15
availability of alternative fiscal relief measures for corporations (e.g., direct grants of State aid). This is
consistent with the general pattern we find in Section 4 of what appears to be substitution between
credit and non-credit assistance. In France, the higher take-up of guaranteed loans may reflect the
favorable pricing offered to borrowers through grace periods and concessional rates, especially during
the first year of the loan. In Germany, the relatively limited use of such loans may be due to: (i) lower
financing needs of firms compared with other countries, owing to a less stringent lockdown and firms’
greater use of a combination of other policy measures that supported corporate balance sheets,
including direct grants and tax deferrals and short-time working allowances; (ii) less favorable lending
terms (e.g., higher rates, a prohibition on distributing dividends and limits on the remuneration of
managers); and (iii) some supply-side bottlenecks related to the risk assessment required for large loans.
On the loan supply side, operational bottlenecks and an overwhelming number of loan applications may
have impeded the take-up at the initial stage of the programs. Core and De Marco (2021) look at the
different levels of information technology used to process online applications by banks in Italy and
emphasize the role of information technology in processing high volumes of online applications and
disbursements. Over time, the take-up in Italy continued to increase, notwithstanding the existence of a
largescale debt moratorium scheme.
The terms of these credit programs varied along a variety of dimensions. To give a fairly typical example,
consider the UK Coronavirus Business Interruption Loan Scheme (CBILS), a guarantee program directed
at small and medium-sized businesses.
9
It provided loans ranging from 50,000 GBP to 5 million GBP,
with the available amounts depending on firm characteristics. Loan maturities ranged from 3 months to
6 years, and a variety of loan types were eligible to be guaranteed. Collateral was not required on most
loans. The program provided an 80% guarantee, with 20% of losses absorbed by the private sector
lenders. Lenders were charged an annual guarantee fee of 75 basis points. The government paid the first
12 months of interest and fees, up to a maximum of 800,000 GBP. Loan pricing was at the discretion of
lenders, but lenders had to demonstrate that the net financial advantage of the guarantee was passed
through to the borrower.
10
The program wound up authorizing 98,000 loans totaling 23.3 billion GBP.
Structurally, there were common elements across most credit guarantee programs. First, a program
specified the characteristics of target beneficiaries. In some programs, companies of all sizes were
eligible (e.g., Germany KfW, France PGE), while in others, only companies of certain sizes could
participate (e.g., UK CBILS vs. CLBILS). Second, program rules specify guarantee coverage, i.e., the share
of losses absorbed by the government in the event of a default. In the programs that we assess, the
guarantee coverage ranged from 70 percent to 100 percent.
11
Third, a program restricts other terms,
such as how interest rate(s) are set, loan maturities and eligible loan types (e.g., term or asset-backed
loans), and guarantee and other fees or premium. In some programs, interest rates were fixed by the
government (e.g., UK BBLS), and in others, lenders were permitted to set the rate but with a cap (Spain),
or subject to benefit pass-through (e.g., UK CBILS and France). For countries in the European Union,
9
Source: HM Treasury coronavirus (COVID-19) business loan scheme statistics - GOV.UK (www.gov.uk)
10
Although such requirements might not have been strictly adhered to in all cases, the considerable regulatory
oversight of the banking system and the adverse consequences of being found to have violated the rules provides
incentives for compliance. Anecdotal evidence suggests such rules were taken seriously.
11
The guarantees were typically pari passu, meaning that losses were shared proportionally between lenders and
the government.