FEAR, POLITICS, AND EBOLA
37ACLU • GHJP
tailored to that interest, because there are a number of alternatives to quarantine that are equally effective
at preventing the spread of Ebola, but that do not involve as severe a deprivation of individual liberty.
97
In
other words, states may not fight Ebola “by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when
the end can be more narrowly achieved.”
98
Courts do give some deference to public health authorities when the authorities ground their actions in
scientific evidence.
99
But such deference is not absolute: courts will strike down a public health policy that
implicates fundamental rights where the “real or substantial relation” between the means and the ends is
absent.
100
Under that doctrine, courts have struck down scientifically unjustified public health measures,
including quarantines. For example, one court invalidated a quarantine of an entire district in San Francisco,
finding it “unreasonable, unjust, and oppressive.”
101
The court relied on the affidavit of a medical professional
who testified that the quarantine was “unscientific.”
102
The court recognized that the quarantine was, for that
reason, “not a reasonable regulation to accomplish the purposes sought.”
103
The Ebola quarantines and restrictions on movement similarly contravened sound scientific evidence. Many
alternatives to quarantine would not have involved as severe a deprivation of liberty, and yet would have
been equally effective in combatting the spread of the disease. These alternatives included self-monitoring,
active monitoring, direct monitoring, and perhaps certain narrow and specific movement restrictions.
104
Because asymptomatic individuals cannot transmit Ebola, any or all of these less-restrictive alternatives
would have prevented the spread of Ebola.
The one court to consider the legality of an Ebola quarantine of an asymptomatic individual did so under a
97 See, e.g. id. at 28 (“[A]n acknowledged power of a local community to protect itself against an epidemic threatening the safety of all
might be exercised in particular circumstances and in reference to particular persons in such an arbitrary, unreasonable manner, or might go so
far beyond what was reasonably required for the safety of the public, as to authorize or compel the courts to interfere for the protection of such
persons.”).
98 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960); see also Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617, 623 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (“A statute sanctioning such
a drastic curtailment of the rights of citizens must be narrowly, even grudgingly, construed in order to avoid deprivations of liberty without due
process of law.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
99 See, e.g., Jacobson, 197 U.S. 11, 28 (1905) (noting that “the court would usurp the functions of another branch of government if it
adjudged, as matter of law, that the [smallpox vaccination] adopted under the sanction of the state, to protect the people at large was arbitrary, and
not justied by the necessities of the case.”).
100 See id. at 31 (“[I[f a statute purporting to have been enacted to protect the public health, the public morals, or the public safety, has no real
or substantial relation to those objects, or is, beyond all question, a plain, palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law, it is the duty
of the courts to so adjudge, and thereby give effect to the Constitution.”).
101 Jew Ho v. Williamson, 103 F. 10, 26 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1900).
102 Id. at 21 (“[D]efendants have proceeded from erroneous theories to still more erroneous and unscientic practices and methods of dealing
with the same; for, instead of quarantining the supposedly infected rooms or houses in which said deceased persons lived and died, and the
persons who had been brought in contact with and been directly exposed to said disease, said defendants have quarantined, and are now
maintaining a quarantine over, a large area of territory, and indiscriminately conning therein between ten and twenty thousand people, thereby
exposing, and they are now exposing, to the infection of the said disease said large number of persons.”) (Quoting afdavit of Dr. J. I. Stephen).
103 Id. at 23 (“The court cannot but see the practical question that is presented to it as to the ineffectiveness of this method of quarantine against
such a disease as this. So, upon that ground, the court must hold that this quarantine is not a reasonable regulation to accomplish the purposes
sought.”). Although there are few recent cases squarely addressing these issues, recent lower-court cases arising in different legal contexts have
found that segregation of asymptomatic individuals for tuberculosis does not meet a requirement of employing the least restrictive means. See,
e.g., Jihad v. Wright, 929 F. Supp. 325, 330–32 (N.D. Ind. 1996) (holding that prison ofcials should not have removed an inmate at risk of
developing active tuberculosis to a medical isolation unit because a less restrictive alternative would have been periodic testing to determine if the
inmate became capable of infecting others); Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 479–80 (2d Cir. 1996) (nding that prisoner’s connement was not
least restrictive means of protecting inmates from tuberculosis where prisoner was not contagious and could be monitored for the development of
active tuberculosis).
104 See CDC, Interim U.S. Guidance for Monitoring and Movement of Persons with Potential Ebola Virus Exposure (Dec. 24, 2014), http://
www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/exposure/monitoring-and-movement-of-persons-with-exposure.html.