Circuit Court for Caroline County

Case No. C-05-CV-19-000084

UNREPORTED

IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS

______________________________________

JASON B. STANTON

v.

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______________________________________

* This is an unreported opinion, and it may not be cited in any paper, brief, motion, or other

document filed in this Court or any other Maryland Court as either precedent within the

rule of stare decisis or as persuasive authority. Md. Rule 1-104.

This case arises out of a foreclosure proceeding that was complicated by the

COVID-19 pandemic. Jason Stanton’s home was sold at a foreclosure sale in March 2020.

In the time preceding the sale, Mr. Stanton says that he believed he was participating in a

loan modification plan, so he didn’t file any pre-sale objections and he contends that he

was unaware that his loan modification plan had been terminated by the servicer, NewRez.

Mr. Stanton then filed exceptions after the sale had been ratified. The trial court found that

the issues Mr. Stanton sought to raise as exceptions to the sale should have been raised as

pre-sale objections. Mr. Stanton appeals and we affirm.

detailed the timeline for foreclosure mediation and cautioned Mr. Stanton to continue

opening his mail. After an initial failed loan modification in 2018, the six individuals

assigned as trustees (the “Substitute Trustees”)

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filed an Order to Docket in the Circuit

Court for Caroline County in May 2019 that included, among other documents, a Notice

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The six Substitute Trustees are Thomas W. Hodge, Christine N. Johnson, Brennan

Ferguson, Jeana McMurray, Robert M. Oliveri, and Melissa Alcocer.

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received, the loss mitigation application should be completed and returned immediately.

The Final Loss Mitigation Affidavit filed in July 2019 stated that Mr. Stanton had not

applied for loan modification and thus had not been considered for a loan modification.

Mr. Stanton filed a timely application for Foreclosure Mediation, and on October

28, 2019, he and servicer, NewRez, entered into a loan modification trial period plan

(“PHH plan”). Under the PHH plan, Mr. Stanton was to make three payments of $1,377.42

to avoid a foreclosure sale. One section of the PHH plan stated payment was due on or

before November 1, 2019, December 1, 2019, and January 1, 2020. Another section stated

“[t]ime is of the [e]ssence,” and noted:

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There is no physical copy of this failed initial loan modification in the record.

However, there is the mailing from Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, which is listed in the

“Other” section of the Preliminary Loss Mitigation Affidavit, and Mr. Stanton

personally testified that there was a 2018 loan modification that did not go through due

to failure to make timely payments.

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It is difficult to determine from the record whether some of the same documents from

the July 2018 mailing were used in the July 2019 mailing, but any discrepancy isn’t

relevant to the issues before us here.

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His later payments came after the first day of the month, though: on December 30, 2019

for the month of December and January 31, 2020 for the month of January. These latter

two payments were made after the due date listed in the contract but were received by

NewRez in the month in which they were due. So on January 7, 2020, NewRez sent Mr.

Stanton a letter terminating the PHH plan because he failed to “make all of the required

Trial Period Plan payments by the end of the trial period.” Mr. Stanton testified he did not

receive this letter until the end of March 2020, but his last payment, made on February 28,

2020, was returned to him.

After NewRez terminated the PHH plan, the Substitute Trustees sent Mr. Stanton a

notice of foreclosure sale on February 18, 2020. Mr. Stanton confirmed that he received

March and April 2020. The notice stated that Mr. Stanton had until April 17, 2020 to file

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confusing and that he complied with his understanding of the contract language. He

contended that because he believed was complying with the terms, NewRez wrongfully

terminated his PHH plan and the foreclosure should not have been allowed to proceed.

The trial court denied Mr. Stanton’s exceptions on the ground that the defenses he

sought to raise should have been raised before the sale under Maryland Rule 4-211. The

trial court found that Mr. Stanton’s exceptions were known to him and ripe before the sale,

and because he didn’t raise them at the appropriate time, they were overruled.

Mr. Stanton filed a timely notice of appeal. Four Gems Real Estate, LLC (“Four

Gems”), the current owner of the Property, filed a Motion to Intervene, arguing that it

should be permitted to intervene as an appellee because “[w]hen it purchased the Property,

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Mr. Stanton raises one issue on appeal: he argues that the circuit court erred in

denying the exceptions on the grounds that they weren’t timely.

offer two responses that proffer different notions of timeliness: first, they argue that the

exceptions filed after the ratification were an untimely motion to reconsider, and second,

they argue that the circuit court did not err in denying Mr. Stanton’s exceptions since the

exceptions should have been filed before ratification of the sale. Four Gems also responds

with two arguments: first, they argue that Mr. Stanton’s exceptions were not timely filed

The Substitute Trustees phrased their Questions Presented as follows:

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to a foreclosure sale . . . trial courts may consider both questions of fact and law.” Jones v.

Rosenberg, 178 Md. App. 54, 68 (2008) (internal citation omitted). We do not set aside the

factual findings of the trial court unless “clearly erroneous,” and “will give due regard to

the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” Md. Rule

8-131(c). We review a trial court’s legal conclusions de novo. Jones, 178 Md. App. at 68.

A. Mr. Stanton’s Exceptions Were Timely.

We start with the temporal timeliness argument: the Substitute Trustees and Four

Gems argue that Mr. Stanton failed to file his exceptions by the deadline prescribed in the

Maryland Rules.

Usually, exceptions must be filed within thirty days after the date of

notice of a foreclosure sale. Md. Rule 14-305(e)(1). The Notice of Sale was issued on

The Substitute Trustees characterize Mr. Stanton’s exceptions as a motion to

reconsider under Maryland Rule 2-533, and peg their timeliness argument to that. But

we generally don’t decide non-jurisdictional issues unless they “plainly [appear] by the

record” to have been raised by the trial court. Md. Rule 8-131(a). And “when a party

raises the issue of standing on appeal, [we] need not decide the issue if it was not raised

and decided by the circuit court.” Granados v. Nadel, 220 Md. App. 482, 499 (2014)

(internal citations omitted). We see no evidence in the record indicating that this

argument was raised in the circuit court, though, and we decline to take it up here in the

first instance.

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on exceptions as though they were timely.

Second, Mr. Stanton’s exceptions ultimately were timely under these

pandemic-infected circumstances. While these proceedings were ongoing, the COVID-19

pandemic suspended many court proceedings, including foreclosure proceedings. On

March 18, 2020, shortly after the notice of sale went out, the Court of Appeals released an

administrative order staying “[t]hose foreclosures of residential properties and foreclosures

of the rights of redemption of residential properties pending in the circuit courts[.]” Court

of Appeals of Maryland Administrative Order on Suspension of Foreclosures and Evictions

During the COVID-19 Emergency, at 2 (2020). The Substitute Trustees contend that

because the notice and sale were sent to Mr. Stanton and published, he was aware of the

COVID-19 Emergency of Foreclosures, Evictions, and Other Ejectments Involving

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B. The Circuit Court Did Not Err In Denying Mr. Stanton’s Exceptions.

Next, we address procedural timeliness. Mr. Stanton argues that the trial court erred

in finding that he was required to raise his defenses before the foreclosure sale rather than

after. Indeed, a foreclosure sale is presumed valid and the burden of proving otherwise rests

on the party contesting it. Hood v. Driscoll, 227 Md. App. 689, 696–97 (2016). And “a

homeowner/borrower ordinarily must assert known and ripe defenses to the conduct of a