterile Area to/from Secured Area/SIDA
2. Public Area to/ from Sterile Area
3. Sterile Area to/from TSA Exit Lanes
4. Public Area to/from Secured Area/SIDA
5. Loading Docks to/from Public Area or Secured/Restricted areas.
6. Any of the above areas to/from Back of House (BOH) spaces
7. Baggage Make-up Areas
8. Baggage Belt from Public Area
Security systems, such as VMSS and electronic access control systems, must be integrated with
an operations center VMS or Security Operations Center (SOC), operating on a 24-hour basis
with dedicated and trained security operations staff. The system shall be tied into the PANYNJ's
Airport Operations Center (AOC) and there shall be a five (5) minute or less response to door
alarms (violations) or other access incidents, as designated in the Airport Security Program.
All elements covered herein for the ACS shall have an uninterrupted power source (UPS) that
can sustain operations for a minimum of four (4) hours. An audible alarm, connected to the AOC
must be operational when the UPS is activated and in use.
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3.4.5.1. Access Control System Components
All portals, doors and access points defined above shall be ACS monitored and controlled and
must be equipped with an appropriate level door control and locking equipment based on the door
or portals classification. If the door also acts as an emergency exit, it shall be equipped with panic
hardware operable from the inside only and otherwise kept secured at all times. In addition, the
following integrated system components are required at a minimum for the ACS door interface:
1. Contactless electronic card access reader to unlock door.
2. Monitored and audible alarm sounds when door is unlocked or opened without access
card.
3. VSS view of individual accessing and egressing, and two-way voice communication
(located on both sides of the door) with video resolution capable of facial recognition and
automatically stored in video management system.
4. Door lock, access card reader, camera view and two-way voice communication tied and
integrated into the SOC so that camera view automatically records and displays visual
and audible alerts, VSS and voice communication on console screen when any
component is activated.
5. Capability to upgrade to/add biometric identification ID layer (see Section 3.4.5.6).
6. Minimum four (4) hour uninterrupted power source (UPS) and generator backup for the
system. An audible alarm, connected to the AOC to indicate UPS malfunction must be
operational when the UPS is activated and in use.
3.4.5.2. Access Control to Back of House Areas (BOH)
Back of house (BOH) areas are those tenant spaces that accommodate electrical, mechanical,
HVAC, communications, operations, and other systems essential to the safe and secure day to
day operation of the facility. As such, these spaces shall be access controlled to exclude any
unauthorized persons including, passengers, vendors, contractors, delivery persons, and anyone
who has no official purpose from entering them. All doors and roof hatches that provide access
to BOH spaces to authorized tenant operations and maintenance staff shall be ACS monitored
and controlled and locked based on the BOH utility space door or hatch type
2F2F 2Fand must meet the
requirements in Section 3.4.5.1 above.
The type of door lock and key card entry may be different for a single door, double door, or roof
hatch access to utility space rooms and roof mounted equipment areas.
3.4.5.3. Access Control Base System and Integration
The Access Control System design must include a level of reliability and redundancy that ensures:
1. No single point failure in the system.
2. Computer system controlled by local controller.
3. Alarm monitoring shall not be interrupted.
4. Access control passages shall be operational without any failure.
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5. ACS management functions.
Tenant planners shall coordinate with the Port Authority during the design phase, for direction on
connectivity to the AOC and other monitoring centers.
The following systems shall be interfaced with the Access Control System:
1. Identity Management and Control System.
2. Video Management System.
3. Intelligent Video Analytics.
4. Biometric Readers.
5. Intercom System.
6. Fire Alarm System.
7. Baggage Handling System.
8. Anti-tailgating (anti-piggybacking) sensors for all Sterile Area and SIDA unmanned doors.
9. Gunshot Detection System.
10. Building Management System.
11. Weapons Detection System (if applicable).
Access control systems shall be interconnected to the Port Authority central monitoring stations
so that any individual’s access control privileges in the terminal can be immediately terminated
when the Port Authority’s revokes their airport access badge. Tenants may not restrict, in any
manner, the Port Authority’s access to any of the tenant’s premises that would prevent it from
inspecting the tenant’s compliance with any security requirements with respect to any Secured,
Sterile or SIDA Areas. Requirements for connecting into the Port Authority network are detailed
in the Port Authority Technology Department – Technology Standards Overview.
3.4.5.4. Electronic Access Control and Alarm Monitoring Systems
(ACAM)
Specific areas that will be viewable from the Access Control/Alarm Monitoring System shall
include, but shall not be limited to:
1. Doors and/or portals leading to runways or AOA areas or corridors; Alarms shall be
correlated with the associated VSS providing a visual record of any door breach or alarm
event.
2. All doors from any Public Area to any Security Identification Display Area or Secured Area.
3. Panic or duress alarms that may be installed and associated with employee or public
safety events.
The Port Authority uses Lenel OnGuard for Access Control and Alarm Monitoring application. Any
data sharing or third-party interfaces that may be required shall be compatible with the Port
Authority system. Additional dialog will be required to work through the specifics of any design
that may or may not be needed.
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3.4.5.5. Access Control System Management Policies
The Port Authority requires that the terminal operator establish management policies that are
regularly monitored and enforced including but not limited to the following.
1. Issue written access control policies and procedures that employees and authorized
visitors must follow (e.g., no tailgating/piggy-backing policy).
2. Investigate access incident violations and maintain documentation of investigation and
follow up with employees or authorized visitors based upon review of ACS audit records.
3. Conduct periodic random spot inspections of employee and authorized visitor electronic
access cards and their personal identification credentials.
4. Store tenant access control data for a minimum of three (3) years (i.e. alarms, access
granted, denied, etc.).
5. Install alarms that will sound if and when a cabinet storing sensitive security information
is accessed.
6. Store tenant card holder record data for a minimum of seven (7) years (i.e. people who
have or had a badge in the past seven years and associated personnel data for
cardholders).
3.4.5.6. Biometric Authentication
Fingerprint readers, facial recognition Video Surveillance Systems (VSS), or other biometric
readers must be compatible with the identity verification method established by the terminal
operator. The type of biometric reader to be considered shall comply with the Port Authority
specific requirements and instructions. Terminal plans may propose the latest manufacturer
products during the design phase that are compatible with the credentialing and Access Control
systems for Port Authority consideration and approval. Terminal operators shall coordinate with
the ASM to determine the necessary requirements. Any TSA regulated access point can only be
controlled by access media issued by the Port Authority Credentialing Office (SIDA cards).
Alternate access media to BOH areas which is not a regulated access point may be approved by
the ASM. All requests for this must be provided to the ASM prior to the submittal of any contract
drawings for Port Authority approval.
3.4.5.7. Badging or Credentialing
Each Port Authority airport has an ID Office location at which airport-specific credentials are
issued. An Airport Security ID Card, when properly displayed, shows that the cardholder is
permitted access to non-public, Secured or Sterile Areas of the airport to perform their job duties.
All persons entering non-public, Secured or Sterile Areas shall comply with all applicable security
regulations and procedures as established by the Port Authority pursuant to 49 CFR, Parts 1540
and 1542.
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3.4.5.8. Electronic Card Access
At a minimum, tenant electronic ACS system shall be configured to reliably meet the following
performance criteria:
1. Prevent unauthorized visitor access.
2. Restrict employee access to sensitive areas.
3. Support management of access credentials.
4. Accommodate trusted vendors and suppliers.
5. Generate traffic reports by time-of-day, day-of-week and more.
6. Track entry/exit times by employee or department.
7. Retrieve audit data for review in case of an incident.
8. Perform centralized lock-down in the event of an emergency security threat.
9. Equip exterior entrance doors and sensitive interior doors with high security locks.
10. Limit employee access to only areas where they have an operational need to be present.
11. The ACS shall be capable of being upgraded to incorporate identification technologies in
addition to just an access card. For example, requiring a card and a Personal Identification
Number (PIN) or utilizing a fusion biometric device (e.g. fingerprint, iris, or facial
identification).
12. Access Control events and Transaction Data shall be kept for a minimum of three (3) years
by the airline terminal operator.
3.4.5.9. Manhole Lock Systems (Access Covers)
All utility manholes included but not limited to tenant space, AOA apron or adjacent to a security
fence, lockable covers with a standard locking tool are required. These manholes must be
maintained in a locked status at all times to restrict access for authorized use only.
3.4.6. Video Surveillance Systems (VSS)
At a minimum, tenants are required to plan for, install, maintain, and operate a comprehensive
Video Surveillance Systems (VSS). The VSS shall provide continuous views of persons for
tracking from the point of entry to the terminal (i.e., terminal roadways and sidewalk), all the way
through the terminal, passenger screening checkpoint, and up to the boarding gate, except for
restrooms, and shall be configured to reliably meet the following performance criteria:
1. Capability to configure and provide computer aided monitoring alerts to console operator
in SOC when anomalies are noted (also referred to as supporting programmable computer
analytics).
2. Utilize only Internet Protocol (IP) cameras that have capabilities to send and receive data
via a computer network based on camera models and firmware that are appropriate for
the environmental conditions, required Field of Views, and are compatible and capable to
integrate with all the ACS, VMS and other systems called for in this Guidelines.
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3. At a minimum, camera display and storage system image quality shall be capable of
Identification Surveillance, however it should be noted that not all areas may require that
level of resolution, see Section 10.2.8 for additional information.
4. Enable all VSS camera views to be electronically streamed (monitored and displayed) by
the Port Authority upon request on a 24/7 basis by tying in system to the Port Authority’s
AOC. Contact the Airport Security Manager for the specific technical requirements.
5. Tenants must provide copies of any video stream upon Port Authority request to be used
for any lawful purpose (i.e., forensic, law enforcement).
6. All elements covered herein for the VSS shall have an uninterrupted power source (UPS)
and generator backup that can sustain operations for a minimum of four (4) hours. An
audible alarm, connected to the AOC to indicate UPS malfunction must be operational
when the UPS is activated and in use.
7. In addition to the VSS camera locations that are integrated with the Access Control System
under Section 3.4.5 and Video Management & Surveillance Systems under Section 3.4.7,
provide the following minimum camera coverage for situational awareness and incident
management in airline terminals. The Surveillance Levels for these areas will vary
depending on the operational need and design of the terminal, review of surveillance
levels shall be provided to Port Authority as part of the design process; see Section 10.2.8
(Surveillance Video Design Methodology) for additional information:
a. Coverage of landside areas including but are not limited to each level and all lanes
of the frontage roadways; the full width and length of sidewalk areas for passenger
and package drop off and pick-up; and all loading docks and restricted parking
areas near the front of the terminal.
b. Building perimeter ensuring all means of ingress and egress are covered by VSS.
c. Coverage inside the terminal from the terminal entrance/exit doors all the way to
the departure gates including but not limited to terminal Public Areas, pre-TSA
checkpoint queuing, ticketing, baggage claim, meter greeter, ground
transportation, unclaimed baggage, concessions, and all BOH spaces.
d. Coverage of the security screening areas.
e. Coverage of airside areas including, but not limited to: AOA entry/exit points.
f. Coverage of Sterile Areas including, but not limited to retail corridors, vertical and
horizontal transportation corridors, all secure entry/exit doors, and baggage
handling areas.
g. Coverage of Secured Areas, specifically the Ramp and Aircraft gate areas.
h. Coverage of baggage make-up areas and TSA baggage screening areas.
i. Cameras that view the loading dock areas and adjacent corridors and spaces.
j. Cameras that view the critical infrastructures rooms/closets (mechanical rooms,
electrical rooms, water tank rooms, telecom rooms, etc.).
k. Cameras that view the fire stairwells and cameras located inside the fire stairwells.
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3.4.7. Video Management & Surveillance Systems (VMSS)
At a minimum, tenant Video Management & Surveillance Systems (VMSS) shall be configured to
reliably meet the following performance criteria which includes the requirement that the VMSS
shall be configured to be shared with the Port Authority ASM and/or PAPD upon request:
1. Enable the display of live and recorded security camera video feeds at designated
locations and support archiving video feeds on redundant VMSS servers.
2. Enable the users to operate on the video streams, distribute the video, store the video and
perform other functions.
3. Ability to call-up cameras, monitor and process images, and organize how images are
stored, retrieved, and integrated to third party applications.
4. Enable all video from the integrated VMSS to be electronically shared with (monitored and
displayed by) the Port Authority upon request on a 24/7 basis, and on stored media if
requested.
5. Store all VSS streams for a minimum of thirty-one (31) days for future retrieval. The OCSO
shall have the ability to access to the feeds.
6. Configure the distributed video recording server architecture and supporting software
application to allow each of the management or head-end servers to operate in an
independent mode, furnishing identical capabilities for live viewing, video recording and
review functions to its connected review workstations.
7. Configure the video storage solution to avoid any single point of failure and to operate
independently of one another and support all integrated security systems.
8. All elements covered herein for the VMSS shall have an uninterrupted power source
(UPS) that can sustain operations for a minimum of four (4) hours. An audible alarm,
connected to the AOC to indicate UPS malfunction must be operational when the UPS is
activated and in use.
9. See Section 10.2.8 Surveillance Video Design Methodology for additional information
related to VMSS.
3.4.8. VMSS Base System
The design of any video expansion or renovation project shall be configured as follows:
1. Core system hardware shall be located in a secure communications room (see Section
3.4.5.2 Access Control to Back of House Areas).
2. Contractor shall furnish equipment with the most current compatible version of firmware
and software. Additionally, provisions shall be made to ensure the equipment is running
the current compatible version of firmware and software at all times.
3.4.9. TSA Checkpoint VSS and VMSS Requirements
When the TSA Checkpoint VSS and VMSS systems are the responsibility of the lessee and/or
terminal developer and are to be integrated into the terminal systems, the following shall apply:
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1. For VSS coverage of TSA Passenger Security Screening Checkpoints (SSCP), see the
requirements in TSA Checkpoint Design Guide (CDG).
2. TSA prefers VSS design as an extension of an existing facility security system within the
airport. When VSS is part of an extended system, the equipment shall match the existing
hardware in order to minimize maintenance costs and provide operator familiarity.
3. All camera “Field of Views” must be approved by the local TSA office assigned to the
specific Port Authority airport and camera feeds must go to the location designated by
TSA.
4. Local TSA and law enforcement (PAPD) shall be able to access the system at or near the
checkpoint. Access to the system shall also be provided at PAPD locations on airport
property which may be outside the terminal. Tenants shall coordinate with Port Authority
for specific details on how to achieve that functionality for PAPD.
5. VMSS system shall be configured so that any camera streams of the SSCP may not be
disclosed unless approved by local TSA and the ASM.
6. Configure Airport Checkpoint Digital Closed-Circuit Television (ACDTV) Systems (a
component of the Airport Video Surveillance Program) to record activity at passenger
screening checkpoints and to provide the PAPD, and the TSA, with a tool to assess and
deal with security incidents more effectively.
7. Notify the Port Authority, TSA and ASM when ACDTV Systems are modified, extended or
restructured at checkpoints. This includes maintenance activity that may take the ACDTV
system offline during maintenance window. Times and schedule of maintenance activities
must be coordinated with TSA and ASM.
8. Provide full size design drawings to the local TSA office assigned to the specific Port
Authority airport that show the following:
a. VSS & Electrical System Abbreviations, Symbols and General Notes
b. Camera Mounting Details, system demolition (components to remain or be
removed)
c. VSS schedule indicating the focus, aim, mounting, and applicable remarks for each
new or existing camera.
d. Clean floorplans that clearly show architectural layout of checkpoint areas and
camera locations for use by TSA and Port Authority for familiarity and situational
awareness purposes.
3.4.10. Public Address Systems (PAS)
1. Public Address Systems (PAS) must be sufficiently flexible to handle the various planned
usages including emergency notifications.
2. PAS shall be configured by zones so that advisory messages and emergency
announcements can be directed to specific areas where an emergency develops.
3. Emergency notifications shall take priority over all other messages. Standard wording of
the distinct types of emergency messages shall be developed in advance.
PAS shall be integrated to enable alarm notifications to be precise, indicating location,
type of danger and evacuation directions in calmly spoken live or recorded messages.
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4. PAS shall provide sufficient sound volume and audible clarity of messages, a clear source
of the message, proper routing of audio signals, appropriate equipment selection and
acoustic design to avoid acoustic feedback and echo and to ensure that sound quality is
maintained.
5. PAS shall have a minimum four (4) hour uninterrupted power source.
6. PAS shall be connected to the Port Authority central monitoring station for the purpose of
auditory monitoring and for remote operation in an emergency.
7. The PAS shall be tied into the Port Authority AOC. Actual emergency messaging may
come from PAPD as directed by the Incident Commander.
8. The PAS shall allow the AOC and other areas designated by the ASM to have message
programming/overriding capability.
3.4.11. Variable Message Signage
1. Variable message signage must be sufficiently flexible to handle the various planned
usages including emergency notifications.
2. Variable message signage must be coordinated with advisory messages and emergency
announcements on the PAS and follow the same protocols.
3. Variable message signage shall be connected to the Port Authority central monitoring
station for remote operation in an emergency.
4. Variable message signage must be tied into the Port Authority AOC. Directing of
messaging may come from PAPD as directed by the Incident Commander.
5. All elements covered herein for the variable message signage shall have an uninterrupted
power source (UPS) and generator backup that can sustain operations for a minimum of
four (4) hours. An audible alarm, connected to the AOC to indicate UPS malfunction must
be operational when the UPS is activated and in use.
3.4.12. HVAC Systems
HVAC systems must comply with the following security requirements:
1. Air intakes for the building shall be located so that they are inaccessible to the public or
other unauthorized personnel and shall be protected by a detection system.
2. If they are located on the roof, access to the roof shall be controlled by hatches that are
entry controlled, alarmed and monitored by VMSS (or by another type of unauthorized
entry detection system).
3. The HVAC systems shall have a highly effective air filtration system (MERV 14 or higher)
and the ability to isolate airflow under the tenant lease. Filtration and air-cleaning systems
may protect a building and its occupants from the effects of a CBRNE attack.
3F3
4. Air recirculation intakes, mechanical rooms, and HVAC plenums shall be secured against
unauthorized access and provide immediate detection of unauthorized access. All HVAC
back of house (BOH) spaces shall be for authorized personnel only and shall be enforced
by employee background checks, official ID credentials, key card entry tied into CACS,
and VMSS.
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5. Video surveillance equipment shall be installed at all entry points and all entries shall be
monitored and recorded.
Figure 1 – Protected Rooftop HVAC Configuration
3.4.13. Accommodation of Space in Public Areas for Police
Screening Operations
1. Terminal plans shall incorporate space on the floors of the departures level and arrivals
level that can be made available to PAPD to set up random screening operations.
2. Allow space for PAPD to set up a table to randomly select passengers for the purpose of
inspecting luggage and packages for concealed threats and for use by PAPD canine
operations at the terminal frontage.
3. Screening operations shall apply to passengers entering the building at the departures
level with luggage or people entering the arrivals level to meet arriving passengers.
3.4.14. Accommodation of New Security Technologies and
Protocols
Tenant terminal designs, especially at entrance locations, shall be sufficiently flexible and
adaptable to be capable of accommodating new, emerging, and next generation security
technologies (e.g. "at-speed" explosives, weapons, and other threat detection technologies such
CBRNE at entrances) with minimal installation disruption. Accommodations may include spare
conduits routed to electrical power and communications rooms to minimize the need to disrupt
ceilings, floors, and walls in the future.
3.4.15. Terminal Airside Operations Areas
Terminal planners and designers must limit the number of delivery portals to Sterile and
Secured/SIDA Areas to the absolute minimum number possible based on the terminal’s physical
configuration. The goal is to consolidate all deliveries to a specific location or a reduced number
of locations, increase ramp safety and security, and reduce inspection costs.
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3.4.16. Expansion and/or Replacement of Security Systems Areas
It shall be the responsibility of the airport tenant to expand, update or replace any of the above
listed BOH Systems and TSA Checkpoint VSS and VMSS under above Sections (Section 3.4.5
through 3.4.15) in the event the Port Authority is no longer supporting installation of these systems
outside of the previous original tenant agreement. Additionally, these systems must be kept in a
state of good repair and required functionality must be maintained throughout their useful life.
This includes ensuring appropriate maintenance contracts are put in place to maintain the
physical and logical (i.e. software upgrades and patching, administration) beyond the warranty
period and for as long as the system or component or equipment is in use.
Security Related Areas
3.5.1. Secured Area
Although the Secured Area generally includes portions of the airside and terminal, it is important
to locate Secured Areas contiguously or as close together as possible to maximize ease of
access by response personnel, utilize common areas of VSS surveillance coverage, and
minimize requirements for redundant boundaries and electronic access controls. Where there
are several unconnected Secured Areas, such as baggage makeup areas, movement areas,
safety areas, etc., each shall require separate but integrated electronic access controls.
3.5.2. Sterile Area
General security requirements of the Sterile Area include:
1. All portals that serve as potential access points to Sterile Areas (i.e., doors, windows,
passageways, etc.) must be secured to prevent bypassing the security screening
checkpoint. Access control readers shall be installed at the checkpoint to verify that a
displayed badge is valid.
2. The number of access points shall be limited to the minimum that is operationally
necessary, as determined by the airport operator.
3. Portals, including gates and fire egress doors, must prevent unauthorized entry by any
person to the Sterile Area, and to the Secured Area, which includes airside and baggage
make-up areas. Doors must also comply with applicable local fire and life safety codes
and Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) requirements, among others. The reliance upon
security guards in lieu of electronic access control technology is not permitted.
Discussions with local building and/or life safety code officials shall take place early to
resolve special design issues, including how to accomplish the securing of fire doors,
possibly with delayed egress hardware.
4. Sterile Areas shall be designed and constructed to prevent articles from being passed
from non-Sterile Areas into Sterile or Secured Areas such as restrooms, airline lounges
and kitchen facilities, through plumbing chases, air vents, drains, trash chutes, utility
tunnels, or other channels.
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5. Sterile Area exit locations/boundaries shall not exist in areas where there is a high
passenger traffic (sterile or public). They shall be located a sufficient distance away from
any high traffic walkways, corridors so as not to potentially confuse passengers as to their
travel path to areas other than the exit location.
6. Security personnel stationed at Sterile Area exit locations/boundaries shall be stationed
just outside of the sterile/public boundary line on the sterile side of the exit portal.
7. During construction or modification of facilities, provisions must be made to ensure that
any individual who has not undergone screening is prevented from having contact with a
screened person inside the Sterile Area.
8. New terminal plans shall provide as much distance as possible between exits from the
Sterile Area and the nearest TSA screening checkpoint. No vendors or other material
deliveries shall be processed through the passenger screening checkpoint into the Sterile
Area.
3.5.3. Exclusive Use Area
An exclusive use area is any portion of an Airport tenant’s Secured Area, Sterile, AOA, or SIDA,
including individual access points, for which an aircraft operator or foreign air carrier with a
security program under 49 CFR §§ 1544 or 1546 assumes security responsibilities under an
Exclusive Area Agreement (EAA) with the Port Authority, under 49 CFR § 1542.111 (Exclusive
Use Area). The EAA, which is incorporated into the Port Authority’s Airport Security Program
(ASP), must be approved first by the Port Authority and thereafter by TSA.
Within the Exclusive Use Area, the responsible aircraft operator or foreign air carrier must perform
security control requirements described in the EAA. Pursuant to the EAA, the aircraft operator,
not the Port Authority, must control access and movement within the exclusive area.
Specific requirements and conditions are contained in the EAA, including a description of very
specific areas for which the aircraft operator assumes security responsibilities. This does not
include law enforcement responsibilities, which always remain with the Port Authority.
The Port Authority has the right of inspection of a tenant’s operating area to determine compliance
with security requirements.
3.5.4. Airport Tenant Security Program Area
The Airport Tenant Security Program (ATSP) identifies areas within the Port Authority aviation
facilities specified by agreement between the Port Authority and airport tenants that stipulates the
measures by which the tenant shall assume security responsibility under 49 CFR § 1542.113.
ATSPs are considered exclusive use areas, except that a tenant may not assume responsibility
for a passenger terminal. The ATSP, which is incorporated into the Port Authority’s ASP, must
be approved first by the ASM and then final TSA approval.
The Port Authority has the right of inspection of a tenant’s operating area to determine compliance
with security requirements.
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4. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR TERMINALS AND
OTHER BUILDINGS IN PUBLIC AREAS
Terminal Public Areas consist of the following areas: arrivals, departures, ticketing, check in,
baggage claim, passenger drop off and pick up, public frontage roadway, truck loading docks and
any other area accessible to the public prior to the TSA security checkpoint.
Frontage Roadway and Sidewalk Areas
Efficient traffic control is required to keep the building frontage open and quickly accessible to
emergency access by police, first responders and emergency vehicles when an emergency
occurs. Port Authority requirements include:
1. The design shall maximize the standoff distance between vehicles on the roadway and
the building façade which must be enforced by crash rated bollards which are specified in
Section 4.2.
2. Provide a sufficient number of traffic lanes for passenger drop off while affording strict
operational enforcement of “no standing” rules for vehicles.
3. Provide clear and easily understood traffic signage to direct expeditious movement of
vehicles and pedestrians through the frontage roadways and sidewalks.
4. Collaboration with the Port Authority in the planning phase on the use and expansion of
landside taxi hold areas and for hire vehicle cell phone lots at on-airport locations
accessible to the terminal.
5. Vehicle entrances and exits to public parking facilities directly in front of terminals are not
permitted.
6. Recognition Surveillance of these areas with coverage adequate for the usage of video
analytics and police investigations, minimizing blind spots or sizable gaps in coverage.
Enforcement of Vehicle Standoff (Use of Bollards)
1. Standoff protection measures from vehicles must be provided adjacent to critical building
assets along a standoff limit.
2. Security bollards are required to be installed for the full length of the building roadway frontage
providing a generous standoff distance from the sidewalk curb to the terminal façade.
3. The standoff distance between the bollard line and the terminal façade is relied upon for
protection and as such shall be maximized by the designer and shall equal or exceed the
distance determined by the security engineer’s Protective Design Narrative defined in Section
3.4.1, or as required by similar Port Authority facilities.
4. When bollards are installed at existing building frontages, they shall be set at a minimum
distance of 18” and maximum distance of 36” from the terminal frontage sidewalk curb line
that is closest to the terminal façade.
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5. Security bollards shall have been tested and found to resist the dynamic impact for the
maximum required vehicle weight and speed specified by ASTM F2656 criteria with a
Dynamic Penetration Rating P1 less than or equal to 3.3 feet.
6. The vehicle impact speed may be reduced if it can be shown by vector analysis that the
highest 90-degree impact speed achievable is less than the maximum.
7. Protective bollard dimensions and stainless-steel exterior sleeves are required to comply with
Port Authority design standards.
8. For bollards, the clear distance between the structural members shall not exceed 48” and the
clear opening between the finished bollard covers shall be ADA compatible.
9. ADA compliant curb cuts with tactile warning surface shall be provided between bollards per
local codes and ordinances.
10. A minimum curb height of 6” must be provided at roadway frontages that accommodate ADA
compliant kneeling buses.
11. Where there is no sidewalk curb required or constructed, a continuous ADA compliant tactile
warning surface must be provided for the full length of the bollard line to establish the edge of
roadway.
12. Where the maximum bollard spacing is not adequate to accommodate the building operator’s
clear opening requirement for operational or maintenance access, an equivalent crash rated
horizontal beam barrier system or approved equal may be utilized at those locations.
13. Horizontal beam barriers shall have equivalent structural crash rating as the standard bollard
system. They may be operated manually, or power operated, with backup power provided.
14. Horizontal beam barriers shall be capable of being locked with access monitored by VMS.
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Figure 2a – Security Bollards at Terminal Frontage Roadway
Figure 3b – Crash Test Ratings for Security Bollards at Terminal Frontage Roadway
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Terminal Building Entrances, Curtainwall and Façade
Glazing System
1. Security concerns must be addressed during planning and design of terminal building
facades. The exterior curtain wall shall incorporate a blast debris mitigating system that shall
provide a level of protection that is consistent with glazing systems designed to achieve a
“high level” of protection as defined by the ISC Security Design Criteria for Federal Buildings,
consistent with GSA Performance Condition 3b or better which provides a “High Level” of
protection and “Low Hazard Level”.
2. Glazing panels themselves shall meet ASTM F2912 - 17 Standard Specification for Glazing
and Glazing Systems Subject to Air Blast Loadings. See Figure 3 for an example of Blast
Resistant Glazing System.
3. This area of the terminal requires critical security planning considerations to reduce risks
associated with close-proximity to vehicles and unscreened passengers, luggage, and
packages.
4. Entrance doors on the arrivals level shall be designed to be capable to operate in “exit only
mode” so that either PAPD or the terminal operator can restrict access by taxi drivers, “for
hire” drivers and others meeting arriving passengers to the sidewalk frontage area only, due
to security, safety or other operational concerns.
5. Entry/exit portals shall be designed with sufficient width to accommodate mass pedestrian exit
during emergency evacuation.
Figure 3 – Blast Resistant Cable Supported Building Facade
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Building Construction for Blast Loading
The Port Authority has established specific threat definitions and threat magnitudes to be used
by building designers and applied by blast analysis experts at its facilities. The standoff protection
distances are defined in Section 4.2. Based upon the standoff distance determined by the
designer’s PDN, the following criteria shall be followed for the design of building structures.
1. Threat magnitudes will be provided by the Port Authority.
2. Resistance to blast effects must be designed in accordance with the specific PDN Report
developed for the building structure in the planning phase.
3. The EOR for blast analysis and blast mitigations shall demonstrate sufficient previous
experience in force protection design for building projects of a similar nature. See Section
3.4.1 for additional information.
4. The performance requirement for the building structure when considering the blast effects
from a vehicle threat on the roadway frontage is that no global or progressive collapse
shall occur for the structural framing system and that post event, there shall be no worse
than repairable damage to the building structure.
5. Damage from a hand carried explosive device threat inside the building in the pre-TSA
screening Public Areas of terminals (departures area, baggage claim area, or arrivals hall
area) shall result in no more than local floor framing collapse, without collapse progressing
to adjacent building framed bays or floors above.
6. The EOR may utilize various means and methods to design the terminal building structure
to meet the blast performance requirements including, but not limited to, any combination
of the following:
a. increasing threat standoff or reliably controlling threat access.
b. providing structural building system redundancy so that a locally damaged
structural element shall not lead to global or progressive collapse and overall, the
structure shall be repairable.
c. physically hardening individual structural elements to resist blast effects so they
do not fail and are repairable.
Landside Vehicular Parking Lots and Garages
1. Vehicular parking lots and structures for public use shall be proven to have adequate
standoff distance from airline terminals and other critical airport infrastructure (Section
3.3). Parking structures shall be designed to resist progressive collapse due to blast
forces.
2. Vehicle height in parking structures shall be limited to 9’-6” vertical clearance.
3. Damage to parking structures from the vehicle size threat shall be limited to ASCE 59-11
“Heavy Damage” limits or better.
4. Maximum damage shall result in only localized collapse of no more than two adjacent
structural columns that extends vertically through the structure but doesn’t extend laterally.
5. Restricted parking areas close to the terminal must be access controlled, allowing vehicle
access to only known persons or screened individuals who exhibit proper credentials.
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6. Access control shall consist of a staffed guard post with a “sally port” consisting of two
lines of movable barriers to limit entry to only one vehicle at a time that meets the criteria
for the maximum required vehicle weight and speed specified by ASTM F2656.
7. Access control shall be supervised by a guard and monitored remotely by VSS.
8. LPRs shall be installed at the access entry and exits points, and shall be integrated with
VSS.
9. The perimeter of the restricted parking area shall be separated from any adjacent
roadways, or from any sidewalks/curbs mountable by vehicles, by a fixed crash rated
barrier or bollards that meet the criteria for the maximum required vehicle weight and
speed specified by ASTM F2656 to deny unauthorized vehicle entry.
10. Consult with the ASM to identify and determine physical and electronic security
countermeasure requirements.
Operational Security at Terminal Frontage, Arrivals and
Departures Halls
4.6.1. Tenant Coordination with Airport Security Manager (ASM)
and Port Authority Police Department (PAPD)
Terminal operators shall coordinate their security operations and communications plans with
PAPD by working through the Airport Security Manager for approval, to implement the following
criteria:
1. Provide sufficient security staffing at the terminal frontage to support the continuing
movement of vehicles and the avoidance of any vehicles being left unoccupied.
2. Provide space for PAPD to perform scheduled random screening of passenger luggage
at the roadway frontage and at the airline terminal arrivals and departures halls as
described in Section 3.4.13.
Figure 4 – Airport Luggage Screening Signage Advisory
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3. Post advisory announcements distributed by the Port Authority that all persons, luggage
and packages are subject to random searches for safety and security reasons and run
audible announcements related to security awareness as requested by the ASM.
4. Manage terminal pick up and drop off operations to maintain steady traffic flow so as not
to impede emergency response.
5. Unattended vehicles, luggage or packages are not permitted on the frontage roadway or
sidewalk.
4.6.2. Terminal Public Areas
The Public Areas of the terminals consist of airline ticketing counters, baggage claim, and may
also have retail stores, restaurants, elevators, escalators, seating areas and other spaces in the
terminal departures and arrivals hall Public Areas. Newer and recently renovated airline terminals,
designed after the establishment of the TSA and TSA operated passenger screening facilities at
airports have decreased the size of Public Areas in the pre-screening zone and have located most
public facilities including waiting areas, retail, dining, and traveler club facilities beyond the TSA
screening zone. However, airline terminals that continue to have waiting areas, and other Public
Areas in the pre-TSA screening zone are required to diligently monitor those areas via VSS
coverage for any suspicious behavior and have assigned security staff to intervene and notify
PAPD when there is any suspicious behavior. The minimum Port Authority security requirements
in these areas are described in this section.
1. These areas are required to be monitored from the terminal SOC for situational awareness
of suspicious behavior utilizing VSS. VSS coverage shall be sufficient to cover all areas
where the public gather upon departure or arrivals. See Section 3.4.6 on VSS.
2. The terminal operator’s security personnel shall be trained to observe and report unusual
behavior or suspicious activity, particularly in the pre-screening Public Areas of the
departures lobby.
3. Security management must also ensure their security personnel are provided up-to-date
situational awareness information to improve their readiness to react correctly to observed
anomalies.
4. During implementation of crisis contingency plans, expect terminal operations to be
affected by special security measures as determined by Port Authority and ASMs.
5. Public Areas shall be planned to provide for easy egress in event of emergency.
6. Self-service public storage lockers are not permitted in any terminal building.
7. Avoid sight lines from adjacent stair landings or balconies looking down on ticket counters,
baggage claims or TSA screening lines. Where such sight lines are unavoidable, bullet
proof glass shall be installed on stair and balcony parapets that look down on Public Areas.
8. Minimize the number of terminal entry point to those necessary to accommodate
throughput.
9. Minimize concealment areas in public space yet provide for defensive shelter for the public
if under attack and for rapid evacuation.
10. Minimize or eliminate seating in ticketing areas.
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4.6.3. Security at Baggage Claim and Inbound Baggage Areas
The baggage claim for domestic flights is located in the non-secure Public Areas of the terminal
arrival hall with direct access to the curbside and accessible to unscreened transient ground
transportation agents.
The planning and design of terminals shall incorporate the following operational security practices
in the baggage claim area:
1. Utilize trained security personnel to provide claim ticket monitoring, provide customer
assistance to arriving passengers and to engage any suspicious persons who exhibit
abnormal behavior.
2. Where possible, passenger pick up of checked firearms shall be in a separate location from
the baggage claim area.
3. The procedure for picking up a checked firearm is as follows:
a. Firearm must be in a locked box.
b. PAPD is notified that a passenger is picking up a checked firearm at the terminal. Follow
any instructions given by PAPD.
c. Passenger must first be escorted out of the terminal by a security guard before being
handed the firearm.
4. Position VSS, with Identification level surveillance capabilities for surveillance and situational
awareness of any suspicious behavior, and place at all exit and entrance doors to the arrivals
level.
5. Baggage claim systems must be designed as to prevent direct access to the baggage make
up area. Many of the current systems have doors which open and stay open providing access
into Secure areas from public.
6. Arrivals level doors to the terminal frontage shall be adaptable to operate as follows:
a. All doors can operate as “exit only” when needed.
b. In such cases, ground transportation agents may be required to enter through one central
entrance where they shall be subject to random screening for weapons or other threats
before being allowed to enter.
c. The central entrance door to be used for random screening shall be able to operate
manually as a “Sally Port” with exterior door opening first, then closing after person
enters, before the interior door is opened.
4.6.4. Trash and Recycling Receptacles in Public Areas
1. Utilize only DHS approved blast resistant trash containers with see-through plastic walls
that allow ease of visual inspection of contents through clear plastic liners, as shown in
Figure 5 . See-through walls also allow security personnel or police to quickly vet a bomb
threat.
2. Trash receptacles with opaque walls that conceal items placed within them are not
permitted.
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3. Trash receptacles with heavy walls, such as aggregate cement/stone trash containers are
not permitted.
4. Trash containers must not be located next to structural building columns.
5. Limit trash and recycling containers to the minimum number required.
6. Empty trash containers frequently.
Figure 5 – DHS Approved See-Through Trash Receptacle
4.6.5. Terminal Interior Landscaping in Public Areas
Interior landscaping which may include plantings, balconies, and pools of water, shall be designed
following guidance provided in the Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) for
Transit Facilities Recommended Practice published by the American Public Transportation
Association (APTA SS-SIS-RP-007-10A) that provides guidance on construction designs that
emphasize using the structures, spaces, lighting and people around an area to prevent crime and
to increase loss prevention. The purpose of this APTA Transit Recommended Practice is to
ensure that each transit system achieves an appropriate level of protection for people, operations
and assets, and the public. CPTED involves the design use of five strategies (natural surveillance;
natural access control; territorial reinforcement; activity support; and maintenance), all of which
are described below:
1. Natural surveillance. This strategy involves reducing crime by decreasing target
opportunities in a space/area by placing physical features, activities, and people to
maximize visibility.
2. Natural access control. Channeling people into, alongside or out of spaces/areas and
deterring entry elsewhere along the boundary are the concepts of this principle (through
the judicial placement of entrances, exits, fencing, landscaping, and lighting); This concept
denies access to crime targets and creates a perception of risk for adversaries.
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3. Territoriality. Territoriality notifies users and non-users of the boundaries of a space/area
or facility. It creates a psychological deterrent to crime by notifying users of the
space/area/facility that they are being watched and that the community is the
space/area/facility for purposeful activities.
4. Activity support. By encouraging authorized activities in public spaces, the community and
transit system ridership understand its intended use. Criminal acts are discouraged, and
an increase in safety and security of the transit system, its operations, facilities, ridership,
and people are realized.
5. Maintenance. Care and upkeep demonstrate expression of ownership for the intended
purpose of the area. A lack of care indicates loss of control of a space or area and can be
a sign of tolerance for disorder. Establishing care and maintenance standards and
continuing the service preserves the intended use of the space/area. CPTED maintenance
and care standards also safeguard the best interests of the community and transit agency
where they serve.
4.6.6. Terminal Expansion or Renovation
Airline terminals that are planned to undergo expansion or renovation will be required to comply
with the current security design standards for new terminals under the ASGM. The scope of the
expansion or renovation project and the security related design that is anticipated should be
discussed with the Port Authority facility managers early in the process.
4.6.7. Gunshot Detection Systems
Gunshot Detection Systems which use acoustic and infrared sensors to detect the noise and the
flash of light associated with the discharge of a weapon shall be installed in all Public Areas of
airline terminals. The systems use this technology to rapidly locate the source of gunshots within
a terminal by triangulation on the origin of the shot. It will be used by law enforcement to improve
the speed of response to the incident and provide the operations center with information that shall
be used to alert, instruct, or advise the building occupants.
Any gunshot detection system installed by the tenant must be compatible with SDS software and
report back to the Port Authority systems such as GDS, CACS and VSS.
The Port Authority uses Shooter Detection Systems (SDS) for gunshot detection in interior
spaces. Any gunshot detection sensors must be compatible with SDS software and report back
to the Port Authority systems and to integrated with VSS to identify the location of GDS event.
The design and architecture of the gunshot detection system must be reviewed and approved by
the Port Authority.
4.6.8. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive
(CBRNE), and Detection Sensors
The integration of CBRNE will provide PANYNJ with the capability to monitor the status of the
CBRNE field devices. There are different types of modules that can be deployed throughout the
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facility, such as chemical, biological, and radiological detectors. The requirements of CBRNE
monitoring systems can vary from a single monitored detection point system to multiple detection
points that are located across a security network. CBRNE sensors support first responders by
providing information as to the release source and type of contaminant as well as provide plume
modeling, which can help to predict the direction of travel of the contaminant. As the CBRNE
program continues to evolve over time, PANYNJ and tenants will have on-going dialogues and
identify the CBRNE systems that should be included for monitoring (if applicable and/or relevant).
Any CBRNE sensors that are installed in the terminal shall be provided with the capability to report
back to existing Port Authority Police CBRNE software system, in addition to terminal software
system. Technical configuration of sensors such as contaminant libraries (what the sensors are
detecting), method of communication, and alarm escalation logic, shall be reviewed and approved
by Port Authority in order to ensure consistency in detection and response protocols for PAPD
across the airport.
The Port Authority currently uses SIGMA DTECT software for CBRNE monitoring and reporting.
The Agency has existing chemical and radiological sensors deployed at certain terminal facilities.
The design and integration will require coordination with the Port Authority to designate or install
such sensors to current and future software monitoring integrations.
4.6.9. Automated License Plate Recognition Systems (LPR)
A fully functional Automated License Plate Recognition System to be designed and constructed
to be utilized by the Lae Enforcement. This system must adhere to specific performance
standards:
1. LPR cameras must seamlessly integrate with the existing LPR system of the Port Authority
Police Department, following Port Authority-approved protocols.
2. All necessary infrastructure enabling the new equipment to communicate with the existing
system must be provided, with specifications varying by location. A hard-wired connection
is mandatory.
3. Installation sites for LPR cameras must strategically cover chokepoints and key areas
along roadways to capture both front and rear license plates, ensuring comprehensive
coverage of vehicles entering airport premises.
4. Designate shoulders along roadways and terminal frontages to allow PAPD safe access
for vehicle pull-overs and operations, minimizing risks from traffic or other hazards.
Approval from the Port Authority is required for these locations.
5. Strictly prohibit the use of LPR cameras for revenue collection; they are intended for Law
Enforcement purposes and traffic monitoring. Use cases of LPR data shall be reviewed
with OCSO as well as Port Authority Operations and Traffic Engineering.
6. Ensure ease of accessibility for maintenance vehicles such as bucket trucks or person-
lifts to the locations of LPR cameras.
7. Each LPR camera proposed should accommodate current and anticipated future traffic
volumes within the roadway network.
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8. Where feasible, supplement LPR cameras with VSS cameras to provide operators with
visual validation of traffic conditions. Include necessary infrastructure for VSS.
9. Integrate the system with the Port Authority AOC/SOC and the PAPD desk.
10. Mandate the installation of LPRs at critical vehicular entry points across specified
locations, including but not limited to; AOA Perimeter Guard Post Vehicle Gates, Terminal
Loading Dock Salley Port to/from Public Roadways, Electrical Substation Vehicle Gates,
Loading Docks at Cargo Facility Public Side Service Doors, and Vehicle Access Points to
Construction Work Zones.
4.6.10. Public Safety Life Safety (PSLS) Radio systems
PSLS Radio systems shall be designed to provide radio frequency (RF) coverage to
accommodate the needs of PAPD including mutual aid and other first responder organizations.
PSLS Radio Distributed Antenna System (DAS) shall be independent and separated from the
Cellular DAS system. PSLS Radio System shall meet all applicable codes and Port Authority
design guidelines. Maintenance, supervisory or trouble alarms related to the associated radio
equipment (PSLS and/or DAS) and UPS in the facility shall be sent to the AOC or location
designated by the Port Authority. Standard Operating Procedures must be established to correct
trouble alarms or any degradation in performance of the PSLS or DAS system that may be caused
by RF interference or failed equipment.
The tenant is responsible for maintenance of the radio equipment and distributed antenna system
within their facility including preventative maintenance tasks, future upgrades necessary to keep
the system in a state of good repair. Coordinate with OCSO the system channels and radio
frequencies in addition to required functionality of the radio system.
AirTrain Stations
AirTrain light rail system stations may be located across the frontage circulation roadway from the
terminal, in which case the AirTrain passengers arrive at the terminal entrance by either an at-
grade cross walk or an elevated pedestrian bridge. In other cases, AirTrain stations shall be
located within the Public Area of terminals. Security within AirTrain stations is the responsibility
of the system operator, however, any emergency response event at an AirTrain terminal station
shall require coordination between the terminal operator, the AirTrain operator, PAPD, and the
ASM. For that reason, the following security measures are required:
1. When AirTrain stations are located within the terminal, the terminal operator is required to
provide VSS coverage and public-address system coverage, gunshot detection system
and CBRNE sensor detection at the station entrance portals to the terminal in accordance
with Sections 4.6.8, Video Surveillance Systems (VSS) Section 3.4.6, Video Management
& Surveillance Systems (VMSS) Section 3.4.7, Public Address Systems Section 4.6.10
and Gunshot Detection Systems, and Section 4.6.7.
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2. Station entrances to the terminal are required to be treated as any other entrance to the
terminal, therefore, for security planning and operations purposes, Accommodation of
Space in Public Areas for Police Screening Operations Section 3.4.13, and
Accommodation of New Security Technologies and Protocols Section 3.4.14 shall apply.
3. For the same reason as above, for security operations Operational Security at Terminal
Frontage, Arrivals and Departures Halls Section 4.6 shall apply.
Loading Docks for Delivery to Vendors
1. The Port Authority requires 100% screening of all vehicles and cargo that is delivered to
airline terminals at Port Authority airports by one of the alternative methods of delivery
listed below.
2. All new terminals are required to incorporate a remote, consolidated distribution center,
located outside the airport, in another part of the airport or at the far edge of the terminal,
which must provide the airport an opportunity to screen deliveries by electronic methods,
canine methods or other types of inspections as per TSA directives, for prohibited items
and explosives prior to entry to the airport or terminal.
3. Deliveries shall be pre-scheduled and confirmed by the airline terminal operator.
4. Otherwise, goods destined for vendors must have direct access to the drop-off or pick-up
location from a public (possibly restricted) roadway that does not require access to the
AOA, SIDA, or Secured Area. The drop-off location to the terminal must provide loading
dock facilities for trucks as large as tractor-trailers. Trucks shall only be permitted when
the loading dock fully complies with items 5., 6. and 7. below.
5. In no case shall loading docks be placed adjacent to critical infrastructure and facilities
(see Section 4.9 for definition).
6. The Port Authority requires that all vehicles intended for deliveries to landside loading
docks be pre-screened and cleared prior to entry access pursuant to TSA directives. This
shall be achieved by operation of a truck-specific access point at the required standoff
distance based upon the security designer’s criteria and configured with a staffed guard
post and a “sally port” consisting of two lines of movable barriers to limit entry to only one
vehicle at a time that meets the criteria for the maximum required vehicle weight and speed
specified by ASTM F2656. Security guard personnel shall verify cargo loads, shipping
authorization documents, and conduct visual vehicle inspection as per guard post orders.
7. Space in the “sally port” must be allocated and configured to allow for physical inspection
of vehicles and their contents. During heightened security conditions, physical inspection,
including the under-carriage, of all delivery vehicles approaching the terminal may be
required, with consideration for additional temporary vehicle inspection points and holding
pens.
8. When pre-screening is not possible, the goods themselves shall be received in an area
where they can be inspected and/or screened upon arrival.
9. for regulatory and inspection reasons, it is required that the screening facility have
adequate VSS coverage, video storage, and be protected by electronic access control.
The Port Authority shall have access to conduct security inspections.
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10. Delivery personnel who use the airport loading docks and delivery areas must be provided
with appropriate ID such as a driver’s license, or company ID and may be subject to
random inspection background checks.
Terminal Non-Public Areas
a. Service Corridors, Stairwells and Vertical Circulation: Following sections are similar
to Part III – TSA Recommended Guidelines, Section D – Terminal, in reference
4Fbut shall
be treated as mandatory:
1) To avoid opening portals for unauthorized access to Secured or Sterile areas,
service corridors shall be designed so as not to cross area boundaries; if crossings
are unavoidable, transitions must be minimized, access-controlled, and with
supporting electronic surveillance.
2) Service corridors shall be used to minimize the quantity and types of security
access points. If access requirements are clustered by similarities of personnel or
tenant areas (such as airline ticket offices, concession storage areas,
concessionaires, or equipment maintenance access points), a common service
corridor shall be used to serve multiple entities and provide greater control of
security than separate access points for each user.
3) The planning and design of non-service corridors shall consider placement and
possible use by airport emergency personnel and law enforcement agencies.
While use of service corridors by emergency and Law Enforcement Officer (LEO)
personnel is not a security requirement, proper corridor placement and design
characteristics enhance response times as well as allow for private, non-disruptive
transport of injured persons or security detainees.
4) Vertical circulation and stairwells provide access not only to multiple floors, but
often to multiple security levels as well. Fire stairs typically connect as many of the
building’s floors/levels as possible. Since they are located primarily to meet code
separation requirements and provide egress from the facility, they are not often
conveniently located regarding security boundaries or airport operation. In these
instances, additional non-fire stairs, escalators, and elevators must be integrated
into planning and design. Optimally, vertical cores will be shared for egress and
operational movement. The Port Authority will have direct access to these areas.
5) When any elevator serves one or more Sterile or Secured Area floors it shall not
open at any floor serving Public Areas. The same shall be true for any elevator
serving a Public Area floor. It shall not open at Sterile or Secured Areas floors. The
elevator control panel will only allow the fire department to override this feature.
b. Airport and Tenant Administrative/Personnel Offices: Following sections are similar
to Part III – TSA Recommended Guidelines, Section D – Terminal in reference
6
but shall
be treated as mandatory under these Guidelines:
1) Office areas shall be located close to the primary activity of the occupants to
minimize the need for multiple security transitions. There may be various office
areas within multiple security areas depending upon the function and preferences
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of the airport personnel. Office areas shall be located and connected via corridors
and vertical circulation, to minimize the amount that the office personnel will need
to cross security boundaries in their daily activities. Likewise, office spaces shall
be planned with consideration for visitors and public access, to avoid the likelihood
that any visitors will be left unattended or unescorted, providing unintended access
to security areas.
c. Law Enforcement & Public Safety Areas: Following sections are similar to Part III – TSA
Recommended Guidelines, Section D – Terminal in reference
6
but shall be treated as
mandatory:
1) Terminal space planning related to law enforcement shall be coordinated with
PAPD through the ASM.
2) Allocate dedicated terminal parking spaces for PAPD with direct controlled
landside/airside access and with quick access capability in both directions
integrated with the access control system.
3) Allocate storage areas for PAPD tactical supplies and equipment in tactically
identified areas.
4) When terminal plans include the allocation of operational space for contract
security personnel and their equipment, include the need for inter-jurisdictional
communications into the space planning, emphasizing the requirement to have in-
depth discussions with all affected security and PAPD staff before designing their
integrated space.
5) Communication/Dispatch facilities, equipment repair areas and other support
functions near security personnel and police functions shall be located away from
high threat areas and be considered for protection and control treatments.
d. Security Operations Center (SOC): Following sections are similar to Part III – TSA
Recommended Guidelines, Section D – Terminal in reference
6
but shall be treated as
mandatory under these Guidelines:
1) SOCs are sometimes known by other names, particularly where they may co-locate
with other terminal operational functions; such designations may include
Communications Center, Operations Center, or Security Control Center.
2) SOC shall be located close to the terminal’s Fire Command Station, and in a controlled
area because the Airport Incident Command Post must manage the emergency while
the terminal operator deals with continuing regular operational concerns, and each
must coordinate with the other. From the standpoint of cabling interconnections, a
relatively central geographic location serves to maintain reasonable cable lengths to
all the detection devices in a terminal security system that report alarms to the SOC.
In addition, if facilities other than the SOC handle the airport’s non-security
communication functions (information, paging, telephones, maintenance dispatch,
etc.), co-location or geographical placement of the SOC and the other facilities shall
be considered such that cabling, equipment, maintenance, and emergency operations
can be installed, operated and maintained in a cost-effective manner.
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3) Other communications functions, equipment and operational areas shall be co-located
with the SOC. Consider the merit and operational impact of consolidating the following
functions within or adjacent to the SOC:
a. Automatic notification system for emergency response recall of personnel.
b. Direct phone lines to PAPD, Airport Operations Center (AOC)/Admin Building,
control tower, and other sites, etc..
c. Fire alarm monitoring.
d. Flight Information Display (FIDS) systems; Baggage Information Display (BIDS)
systems.
e. ID management department.
f. Information specialists for customer information lines, courtesy phones, airport
paging.
g. Landside/terminal operations.
h. Maintenance control/dispatch or alarm monitoring (includes energy management
of HVAC systems).
i. Monitoring of PIDS, public safety, duress or security alarms.
j. Personnel call-down paging system.
k. Contract security department.
l. Radio systems.
m. Recording equipment.
n. Weather monitoring/radar/alert systems.
Electrical Substations and Critical Infrastructure
Facilities
The security design criteria and applicable threats that apply to the design of electrical substations
at Port Authority facilities will commence once a Stage I level design has been developed for the
specific electrical substation. The Port Authority has established specific threat definitions and
threat magnitudes to be used by building designers and applied by blast analysis experts at its
electrical substation facilities. Threat magnitudes will be provided by the Port Authority. Following
are the steps in the security design process.
1. An independent security engineer will be assigned by the Authority to prepare a Design Basis
Threat (DBT) Analysis Report. The DBT Analysis will determine the credible threats to be
mitigated by various protective methods which may include the following:
a. A crash-rated, anti-climb, perimeter security fence with crash-rated access-controlled
entry/exit gate(s)
b. The perimeter security fence shall create sufficient standoff distance so that a hand
carried threat, if thrown, or a vehicle borne threat post collision, cannot fully breach the
protective walls of the substation building enclosure.
c. Physical ballistic screening to interrupt any visual sight lines of critical substation
components from any exterior vantage points.
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d. Physical hardening of the buried electrical utility duct bank to resist damage from the
DBT.
e. Other required “hardening” includes protection of power transmission and
communications systems, and protection from cyber-attack.
2. The Engineer of Record (EOR) for blast analysis and blast mitigations shall demonstrate
sufficient previous experience in US-DHS force protection design for building projects of a
similar nature. See Section 3.4.1 for additional information.
3. The designer shall complete the design by developing appropriate mitigations for the building
at each stage of design with supporting engineering analysis including blast analysis. The
costs of the required threat mitigations will be included in the total cost of the project at each
level of design through final design.
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5. TSA PASSENGER SECURITY SCREENING
CHECKPOINTS (SSCP)
SSCP Overview
The TSA is responsible for the screening of personnel and carry-on baggage at SSCPs prior to
entering the Sterile Area. As such, all SSCP designs and reconfigurations must be coordinated
with TSA Headquarters (TSA HQ), the local Federal Security Director (FSD) and staff, and local
airport stakeholders for adaptation to site-specific requirements. For specifics, review the most
recent version of the full TSA Checkpoint Design Guide (CDG).
Regulations and Guidelines
The regulations governing airport security and passenger SSCPs include, but are not limited to:
1. 49 CFR § 1540 (Security: General Rules)
2. 49 CFR § 1542 (Airport Security)
3. 49 CFR § 1544 (Aircraft Operator Security)
4. 49 CFR § 1546 (Foreign Air Carrier Security)
While the regulations do not define the specific technical requirements that govern design of
SSCPs, they define in general terms what must be accomplished by the design. All TSA
regulations can be obtained on the TSA website.
Figure 6 – TSA Security Checkpoint (EWR Terminal C)
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Essential Coordination
Key individuals from TSA HQ, local TSA FSD offices, government agencies, airport, and airline
operations must be involved early during the SSCP design process. These groups will be able to
facilitate dialog regarding local building codes, mutual aid agreements with local law
enforcement/emergency responders, and joint commercial/military presence that could factor into
the checkpoint design, especially during emergencies.
Planning Considerations
Designing for the Future: As the number of enplanements per year increases and the equipment
and technology evolve, the SSCP needs to have the flexibility for change and the ability to expand.
Allowance for future modifications must be included in terminal planning.
SSCP Power, Data and VSS
The power and IT requirements for security screening equipment and ancillary equipment is
unique regarding the circuit type, receptacle type and quantity of data drops required. TSA
checkpoints shall have an uninterrupted power source and generator backup so that it can
operate during an emergency power outage.
VSS requirements for SSCP are covered under Section 3.4.6. At each Port Authority airport, the
SSCP VSS feeds shall be transmitted to specific TSA designated locations both locally and
regionally and shared locally with Port Authority. As noted in Section 3.4.6, any VSS streams
must be provided to the Port Authority upon request. Any VSS streams of the SSCP may not be
disclosed unless approved by the local TSA.
Safety
SSCPs must not only screen passengers and their carry-on baggage but must do so without
compromising the safety of either the passengers or the Transportation Security Officers (TSOs)
conducting the screening. Security requirements and safety related considerations shall be built
into the SSCP design from the beginning and shall be treated as an integral part of the design
process. Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) in security shall be included in every phase of the design
to provide input on conceptual plans and/or construction drawing packages. With respect to
security and safety, the following concerns shall be mitigated:
1. Sight lines of queued passengers from any horizontally adjacent or elevated vantage
points in the terminal Public Area must be visually blocked by an opaque screen or
shielded from ballistics by “see through” bullet proof glass to the extent possible.
2. TSA screening lanes shall be designed to accommodate increased passenger loads
over the term of the lease in order to increase throughput and minimize crowding.
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6. AIR OPERATIONS AREA (AOA)
AOA Perimeter Protection
6.1.1. Perimeter Intrusion Detection System (PIDS)
1. The Port Authority PIDS is a multi-sensor perimeter intrusion layered security system and
is incorporated into the AOA perimeter boundary fence. It is designed to protect airport
perimeters against unauthorized entry twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, in all
weather conditions. The following are the minimum requirements with
preferred/recommended levels of coverage. The PIDS shall maintain a system operational
availability (up-time) of 99.9%. It is the PANYNJ’s requirement that all tenant lease holds
will meet or exceed all PANYNJ’s PIDS requirements as outlined within this document.
Based on the PANYNJ’s security assessment of a tenant’s leasehold, PANYNJ may
require a tenant to install its own PIDS system. A tenant is not required to install the
PANYNJ PIDS.
2. The PANYNJ PIDS is installed and operational at all PANYNJ Airports except SWF and
since it is a program maintained by a third-party provider, temporary and permanent
installation, or removal of PIDS sensor equipment, design, installation, test and operator
training of PIDS sensor equipment shall be subcontracted to the authorized system
maintainer.
3. Perimeter segments must be broken into zones that do not exceed 100 feet in length,
however the preferred zone length specified by the Authority is 50 feet to properly identify
intrusions points to assist in a rapid response. All zones shall have complete visual
assessment capabilities that work in the given lighting conditions and redundant
assessment coverage should be provided for all zones to allow for maintenance of an
individual camera.
4. Each perimeter segment should be covered by at least one detection technology with a
goal of dual/redundant detection coverage and the system shall be scalable/expandable
to meet the future needs due to AOA changes and tenant expansion.
5. Sensor technologies include camera system equipment with video analytics and/or video
motion detection capabilities, vibration sensors (above ground and/or buried), radars,
lasers, thermal cameras, infrared cameras, day/night cameras, and microwave.
6. All video cameras shall meet the latest industry standards at the time of purchase and
comply with classification level surveillance as a minimum in lighting requirements of low-
light, infrared, and thermal, and have power requirements (POE), network connectivity,
weather resistance, data compression and shall be ONVIF compliant (or latest
compatibility standard).
7. The system must include a Video Management System (See Section 3.4.7 Video
Management & Surveillance Systems (VMSS))
8. A tenant will be required to install, monitor on a 24/7 basis, and maintain a PIDS in any
perimeter fencing on its leasehold, which must integrate with the Port Authority’s SOC.
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9. The tenant shall enable all PIDS VSS camera views to be electronically streamed
(monitored and displayed) by the Port Authority upon request on a 24/7 basis by
integrating the system feed to the Port Authority’s PAPD Desk. Contact the Airport
Security Manager for the specific technical requirement or operational procedures/
requirements.
10. All perimeter zones shall have complete visual assessment capabilities that work in the
given lighting conditions (redundant assessment coverage should be provided for all
zones to reduce the likelihood of down time in the event of equipment or camera failure).
11. If any tenant construction or perimeter fence system modifications impact the AOA
perimeter or are within a facility that affects existing infrastructure supporting the PIDS
system, then the tenant’s EOR must engage the Port Authority to obtain the proper design
for the PIDs features and to coordinate with the specific PIDS contractor for the
requirements, standards, and product information.
12. Any design, installation, or modification to the existing PIDS shall comply fully with PIDS
Standards.
13. PIDS applications are scalable and may be linked to other sensor technologies designed
for intruder detection and tracking such as Video Motion Detection (VMD) and Tracking
(VMDT); Ground Surveillance Radars (GSR); and linear-type perimeter sensors, such as
fence sensors, infrared trip lines, and buried cables sensitive to ground vibrations.
14. PIDS shall provide a visual and audible alarm at the PIDS workstation(s), on a situational
awareness map, to inform the system operator of the location of any intrusion(s).
15. Airport tenant inquiries about the PIDS that the Port Authority would recommend installing
at Port Authority facilities shall be referred to National Safe Skies who maintains the
“FAST” database of security equipment vendors many of which (not all) have been
comprehensively tested by National Safe Skies in a real-world airport environment.
https://fast.sskies.org/
16. Other requirements:
a. Exterior components must operate between minus 10 and plus 130 degrees
Fahrenheit.
b. Interior components must operate between minus 10 and plus 120 degrees
Fahrenheit.
c. All components within a control room facility and related equipment rooms shall
operate between plus 50- and 95-degrees Fahrenheit.
d. Prior to formal acceptance/final invoicing, the tenant PIDS must be reviewed and
approved by PANYNJ’s Cybersecurity Program Group for compliance.
6.1.2. Perimeter Fencing
The AOA perimeter must be protected along its entire length by a security fence that conforms to
Port Authority requirements.
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Figure 7 – Example of Port Authority AOA Security Fences
The basic features of Port Authority AOA Perimeter Security Fences are as follows:
1. Chain link fence design and details as a minimum shall comply with High Security
Galvanized Steel Chain Link Fence (Type 3) as shown in the current Port Authority of NY
& NJ Standard Security Galvanized Steel Chain Link Fence standard drawings.
2. A continuous crash resistant concrete base embedded in the ground is required where
any type of vehicle may have access to the terrain where the fence line is constructed.
3. The minimum fence fabric height is 8’-0” above the top of concrete barrier or above
finished grade (total fence height will include the concrete barrier, where required, and the
barbed wire/concertina wire).
4. Chain link fabric is 1” x 1" mesh with 0.148” OD wire, anti-climb with metal coated
(galvanized) or polyvinyl chloride (PVC) coated.
5. Fence is topped with 6 lines of barbed wire, plus 30" diameter concertina single coil barbed
tape.
6. Within the Central Terminal Area (CTA) the AOA perimeter fence shall be a crash rated
ornamental metal fence meeting the same height requirements.
7. Use of a non-metallic/non-conductive security fence shall be required in limited areas as
required to ensure that the fencing does not conflict with the operational requirements of
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the airport such as when metal fencing will interfere with electronic aeronautical approach
landing system equipment.
8. To assist in surveillance and security patrol inspections, fences shall be configured as
straight and uncomplicated as area conditions will allow to preserve long straight lines of
sight and detection zones for visual observations from patrols, VSS monitoring, and
various fence system detection sensors.
9. Contact the ASM for the current Port Authority AOA Security Fence design criteria when
altering an existing security fence or constructing a new security fence.
AOA Security Fence Clear Zones
1. A clear zone must be maintained on both sides of the security fence at all times to prevent
visual obstruction of any potential security breach by climbing or otherwise cutting the
fence fabric to achieve unauthorized access.
2. A minimum clear zone of 10 feet from the AOA security fence line (or as agreed to by the
ASM in writing) shall be maintained on both sides for its entire length at all airports.
3. Within clear zones there shall be no stored materials (boxes, stackable crates, pallets or
other objects), and no parked vehicles, baggage carts, storage containers, climbable
objects, trees, utility poles or other visual obstructions near the fence lines.
4. All clear zones shall be clearly marked with surface paint and maintained and shall denote
the outer limits of the zone. Signage shall be provided “No Parking or Storage within the
described clear zone.
Figure 8 – Example of AOA Clear Zone
Violation by Stored Objects
Figure 9 – Example of Compliant
AOA Clear Zone
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6.1.3. AOA Perimeter Guard Posts
6.1.3.1. General
1. AOA security guard posts permit passage of authorized vehicles and passengers into the
AOA. The guard post locations must be approved in advance by the Port Authority.
2. Any vehicles, persons or cargo passing through the guard post, whether they require
access to perform routine activities to service aircraft on the airside of the terminals, or to
perform construction or inspections on the airside, are subject to inspection by a Port
Authority security guard for valid SIDA identification credentials for the driver and routine
checks of all individuals in the vehicle, and inspection of vehicles and their contents for
any contraband or illegal items.
3. The AOA vehicle inspection shall also include a search of the underside of every vehicle
using a high-resolution vehicle undercarriage scanner in the roadway pavement which will
also save a digital image. Existing inspection stations without an undercarriage scanner
shall use an under-vehicle mirror to search the underside of every vehicle.
4. Dependable and instant voice and video communications from the guard post to the
Security Operations Center (SOC), or other appropriate central location, shall be installed,
maintained, and frequently tested.
5. If a tenant project scope of work includes an AOA perimeter guard post, tenant shall
contact the ASM for the latest design and construction requirements.
6. Any vehicles intended to work routinely on airside must have Port Authority license plates.
Figure 10 – Crash Rated Vehicle Arrestor Bed
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6.1.3.2. Vehicle Barrier Gates
1. All new guard posts at vehicle portals must be configured with crash rated vehicle
barrier gates such as the “Grab Barrier” or other certified moveable arrestor bed type
that meets Port Authority requirements and must be manually controlled from inside
the guard booth with automated safeguards.
2. The moveable or arrestor barrier model shall have been tested by the manufacturer to
meet or exceed the ASTM F2656-07 criteria for the maximum vehicle weight and
vehicle speed.
3. Any existing guard posts with barrier gate control arms shall be of a “break away”
design.
4. All guard posts shall have vehicle detection loops in the pavement to detect or prevent
vehicle spacing that is too close (piggy backing) which automatically prevents the
vehicle barrier gate from being lowered.
5. Once a vehicle, its cargo and all occupants are cleared by the guard for entry, the
vehicle barrier is lowered by guard manual control to permit access of the vehicle and
occupants, and then raised again to prevent entry of the next vehicle, if any.
6. See Figure 11 and Figure 12 for the types of moveable crash rated barriers that are
required by the Port Authority.
7. It is required that guard posts be configured as vehicle “Sally Ports” for positive control.
Figure 11 – Permanently Installed Vehicle
Arrestor Bed Gate in Raised Position
Figure 12 – Anti-Ram High Security
Fence
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6.1.3.3. AOA Guard Post Configuration and Booths
1. A climate-controlled and bullet resistant guard booth is required that provides maximum
visibility over the immediate area of the station and provides easy access for the guard to
carry out the duties of inspecting passengers, vehicles, and their contents.
2. Booth foundation shall be on a concrete island with protective pipe guard bollards. Pipe
guard bollards shall also be installed to protect any equipment that would otherwise be
exposed to vehicle collision.
3. The guard booth shall:
a. be designed so that the guard can perform all inspection functions without leaving
the protection of the guard booth. This includes microphone and speakers for audio
communication, bulletproof glass, a transaction drawer that permits the passing of
vehicle driver and occupant credentials only.
b. be designed so it can comfortably accommodate a second guard.
c. provide adjustable booth interior lighting level and minimum guard post exterior
lighting level contours of 20.0 foot-candles around booth and 2.5 foot-candles at
end of vehicle queuing line.
d. include dependable and instant voice and video communications from the guard
post to the Security Operations Center (SOC) or other appropriate central location
should be installed, maintained, and frequently tested.
e. include video streams from VSS camera coverage providing face view of driver in
vehicle, front and rear view of stopped vehicle, and license plate reader camera
data shall be tied into the Port Authority’s video management system and shall be
shared with the Port Authority Office of Security Technology and the Port Authority
Office for Law Enforcement (Port Authority Police).
f. include a duress alarm system tied to the PAPD and AOC shall be provided.
g. provide ample vehicle queuing distance and vehicle inspection portals to avoid
long traffic backups and delays.
h. provide a pull-off space for waiting vehicles or for conducting a secondary
inspection.
i. provide turn-around space so that a vehicle denied entry does not have to enter
the SIDA to turn around.
j. provide traffic signals integrated with the vehicle barrier gate.
4. Other guard booth features shall include crash barrier control panel, LCD monitor,
Biometric reader (fingerprint or other), non-corrosive metal booth enclosure, pedestrian
intrusion detection annunciator, 2 card readers, outside fresh air intake protection.
5. All guard post barrier equipment shall be placed on Landside.
Identity Checks, Background Screening, and Issuance
of Photo Identification Badges/Cards
1. No person shall be permitted within the Sterile or Secured Area without an Airport Security
ID issued by the Port Authority or an authorized escort. An individual who has previously
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been denied an Airport Security ID or had access privileges revoked cannot be escorted
into the Sterile or Secured Area at any time. A person who has an Airport Security ID
with escort privileges may escort up to five persons into the Sterile or Secured Areas, and
must follow the escort procedures as noted in the Port Authority’s website at
https://www.panynj.gov/airports/en/aviation-security/ecscort-rules-procedures.html
.
Persons that are escorted or badged and entering into Sterile and Secured Areas may be
required to submit to a screening program. Staff under escort may also be required to
have a background check through the “Info-Corp” system, which checks Federal, state
and local databases.
2. Contractor employees who work landside on site at the airport in security sensitive areas
may be required to undergo background checks through the Secure Worker Access
Consortium (SWAC) and obtain SWAC ID cards. Information on the SWAC process
specific to the Port Authority on NY and NJ requirements, including office locations and
hours of operation, is available on the following website: http://www.secureworker.com
.
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7. TENANT AIR CARGO AND AIRLINE SERVICES
FACILITIES
Cargo Facilities and Security Considerations
Generally, cargo facilities are subject to precisely the same physical security requirements for
planning and design purposes as any other facility on the airport, although their procedural and
operational differences often require some site-specific modifications or upgrades.
7.1.1. Requirements for Air Cargo Screening
1. The TSA requires one hundred percent (100%) percent screening of all cargo that is to be
loaded on passenger aircraft.
2. TSA has adopted security measures throughout the air cargo supply chain that apply to
aircraft operators, foreign air carriers, indirect air carriers (freight forwarders), and
participants in the Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP).
3. Under CCSP, shippers and other entities can screen cargo at an earlier point in the cargo
supply chain, which also has an impact on the planning and design of cargo facilities both
on and off the airport.
4. The security considerations during planning and design of cargo facilities revolve around
a facility’s location and the type of cargo businesses/facilities: those accepting and
processing cargo that will be transported in passenger aircraft; those accepting and
processing cargo that will be transported in all-cargo aircraft (freighters); those accepting
both types of cargo, and whether the cargo shipping involves international export or
import.
7.1.2. Cargo Facility Security Requirements
In general, the following security requirements shall be followed when planning, designing and
operating cargo facilities at Port Authority airports. The cargo facility parameters are as follows:
1. Air cargo facilities must be separated from critical passenger loading areas and general
aviation areas.
2. The airside ramp area adjacent to air cargo facilities and areas inside the building where
cargo is accepted must be designated as SIDA or Secured Area according to ASP (see
ASM for further details).
3. Appropriate lighting levels are also necessary around the perimeter of the facility as well
as inside the facility with an uninterrupted power source (UPS). An audible alarm,
connected to the AOC to indicate UPS malfunction must be operational when the UPS is
activated and in use.
4. On the public side, automobile parking must be separated from truck parking and located
away from the building.
5. The Public Area of the cargo facility must be separated from the Secure/SIDA Area by
metal fencing or solid walls. Any portals used for personnel access or cargo movements
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must be closed when not actively used. They may not be left open and must be guarded
by guard personnel when open.
6. All portals entering or exiting the Secured Area must be monitored by dedicated VSS
coverage.
7. Where ventilation is required, rollup doors with small perforations that prevent passing of
contraband items are permitted (see Figure 13).
8. All personnel must access the Secure/SIDA area through a door/portal that allows the
passage of only one person at a time, e.g. a High Entry-Exit Turnstile (HEET) turnstile
matching the fence height or sally port (see Figure 14), and such doors or portals must be
controlled by a computerized access control system that is compliant with Port Authority
and TSA requirements of denial of unauthorized access, audible alarm, and record
retention of all access attempts, etc. The only exception to this rule is personnel in the
process of moving cargo across the guarded boundary between public and Secure/SIDA
sections. If turnstiles are utilized, a Section of fence should be added to the top of the
turnstile to match the height of the chain link fence, along with concertina wire for any
small sections that are exposed, to avoid giving someone the ability to climb the gates.
9. All authorized-personnel doors or gates that permit access to the airside portion of an
airport, as well as airside-facing and landside-facing cargo doors, require access control
in accordance with the ASP. In addition, all portals entering or exiting the Secured Area
must receive dedicated VSS coverage.
10. Emergency exits in the Public Area shall only exit to landside, not AOA/SIDA.
11. Cargo service doors of the roll up variety are required for access control on both the public
side and AOA/SIDA side of building and they must be kept closed when there is no active
loading/unloading. Cargo service doors that are open must have a security guard posted
at all times that the door remains open.
Figure 13 - Scissor Gates and
Rollup Door.
Figure 14 – Example of a HEET
Turnstile Gate
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12. Cargo doors with scissor gates are not permitted unless used in combination with an
additional barrier such as rollup doors (see Figure 13). Scissor gates can be used as a
barrier for gaps between the cargo warehouse door when trucks are unloading or receiving
shipments but must not be used as the primary cargo bay door.
13. AOA Perimeter security fence meeting the requirements of Section 6.1.1 and Section 6.1.2
must be installed as shown in Figure 7 from the exterior face of the cargo building to the
tenant’s property line, on the AOA fence alignment established by the Port Authority, and
physically abutting any existing AOA security fence without any gaps.
14. Cargo screening areas are required to be segregated and items that have been screened
shall be sectioned off. Provide adequate space for accepted unscreened cargo and space
allocated for bulk pallet inspections.
15. Any Public Area of a cargo facility must be separated from the Secured Area or SIDA by
a metal fence or wall.
16. Cargo facilities are required to meet the requirements for Access Control Systems (ACS)
in Section 3.4.5, Video Surveillance Systems (VSS) in Section 3.4.6, and Video
Management & Surveillance Systems (VMSS) in Section 3.4.7.
17. VMSS system is required at the following locations to monitor, record and store video:
a. Truck loading dock
b. Interior of cargo facility including cargo unloading and receiving area, cargo
screening area, and staged cargo storage area
c. AOA service doors
d. Service counter area
e. Each SIDA access control portal
18. VSS cameras shall be mounted high enough and with unobstructed line of sight such that
camera views of all cargo handling and screening activities are not visually blocked by
cargo handlers, stored cargo, or equipment.
19. Any interior offices, hallways, doors, or other space accessible to the public may not
provide uncontrolled access to the Secured side of the facility.
7.1.3. Cargo Facility Security Operational Practices
1. A cargo tenant/subtenant is required to submit a comprehensive Tenant Security Program
(TSP) to the Port Authority’s ASM.
2. Cargo tenants may be required to enter into an EAA (if an air carrier) or an ATSP with the
Port Authority.
3. All cargo facility personnel shall have SIDA badge displayed at all times and if applicable,
a US Customs seal for CPB security areas.
4. Individuals being escorted must remain within line of sight of escort. A valid temporary
badge or escort authorization form must be presented for anyone who is escorted.
5. The comprehensive ATSP shall also cover security measures that shall be followed to
combat insider threat. For this purpose, it is acceptable that the cargo tenant allows TSA
to conduct security threat assessments to check the names of workers with access to air
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cargo against government terrorist watchlists. The threat assessments shall be conducted
upon initial employment at a CCSP facility or on-airport air cargo facility and every five
years thereafter while employed as an air cargo worker. Employees with SIDA badges
have already been screened by TSA.
6. All security service providers, including security guard companies must have a Port
Authority privilege permit in order to operate at an airport.
7. All security companies must meet established Port Authority security services guidelines
and have the required state license. All security guards must attend SIDA training and PA
Security Guard training.
8. The cargo facility has the option to maintain its entire warehouse as Secured or SIDA area
(depending on airport) or as a combination of SIDA (interior of the warehouse) and
Secured (exterior/ramp area) areas, as approved by the ASM.
9. Utilize technologies that assist with prescheduled deliveries and/or utilize check-in kiosks
to limit the number of visitors in the cargo warehouse at any given time.
10. All aircraft loading/boarding stairs must have locks to prevent unauthorized access.
11. The cargo facility shall schedule the appropriate number of security guards on each shift
as defined in their ATSP or EAA, to monitor all cargo handling and screening activities
during both peak, normal and off-peak hours of operation.
Airline Hangars and Other Aircraft Maintenance
Facilities
Airline hangars and other aircraft maintenance facilities may be completely landside, completely
airside, or part of the airside/landside boundary line. As these facilities contain aircraft ramp and/or
hangar areas as well as involve public access and supply delivery, their property and/or buildings
are typically parts of the airside/landside boundary line and as such require coordination with the
airport operator for access control.
Security requirements for aircraft maintenance facility location, layout and operation include:
1. Compliance with 49 CFR 1542.
2. Aircraft hangars and other maintenance facilities wholly or partially within the AOA are
required to meet the requirements for Access Control Systems (ACS) in Section 3.4.5,
Video Surveillance Systems (VSS) in Section 3.4.6, and Video Management &
Surveillance Systems (VMSS) in Section 3.4.7.
3. Access control, VSS and VMS systems are required to prevent, detect, and record
unauthorized access to the aircraft, or tampering with aircraft parts and equipment.
4. Large hangar doors or openings cannot be relied upon as a security
boundary/demarcation line.
5. Location of loading and delivery docks landside shall have provisions and controlled
procedures to screen all deliveries for contraband and any items other than aircraft
equipment, parts, lubricants, etc. that are to be used or stored within the facility.
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In-Flight Catering Facilities
Facilities for in-flight catering service may be located on-airport (landside, airside, or may be a
boundary facility with portions of both) or off airport. Due to the nature of such facilities and that
the products produced are intended for direct induction for delivery to a departing aircraft, as well
as the typical placement near the passenger terminal, security requirements may involve
substantial amounts of coordination, both architecturally and procedurally. The Port Authority
expects all such facilities to be in full compliance with TSA regulations and to follow best practices
for facility planning, design and operations.
Security plans for any in-flight catering facility layout and operation include:
1. Compliance with 49 CFR 1544 and 1546 and all applicable security directives and
amendments.
2. An on-airport in-flight catering facility shall be required to provide a comprehensive
security plan for Port Authority approval.
3. Access control, VSS and VMS systems are required to prevent, detect and record
unauthorized access to the facility, or tampering with catered deliveries. VSS coverage
must tie into TSA local headquarters and the PANYNJ locations designated by the ASM
AOC.
4. Everything brought into the facility or packaged and sealed for delivery to aircraft must be
completely screened.
5. All personnel entering the AOA perimeter shall have SIDA badges displayed at all times.
6. The comprehensive security plan shall also cover security measures that shall be followed
to combat insider threat.
7. Security guards at Port Authority AOA perimeter guard posts may conduct random checks
for compliance with TSA regulations.
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8. COMMERCIAL TENANT BUILDING COMPLEXES ON
AIRPORT PROPERTY
Hotels and On-Airport Accommodations
On-airport hotels and their event facilities are either located landside in an independent building
or within the Public Area of an airline terminal complex. Due to the nature of the facility, as well
as its placement near or within the passenger terminal, security requirements may involve
substantial amounts of coordination, both architecturally and operationally. The Port Authority
expects all such facilities to be in full compliance with TSA regulations and to follow best practices
for their planning, design and operations.
Security plans for any hotel facility layout and operation include:
1. If the hotel is located so that it borders on the AOA/SIDA, there shall be no hotel balconies
facing the airside. In addition, any hotel windows facing the airside shall not be openable
and shall be bullet resistance. These features are to prevent the passing (dropping) of
contraband to the AOA/SIDA per TSA requirement.
2. If the hotel is located within the Public Area of an airline terminal, all hotel entrances and
exits, including emergency exits, shall be connected only to the terminal Public Areas.
3. If the hotel roof borders on the AOA/SIDA, it shall have complete roof access control
integrated with VSS and VMS systems including roof, stair doors and roof hatches
allowing access only to hotel maintenance staff possessing an Airport Security ID Card.
4. Roof access control systems are required to meet the requirements for Access Control
Systems (ACS) in Section 3.4.5, Video Surveillance Systems (VSS) in Section 3.4.6, and
Video Management & Surveillance Systems (VMSS) in Section 3.4.7.
5. All landside deliveries to the hotel through the terminal Public Area shall be scheduled,
delivered, inspected and screened at the terminal loading dock or an approved off-site
location. Hotel deliveries at the frontage roadway shall not be permitted.
6. The tenant shall be required to provide a comprehensive security plan for Port Authority
approval which shall also cover all security measures , including but not limited to combat
insider threat.
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9. GENERAL AVIATION
Operational Practices
Tenant Fixed Base Operators (FBOs) who operate General Aviation services must follow the TSA
Recommended Security Guidelines for General Aviation Airport Operators and Users, unless
stated otherwise by the ASM. In addition, comply with the following operational practices:
1. Submit a comprehensive security plan to the Port Authority.
2. Remove air stairs away from larger aircraft when unattended.
3. Use heat shields and aircraft covers to block windows to prevent visibility of the aircraft’s
contents.
4. Increase accountability for access control onto the AOA, for example stronger pilot and
passenger verification processes.
5. Pilots must be escorted by FBO operator at all times on the ramp or a system must be
established where pilot is issued with a pass.
6. Must have a procedure requiring from a pilot to establish a connection (identify) between
names reported on a Pax manifest and persons he/she is escorting onto the ramp/aircraft.
Security Control of Personnel
Tenant FBOs who operate General Aviation services, or other GA aircraft at Port Authority airports
are required to comply with the following:
1. Escort all individuals visiting the airport into and out of aircraft movement and parking
areas.
2. Prior to boarding, the pilot in command shall ensure that: the identity of all passengers is
verified; all passengers are aboard at the invitation of the aircraft owner/operator; and all
baggage and cargo is identified by the passengers or flight crew.
3. Develop and use an internal “vetted traveler” type of program for regular travelers
including completion of a background check before adding the traveler to a list of
individuals approved for travel aboard company aircraft.
4. Ensure that the identity of an individual renting an aircraft requires verification by
presentation of a government issued photo ID, an airman certificate and a current medical
certificate necessary for that operation.
5. Operators shall establish procedures to identify any pilots and aircraft using their facilities
who are not normally based there (Transient Pilots).
6. Operators providing rental aircraft must first provide the pilot renter with the security
awareness training program developed by TSA and shall also familiarize the pilot with
local airport operations, including their security responsibilities at the facility.
7. Operators providing rental aircraft shall be vigilant for suspicious activities and report them
to the Airport Security Manager or PPAPD.
8. Flight training schools or student pilots are not permitted at JFK, LGA, or EWR.
9. Where flight training is permitted, comply with 49 U.S.C.
§ 44939 and 49 CFR 1552.
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Security Control of Aircraft
Tenant FBOs who operate General Aviation services, or other GA aircraft at Port Authority airports
are required to employ multiple methods of securing their aircraft to make it as difficult as possible
for an unauthorized person to gain access to it by complying with the following:
1. If there is adequate space, mark/assign parking spots or transient parking areas to easily
identify transient aircraft on the apron.
2. Transient Pilots must be in company uniform display a company ID and/or Pilot Certificate
and be vetted by the FBO or tenant authentication prior to accessing the ramp area and must
remain within 25-feet of their aircraft or be under escort by a badged employee.
3. At least one of the following aircraft security measures, or combination thereof, must be used
to secure any unattended aircraft: Door locks, throttle locks, propeller locks or lockable booths,
aircraft tied to the ground with chain and padlock (applicable to small GA aircraft only) must
be used on aircraft where applicable.
4. Ensure that aircraft door locks are consistently used to prevent unauthorized access or
tampering with the aircraft.
5. Use keyed ignitions for aircraft where appropriate.
6. Use an auxiliary lock to further protect aircraft from unauthorized use and strictly control
access to all aircraft keys.
7. If none of the above requirements in subparagraphs (3) through (6) are feasible or acceptable
to the aircraft operator, the operator must hire a guard company (with a Port Authority Permit)
to guard the aircraft while parked at a Port Authority airport.
8. When hangars are available at the airport facility, store idle aircraft in hangars with locked
doors.
9. Park aircraft in the hangar facing away from the door, or into the corner of the building, or any
other position of the aircraft that requires a prior engagement of ground handling equipment
(towing) for the aircraft to be ready for taxiing. This is also considered secure even if none of
the above stated measures are used.
10. Ensure that aircraft ignition keys are not stored inside the aircraft.
11. Practice strict transfer of control for aircraft and keys before and after maintenance
procedures. Never leave an unattended aircraft open with keys before or after repairs are
completed.
Security Control of Bags and Baggage
Tenant FBOs who operate General Aviation services, or other GA aircraft at Port Authority airports
are required to oversee security control of bags and baggage as follows:
1. GA cargo, baggage, or other passenger luggage shall never be left outside the aircraft
unattended.
2. FBO may have own access gate to the AOA provided, physical barriers are in place (i.e.
bollards or jersey barriers) and permission has been granted from the ASM.
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3. FBO is not permitted to operate their own vehicle gate with access to the airfield unless the
Port Authority and or authorized representative have been notified in advance.
Security Control of Infrastructure
Tenant FBOs who operate General Aviation services, or GA aircraft facilities at Port Authority
airports are required to comply with the following:
1. Display signage as directed by Port Authority. Signage may include warning against
tampering with aircraft, unauthorized use of aircraft and trespassing, as well as how to report
suspicious activity.
2. Hangars shall preferably have a computerized access control system with card readers and
access cards. Access codes and cards shall be changed (or manual locks rekeyed) with every
new tenant sublet.
3. In addition to hangar door locks, provide an electric bypass switch and/or alarm and intrusion
detection system for hangars.
4. Provide adequate levels of lighting without blind spots around hangars and on all
airside/landside areas for proper visibility of ramps and parking lots.
5. The Airport Security Manager shall have access to inspect hangars at any time with short
notice.
6. GA tenants shall have a strict key or access card control program for hangars which will be
periodically audited by the Airport Security Manager.
7. For AOA security fencing and clear zone requirements see Section 6.1.2 Perimeter Fencing.
8. Any (Non-AOA) perimeter security fencing design shall follow the Port Authority of NY & NJ
Standard Security Galvanized Steel Chain Link Fence Standard Drawings, and comply with
the following:
a. Keep perimeter fencing clear of vegetation growth with applicable “Clear Zone” rule
observed.
b. Fencing shall have no gaps underneath greater than 2”.
c. Poles of fencing must be buried into the ground/pavement.
d. Signage that details “no trespassing” must be attached to fence.
e. Minimize access points to the airfield and ensure they are regularly monitored.
9. Other types of security fences are permissible if previously approved by the Airport Security
Manager in writing.
10. Airport operators and tenants, shall make an effort to provide outdoor security lighting and
VSS cameras with an uninterrupted power source to monitor and record activities for the
following areas:
a. Ramp with the pathway leading to the aircraft in clear sight.
b. Aircraft parking and hangar areas.
c. Fuel storage areas and fuel trucks.
d. Airport access control points.
a. Other appropriate areas, such as vehicle parking, fences, or obstructed areas.
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10. MAINTENANCE AND CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITY
The Port Authority requires multiple layers of security standards for the performance of contract
work, including standards for contractors, their staff, and subcontractors and their staff, which
shall depend upon the level of security required, as determined by the Port Authority Airport
Security Manager. In addition to following the Port Authority’s rules and regulations, a contractor
shall, and shall instruct its subcontractors to cooperate with the Port Authority and its staff in
complying with and adopting the following security requirements:
1. All persons entering a terminal shall comply with all applicable security regulations and
procedures as established by the Port Authority pursuant to 49 CFR, Parts 1540 and 1542.
Any violation(s) by a contractor and any subsequent fines imposed due to any violation(s)
shall be the responsibility of the contractor.
2. Upon issuance of notice of award, a contractor must contact the airport security office and
request a security meeting to finalize the Project Security Plan (PSP). All work shall be
completed in accordance with the contract specifications and the approved PSP.
3. The Project Security Plan (PSP) is the documentation depicting project specific security
requirements and is submitted after a contractor is selected. The PSP is coordinated in
detail with the project phasing and includes access points, delivery routes, security guard
locations, details for construction of internal security perimeters, identification of worksites,
and any other job specific security requirements. The contractor shall complete the following
portions of the PSP for the review and approval by the ASM or designee:
a. Name and contact information for the Contractor’s Security Coordinator and a
designated alternate, who is in charge of enforcing the approved security requirements
for the project as a whole.
b. Name and contact information for each Contractor Security Liaison/Worksite
Supervisor and designated alternates (can be the same individual) responsible for
security requirements unless otherwise approved by the Port Authority.
c. Approximate dates for each phase of construction, duration, location, and access
points. Staging areas must be identified, including, the security measures to control
non-badged individuals, equipment, associated tools, and Security Sensitive
Information (SSI).
d. Security measures include Installation of Construction cameras at the entrance/exit of
construction gates with thirty (30) day storage capacity for situational awareness.
4. The PSP shall also consist of all labor and materials necessary to establish one or more
secure perimeters around the construction site. It shall provide personnel to maintain secure
access/escorting to and from secure worksites, and within the site itself, for the duration of
the project.
5. The Port Authority shall have the right to rescind permission for the use of any access control
device and confiscate any Airport Security ID previously given to any individual for any lawful
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reason, including but not limited to violations of airport security and violations of Airport
Rules and Regulations.
6. Any action required by the Transportation Security Administration (“TSA”) or the Port
Authority in response to security compliance with the PSP shall be addressed immediately
by the contractor at contractor’s expense.
7. The following is the general hierarchy of responsibility for personnel working in restricted
public/SIDA/Sterile/Secured areas. TSA personnel may contact any individual at any point
in the hierarchy. In most cases, the Project Manager/Resident Engineer will serve as the
liaison between the ASM and the Contractor. However, direct coordination in emergency
situations should be expected.
Figure 15 – Restricted Area Responsibilities
Tool Management Plan
The “Tool Management Plan” is for all construction projects that take place in the public, SIDA,
Sterile and Secured Areas of a terminal. Mobilization of the “Tool Management Plan” must
precede all phases of construction and shall be enforced for the duration of the project. The
provisions of the Tool Management Plan are intended to strictly control and account for workers
and tools within construction zones and avoid violations of TSA security policies. The Port
Authority form: AIRPORT CONTRACTOR SECURITY, TOOL MANAGEMENT AND ESCORT
RESPONSIBILITIES provides detailed regulatory guidance on rules and responsibilities of
contractors, sub-contractors and their employees during construction projects at Port Authority
and tenant aviation facilities. The following summarizes critical security measures for workers and
tools for projects:
1. Strict accountability of tools through inventories at each shift.
2. Tools on TSA list of prohibited items shall not be removed without authorization from the
construction zone. Tools must never be left unattended.
PMO
ASM
Project
Manager
Resident
Engineer
Contractor
Security
Coordinator
Contractor
Security
Liaison
Contractor
Worksite
Supervisor
Office of Airport
Security Manager
or
Airport Security
Compliance Officer
Contractor
TSA
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3. Contractor’s security representative shall conduct daily sweeps of construction area for
tool and worker compliance.
4. Workers’ access is restricted to areas and times specified in the Project Security Plan.
5. A contractor may be required to use a security guard company approved by the Port
Authority if escorting individuals in a Secured or Sterile Area.
6. When not in use tools shall be stored away in a locked, tamper proof and hardened storage
space that is anchored down to prevent removal from the site. Distribution of keys to the
locked storage shall be centrally controlled and the lock (tumbler) shall be changed
periodically with new keys issued.
The form must be read and signed by each contractor employee working on site.
Landside, Terminal & Airside
10.2.1. Security Management Plan
Prior to any work being performed on Port Authority property the PSP along with verification
documents attesting to the employee background checks, Tool Management Plan, perimeter
security requirements (temporary security fencing and barriers, etc.) and Access Control Plan
must be submitted to ASM for review and approval. The Port Authority form: “AIRPORT
CONTRACTOR SECURITY, TOOL MANAGEMENT AND ESCORT RESPONSIBILITIES”
provides specific instruction on compliance requirements for construction projects and workers
within the landside, terminal, and airside areas of aviation facilities.
Key areas contained in the document are summarized as follows, with details contained in in the
reference document itself.
10.2.2. Identity Checks, Background Screening, and Issuance of
Photo Identification Badges/Cards
No person shall be permitted on or about the construction site in the Secured, Sterile or SIDA
Area without an Airport Security ID issued by the Port Authority or an authorized escort. In
addition to displaying IDs issued by the contractor, all employees of the contractor and
subcontractor shall wear the Airport Security IDs or an official escort badge in a clearly visible
position (above the waist and below the neck) whenever they are working at the construction site.
Contract personnel who cannot get an Airport Security ID since they temporarily require access
to the Secured, Sterile or SIDA Areas may be subject to a background check through the Secure
Worker Access Consortium (SWAC) for all personnel whose expected duration on-site will be
thirty (30) days or greater. Information on the SWAC process, including office locations and hours
of operation, is available on the following website: http://www.secureworker.com
The contractor shall coordinate with the Port Authority at least 30 – 45 business days in advance
to submit a company package in order for its employees to obtain Airport Security IDs. For
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detailed information on the process of obtaining an Airport Security ID can be found at
https://www.panynj.gov/airports/en/aviation-security/new-applicant-process.html
The issued Airport Security IDs are for construction project use only. The contractor and
subcontractor personnel shall not use their Airport Security ID at any other location on airport or
off airport outside of the construction site. The Port Authority’s security auditors and inspectors
randomly check for the proper use of Airport Security IDs.
10.2.3. Project Security Guard Plan
The purpose of the Project Security Guard Plan is to prepare, maintain and update detailed
security guard and security escort work plans and schedules. These plans must be submitted at
least thirty (30) days in advance of each construction stage. The security escort work plan shall
be sufficiently detailed to accurately depict all coverage as specified in Port Authority form:
AIRPORT CONTRACTOR SECURITY, TOOL MANAGEMENT AND ESCORT
RESPONSIBILITIES - “Security Guard Posting Staff Requirements” and “Construction Site
Access Control Physical Requirements” and shall graphically represent the logical sequence and
duration of activities, all in accordance with the requirements of the contract. In addition, the
contractor shall provide site-specific post orders for each post to all guard companies being
employed at the site. The security contractor must acknowledge receipt such orders and ensure
all staff are aware. They shall also provide have proof of acknowledgement to the Port Authority.
10.2.4. Radios/Two Way Communication
Contractor shall furnish to each person assigned to a security post within the project site, including
all supervisors and relief personnel, a portable two-way radio voice communication equipment
capable of adequate communications throughout the airport including antennas, power supplies,
batteries, distributed antenna systems where applicable, and other associated equipment, with
no less than two (2) distinct frequencies, unless otherwise directed by the PANYNJ. The
equipment shall have an eight (8) hour Uninterrupted Power Source (UPS). It shall have a
separate Distributed Antenna System (Public DAS), not on shared DAS. This equipment must be
maintained in good repair and operating condition as long as it is in use. Contractor shall supply
additional handsets for the Port Authority personnel’s use to maintain contact with project security
personnel as necessary.
10.2.5. Admittance to Construction Site
Contractor’s personnel and vehicles may be required to enter the construction site through a
secured vehicle guard post at all times, unless otherwise authorized. Contractor’s personnel and
vehicles must remain within the construction site at all times during shift activity. Authority auditors
and inspectors will randomly inspect and monitor the construction site and other airport areas.
Violations will result in confiscation of Airport Security ID and loss of privilege to work on the
contract and in any restricted area of a Port Authority airport.
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10.2.6. Construction Site Access Control
The Port Authority may provide for construction site access control, inspection and monitoring by
security guards retained by the Port Authority at the contractor’s cost. However, this provision
shall not relieve the contractor of its responsibility to properly obtain security guards to secure
equipment and work at the construction site at its own expense, as stated in the Project Security
Guard Plan.
The Project Security Guard Plan must contain specific requirements for the qualifications,
performance, uniforms and equipment, static and mobile posts, and reporting responsibilities. The
plan includes requirements for both security guards and security guard supervisors and their
staffing levels.
10.2.7. Security Guard Posting Staffing Requirements
Security Guard Posting Requirements
Contractors shall be required to utilize Port Authority security contractor staff for access to airside
construction sites. The cost for these services shall be directly reimbursable to the vendor by the
construction contractor.
Haul Route Security Guards
A “Haul Route” shall be a pre-approved path on the Secured, or SIDA Area, clearly delineated as
the Project Security Plan, where non-Port Authority plated construction vehicles may traverse
from a secure access point as indicated in the approved PSP to a defined construction site under
escort. Haul route security guards shall ensure all vehicles travel within the designated route as
shown in the approved PSP. One security guard shall be posted at a minimum of every 500 feet,
provided a clear line-of-sight exists between each security guard.
Work Zone Security Guards
Work zone security guards will generally be deployed in a pre-determined configuration and
security function as follows:
• Entrance and Exit: A security guard shall be posted at all work site/area entrances and
exits and shall be responsible for ensuring vehicles and/or personnel do not leave the area
without a contractor provided DR1 or an Authority provided DR2 security escort (as
necessary).
• Perimeter Security Guards: Perimeter security guards shall be posted when a
construction area is defined by low mass barrier. Security guards along the perimeter of
the work area shall be spaced no more than 100 feet apart or shall be in accordance with
the “Site Security Guards”.
• Site Security Guards: Any work areas within the AOA that are occupied by construction
personnel shall be guarded as a 1:5 (One (1) security guard per five (5) contractor
personnel) ratio and work for areas no greater than 100 feet by 100 feet.
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Construction Site Access Control Physical Requirements
All construction areas shall be delineated and protected at all times with barriers and/or
barricades. Portions of construction areas, as directed by the Port Authority, including within 600
feet of active runways and/or night work only areas, must be delineated with continuous Low Mass
Barriers (LMBs) and protected with guards positioned as required. All other construction areas,
must be protected and delineated at all times with barricades consisting of a temporary Jersey
barrier with nine-foot-high chain link fence, including barbed wire, as detailed on contract
drawings.
All entry and exit points within the guarded work perimeter shall be secured and monitored at all
times by contractor provided security guards in combination with barriers and/or barricades. The
contractor shall provide area work access control, inspection and monitoring by its retained
security guards.
10.2.8. Surveillance Video Design Methodology
In 2019 the federal government restricted use of technology that pose high cyber security risk,
and those originating from Chinese manufacturers. The current list of banned/restricted cameras
can be found on the Department of Homeland Security website. Camera makes and model
information proposed for installation at any PA facility will require approval from the OCSO.
Video surveillance cameras, in addition to meeting the minimum requirements listed by type
below, should be capable of at least 1080p HD (1920x1080 at 30 frames per second), IP-
addressable, and PoE unless specific conditions require otherwise.
a. Classification Surveillance: Classification video shall enable the operator to detect that
an object or person is in the video scene. Images of the intended target shall provide
information about where the target goes and comes from, the number of objects in a
scene, and other general information.
i. Minimum pixels on target: 15 pixels per foot
ii. Live video monitoring frame rate: 30 frames per second
iii. Minimum recording frame rate: 10 images per second
b. Recognition Surveillance: Recognition video shall enable the operator to recognize or
establish the type of object or defining features of an individual. Images of the intended
target will provide information about the types of clothing, skin tone, height, weight, or
make/model of an object.
i. Minimum pixels on target: 30 pixels per foot
ii. Live video monitoring frame rate: 30 images per second
iii. Minimum recording frame rate: 15 images per second
c. Identification Surveillance: Identification video shall enable the operator to identify or
establish distinguishing and unique features of an object or the defining features of an
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individual. Images of the intended target will provide information about facial features or
make/model of an object.
i. Minimum pixels on target: 60 pixels per foot
ii. Live video monitoring frame rate: 30 images per second
iii. Minimum recording frame rate: 15 images per second
d. Special Purpose Surveillance: Special purpose surveillance provides specific, object-
based video surveillance information as needed based on the facility’s requirements.
Special purpose cameras include, but are not limited to, dedicated license plate
recognition, automatic facial recognition systems, thermal-perimeter protections
systems, and others. The minimum requirements for these systems shall match the
needs of the system being installed.
i. Minimum pixels on target: as per manufacturer specifications and technological
limitations
ii. Live video frame rate: as per manufacturer specifications and technological
limitations
iii. Recorded video frame rate: as per manufacturer specifications and technological
limitations.
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11. ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
AAR After Action Reports
ACS Access Control Systems
ADA Americans with Disabilities Act
AIT Advanced Imaging Technology
ALPR Automated License Plate Recognition
AOA Air Operations Area
AOC Airport Operations Center
API’s Application Programming Interfaces
ASC Airport Security Coordinator
ASM Airport Security Manager
ASP Airport Security Program
ATSP Airport Tenant Security Program
AVS Alternate Viewing Station
BLS Bottle Liquid Scanner
BOH Back of House
CBA Cost Benefit Analysis
CBP Customs and Border Patrol
CBRNE Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear & Explosive
CCSP Certified Cargo Screening Program
DAS Distributed Antenna System
CDG Checkpoint Design Guide
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CHRC Criminal History Records Check
CMS Changeable Message Signs
ConOps Concept of Operations
CP Command Post
CPI Confidential Privileged Information
CPTED Crime Prevention through Environmental Design
CSO Chief Security Officer
DBT Design-Basis Threat
EAA Exclusive Area Agreement
ECMNS Emergency Communications/Mass Notification Systems
EMS Emergency Medical Services
EOC Emergency Operations Center
EOR Engineer-of-Record
ETD Explosives Trace Detection
EWR Newark Liberty International Airport
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
FBO Fixed Base Operators
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FSD Federal Security Director
FIS Federal Inspection Services
GDS Gunshot Detection System
GSR Ground Surveillance Radar
HVAC Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning
IED Improvised Explosive Device
ISA Initial Security Assessment
IP Internet Protocol
IT Information Technology
ITS Intelligent Transportation Systems
JFK John F. Kennedy International Airport
LEO Law Enforcement Officer
LGA LaGuardia Airport
LPR License Plate Reader
OCSO Office of the Chief Security Officer
PA Public Address
PANYNJ Port Authority of NY & NJ
PAPD Port Authority Police Department
PARAS Program for Applied Research in Airport Security
PDN Protective Design Narrative
PIDS Perimeter Intrusion Detection Systems
PIRF Port Authority Project Initiation Report Form
PMO Project Management Office
PoE Power over Ethernet
PSIM Physical Security Information Management
PSLS Public Safety Life Safety
PSP Project Security Plan
PTZ Pan-Tilt-Zoom
PTZR Pan-Tilt-Zoom-Rotate
SEOC Security & Emergency Operations Center
SDK Software Development Kit
SDS Shooter Detection System (Brand of GDS)
SIDA Security Identification Display Areas
SIM Security Information Manager
SME Subject Matter Experts
SOC Security Operations Center
SOP Standard Operating Procedure
SPC Security Performance Criteria
SPM Security Planning Manual
SSCP Passenger Security Screening Checkpoint
STA Security Threat Assessment
SWAC Secure Worker Access Consortium
SWF New York Stewart International Airport
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TAA Tenant Alteration Application
TEB Teterboro Airport
TDC Travel Document Checker
TRB Transportation Research Board
TSA Transportation Security Administration
TSO Transportation Security Officer
UPS Uninterrupted Power Source
VMD Video Motion Detection
VMDT Video Motion Detection Tracking
VMS Variable Message Sign
VMS Video Management System
VSS Video Surveillance System
WTMD Walk Through Metal Detector
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12. REFERENCES
1. Security Planning Guideline: Guideline for Security Classification, Planning and Design
at Project Inception for Port Authority and Tenant Projects
https://paenet.panynj.gov/ocso/pdf/guideline-statement-security-planning-design.pdf
2. Port Authority Airport Planning Standards Version 3, September 2018
https://www.panynj.gov/content/dam/port-authority/pdfs/-available-engineering-
documents/panynj-terminal-planning-guidelines.pdf
3. The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey Information Security Handbook,
Revised April 2018
https://www.panynj.gov/content/dam/port-authority/pdfs/vendor-
resources/Corporate-Information-Security-Handbook.pdf
4. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey Airport Contractor Security, Tool Management
and Escort Responsibilities (Revised 6-19-2018)
https://www.panynj.gov/airports/en/aviation-security/ecscort-rules-procedures.html
5. The Port Authority Of New York And New Jersey Airport Rules & Regulations, July 2022
https://www.panynj.gov/content/dam/airports/pdfs/Airport_Rules_Regs_7_27_22.pdf
6. Port Authority Wayfinding Manual, July 2020 https://wayfinding.panynj.gov/
7. Guidance for Filtration and Air-Cleaning Systems to Protect Building Environments from
Airborne Chemical, Biological, or Radiological Attack (Published by US CDC, April 2003)
https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docs/2003-136/pdfs/2003-136.pdf
8. Port Authority of NY & NJ Standard Security Galvanized Steel Chain Link Fence
Standard Drawings.
https://enet.panynj.gov/ocso/pdf/standard-details-for-security-chain-
link-fence.pdf
9. Recommended Security Guidelines for Airport Planning, Design, and Construction 157,
PARAS 0004, February 2021.
https://www.sskies.org/images/uploads/subpage/PARAS_0028.Recommended_Security
_Guidelines_.FinalReport_.pdf
10. TSA Checkpoint Design Guide (CDG), June 2016
https://files.constantcontact.com/8c363cd8001/f070043f-495f-42bf-99b4-
d1688c57e199.pdf
11. TSA issues new cybersecurity requirements for airport and aircraft operators, National
Press Release Tuesday, March 7, 2023.
https://www.tsa.gov/news/press/releases/2023/03/07/tsa-issues-new-cybersecurity-
requirements-airport-and-aircraft
12. TSA Recommended Security Guidelines for Airport Planning, Design & Construction,
June 2006
https://crp.trb.org/acrpwebresource2/tsa-recommended-security-guidelines-
for-airport-planning-design-and-construction/
